Akwa Ibom’s dream of becoming an industrial powerhouse since the return of democracy in 1999 has been tepid. Thanks to avarice, corruption, and inefficiency that have plagued the political landscape, stalling initiatives that could promote economic prosperity, job creation, and an industrious future for the state. ENO-ABASI SUNDAY reports that, beyond petty politics, poor policy coordination, policy inconsistency, and project abandonment, the stark absence of a depoliticised industrial blueprint, and lawmakers’ docility are major enablers of the abhorrent practice of frittering away the people’s commonwealth, and failure to transform the economy away from oil dependency structurally.

Barely two years after Akwa Ibom State-based Jubilee Syringe ManufacturingAkwa Ibom State-based Jubilee Syringe Manufacturing (JSM) Company said that it would begin exporting syringes to Germany in 2021, it sadly announced that it was shutting down operations due to strangulating economic conditions.

Before the unfortunate announcement, JSM, owned by Onur Kumral, a Turkish national, was on the verge of doubling its production capacity from 400 million to 800 million and thereafter one billion by the end of 2022.

Specifically, the firm fingered high import duties on raw materials, high foreign exchange rate and high cost of power as mountains that proved too steep for it to climb.

As JSM joined the list of victims of harsh government policies, which wrought brutal consequences on the investing public, a father of three and an employee, who simply gave his name as Mr Akpan, said the announcement jolted him and his family to the marrow. “I earned decent pay while working in a very decent outfit. I loved my job and looked forward to resuming daily. Sadly, other colleagues and I were declared redundant,” he told The Guardian.

The syringe manufacturing is one of the major investments attracted to the state by the administration of the immediate past governor, Deacon Udom Gabriel Emmanuel.

Ikoedem Etim Usanga, a resident of Abak Road, Uyo Local Council, heaved a heavy sigh of relief when his younger sister, who had been unemployed for years, was offered employment at the AKEES Pencil and Toothpick Factory, then located at Kilometre One, Ekom Iman Road, in Uyo.

Barely two years into business, “my sister, who had become self-reliant, is back to square one and looking up to others for her upkeep,” he lamented.

The outfit, which was relocated to the Itam Industrial Park in Itu Local Council owing to a dispute over the ownership of the office space, is one of those cottage industries established as part of Emmanuel’s industrialisation programme.

Last month, the Akwa Ibom House of Assembly set up a panel to ascertain whether the St Gabriel Coconut Oil Factory is owned by the Akwa Ibom State Government or a private entity, as well as ascertain why hundreds of duly employed workers of the factory are being owed seven months’ salary arrears.

These scenarios above present a collage of extreme fortunes experienced by investors, employees, and key stakeholders, including the Akwa Ibom State, whose industrialisation programme over the years has been dogged by one scandal/crisis after another.

Chronology of failed industrialisation agendas
For context, the state’s economy is estimated to be worth approximately $19.25 billion based on its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a GDP (PPP) of $50.30 billion USD as far back as 2021. This economy is primarily driven by oil and gas, agriculture, and trade.

Created on September 29, 1987, the state inherited about 10 industries from the old Cross River State, with some of them ailing. All six military administrators that presided over it in infancy did little or nothing to improve its industrial skyline.

From Obong Akpan Isemin’s cameo appearance to Obong Victor Attah’s tenure, that of Godswill Obot Akpabio, Deacon Udom Gabriel Emmanuel, and the incumbent, Pastor Umo Bassey Eno, it’s been a mish-mash of efforts for civilian governors, which has left the state aeons away from being described as an industrialised state.

Given the fact that the hundreds of billions of naira so far expended do not translate into tangible, functioning assets, the inherent systemic corruption and financial leakage have left the state’s finances bleeding on several fronts.

Chief Sunday Afiko, a legal practitioner and principal partner at Afiko Sunday LP, is emphatic that the sustained inability of the state to revitalise and build upon the 10 inherited state-owned industrial establishments showcases institutional failure, and the detrimental interplay between corruption and rent-seeking politics in post-colonial economies.

In summarising the cumulative performance of the state’s industrialisation drive since 1999, he said that the state has not achieved a sustainable industrial revolution commensurate with the massive resources allocated.

He blamed this on major systemic issues- weak industrial base and poor performance; policy inconsistency/project abandonment and corruption, and a lack of accountability.”

Lamenting that the state has continued to be “overwhelmingly dependent on crude oil revenue, and not the internal productivity of its industrial sector, he noted that the state’s industrialisation models are heavily reliant on the government through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or PPPs, as the indigenous private sector has a weak industrial/manufacturing base with low capital content. This reliance on the state often makes these projects politically rather than economically driven…”

Afiko stressed that after Attah, the “entire approach shifted dramatically – from infrastructure-first (Akpabio) to direct industry creation (Emmanuel) without a unifying long-term, depoliticised industrial blueprint. Also, the consistent appearance of high-profile corruption allegations tied to industrial projects under Attah, Akpabio, and Emmanuel suggests that a significant portion of the allocated billions is lost to misappropriation.

Attah’s trailblazing, foundational steps from 1999-2007
UPON coming on board on May 29, 1999, Attah, the second civilian governor, promised to revive viable existing industries, establish industrial parks for the siting of new industries in clusters, and explore chances of local and foreign partnerships.

His administration established the Akwa Ibom Industrial and Investment Council (AKIPOC) to ensure industrial promotion, carry out privatisation and business re-engineering. It also outlined programmes and policies to stimulate industrial development, including the establishment of the first set of industrial estates in Uyo, Ikot Abasi and Essien Udim, for which the sum of N100m was set aside for their accomplishment.

Attah’s government, which also established the state industrial fund to mobilise resources to support private sector initiatives, initiated the Ibom Power Plant (gas sector investment), conceptualised projects like the Ibom Airport, Ibom Science Park, Ibom Deep Seaport, a cement factory, and the Amakpe Refinery, which the government invested $10 million into (despite it being private sector-driven), only to seek the withdrawal of its 25 per cent equity from the investment not long before leaving office.

Most Attah-era industrial projects did not progress beyond the conceptual or feasibility stage, and only a few of them saw the light of day despite being credited as those who set up the state for prosperity.

Upon leaving office, he was a guest of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), where he answered questions bordering on corruption allegations and abuse of office, including bypassing due process and inflated contracts for projects like the Ibom Power Plant and Ibom Airport.
Akpabio’s ‘uncommon transformation’ excluded ‘real industrialisation’

AKPABIO, who assumed office on May 29, 2007, continued and completed some major infrastructure projects like the Victor Attah International Airport and an unprecedented number of new roads initiated by Attah.

Akpabio spent 2007-2015 focusing largely on infrastructure development. On September 22, 2010, while declaring his intention to seek re-election on the platform of the PDP, he promised to focus on industrialisation if re-elected.

This was to be done via the establishment of Ibom Industrial City, which was expected to be a sustainable industrial city with schools, hospitals, shopping malls, and hotels.

“We look forward to the construction of Ibom Industrial City. The Ibom Industrial City will be an industrial mix of oil and gas-based support services, dockyard and watercraft repair facilities, fertiliser plant, oil refinery, gas-to-liquid projects, petrochemical industries, power plant, deep seaport, among others,” he explained, adding that his administration will establish at least one cottage industry in each of the 31 local councils of the state before he left office.

Today, his industries are audio projects, as there are no records of him establishing any real industry until he left office. The Tropicana Entertainment Centre, which his government partnered with a private concern to erect, was abandoned uncompleted despite his government pumping over N65 million of the state’s resources into it.

Questions are also still being asked about the N20 billion that Akpabio provided in the 2012 budget for industrialisation. Based on official data from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and NEITI, Akwa Ibom under Akpabio (2007-2015) received N1.93 trillion. Given its oil-producing status (13% derivation), it got the second-highest allocation after Rivers State. Its annual average from FAAC was N241.2 billion.

From Internally Generated Revenue (IGR), the state earned N132.3 billion within the period under review. Its annual average stood at N14.7 billion.
Cumulatively, the total revenue (FAAC and IGR) that accrued to the state under Akpabio was over N2.06 trillion.

To date, Akpabio, the 15th President of the Senate, still has a multitude of questions to answer over his unkept promise of industrialising the state, and where earmarked funds were lodged. Akpabio’s failure to account for the billions that his administration budgeted for some projects, as well as the management of N108 billion while in office led the EFCC to question him as a member of the opposition.

But since joining the All Progressives Congress (APC), Akpabio has continued to blossom politically, while the people of the state are yet to get justice for their unaccounted resources, despite the EFCC telling The Guardian that Akpabio has questions to answer.

Emmanuel’s encouraging start, mixed grill finish
ARMED with his five-point agenda, Akpabio’s recommended successor, Udom Emmanuel, served notice early about his government’s drive to industrialise the state.

In the months and years that followed, the administration, through direct investment in manufacturing and Public Private Partnership (PPP), created an industrial hub that comprised Greenwell Fertiliser Blending Company, Lion Plywood and Timber Factory, Ibom Agricon Rice Processing Mill, Metering Solutions Factory, and St. Gabriel Coconut Oil Factory.

While Emmanuel’s administration designated Mkpat Enin, Ikot Abasi, Eastern Obolo and Onna local councils as an industrial estate for the state owing to their proximity to the Ibom Power Plant, in a move that many allege smacks of nepotism, three of the nine industries established – Jubilee Syringe Manufacturing Company, Metering Solutions Factory, and Kings Flour Mill, were all established in Emmanuel’s hometown of Awa Iman, and Okat, both in his in Onna Local Council.

Even though the state has never had it so good as far as industrialisation efforts are concerned, some of the industries were either suffering from “paternity issues” or encumbered by harsh government policies, even as many saw them as products of political and not economic considerations, a development that threatens their existence.

At the height of Emmanuel’s feud with his estranged godfather, Senator Akpabio, the latter claimed that supporting Emmanuel to emerge as governor in 2015 was a mistake, which must be corrected in 2019.

But Emmanuel responded spectacularly through his thenCommissioner for Information, Mr Charles Udoh, accusing Akpabio of corruption, mortgaging his conscience and trying to hoodwink the people of the state.

Emmanuel said that Akpabio spent eight years as commissioner under Obong Attah and another eight years as governor at the height of the state’s income receipts from the federal level, yet he couldn’t complete the Uyo-Ikot Ekpene Road (the road to his village) despite appropriating almost all the sums budgeted for it.

The statement apart from accusing Akpabio of commissioning uncompleted projects, emphasised: “Governor Emmanuel has, as of today, facilitated the setting up of more than nine industries in just three years; Akpabio spent eight years with zero industry.”

Of all of Emmanuel’s era businesses, Ibom Air has not only survived the notoriously turbulent Nigerian aviation sector, but also made its way to high altitude, where it has since steadied flight and glided gracefully.

The Meter Solutions Manufacturing Services Limited, one of the industries attracted to the state by the Emmanuel-led administration, is producing up to 3.6 million smart metres annually, which are supplied locally and internationally.

The Greenwell Fertiliser Blending Company, Abak, which the state government has an interest in, is another Emmanuel-era outfit that is doing well.
Conversely, the specific operational scales and financial contributions to the state’s IGR of some of the existing and commissioned industries are suspect, or not always transparently quantifiable, hence making a definitive assessment of their success a difficult task.

That said, other high-profile projects have been grounded or are facing viability questions, lending credence to the critique of a lack of long-term economic sustainability.

For instance, JSM, once hailed as the largest of its kind in Africa, now symbolises a setback. Its temporary closure and placing of all positions on redundancy, effective January 2024, points to the harsh realities of the challenging business environment, including issues like high operating costs, infrastructure deficits, and potentially, market penetration difficulties.

If the shutting down of the toothpick and pencil factories in the Dakkada Cottage Industries was preceded by a wave of controversies, including ownership and product quality and branding, the St. Gabriel Coconut Oil Factory’s viability remains highly contested.

Inaugurated in 2022, it was intended to leverage the state’s vast agricultural potential. However, accusations of poor planning, questionable soil quality for the accompanying 11,000-hectare plantation, and unverified operational status post-inauguration suggest a project that may have failed to move beyond the commissioning stage to genuine commercial production.

This struggle further highlights the perennial challenge of moving from ceremonial project launch to sustainable agro-industrial enterprise. According to indexmundi.com (a data portal that collects and organises country-level facts and statistics from multiple sources, presenting them through user-friendly maps, charts, and comparisons), a metric ton of coconut oil is currently priced between $2,855 and $2,952.50, with global prices nearing $3,000/MT.

This means that the 24,090 metric tonnes, which the factory ought to produce yearly, would have fetched the state $68,771,550 yearly.The Guardian’s observation of the poor state of some of the two million hybrid coconut trees planted on 11,000 hectares across several local councils indicates that if the coconut factory depends on coconut from what is touted as the largest coconut plantation in Africa, it could be without raw materials for a few more years, thereby defeating the factory’s essence.

Afiko agrees, saying that the first and most critical failure of the coconut factory lies in the compromised integrity of the project’s foundation: the selection of the 11,000-hectare plantation site. While public critics suggest a complete absence of soil tests, independent academic evaluations, Afiko said, confirm the inherent unsuitability of the chosen land for optimal coconut cultivation. Agronomic analyses of the designated areas revealed soils overwhelmingly dominated by a sandy fraction, resulting in critically low fertility indicators, notably a diminished Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC) and poor buffering capacity.

“A project of such scale, intended to provide raw material security for a multi-billion-naira processing facility, necessitates rigorous geo-technical and pedological due diligence. The establishment of the plantation on land possessing such intrinsic limitations suggests a profound failure in project conceptualisation, where political expedience evidently superseded scientific viability.

ARISE Agenda … High on consolidation, low on industrialisation
SINCE getting into the saddle in May 2023, Governor Eno has spoken glowingly of his strategy for turning around and industrialising the state as encapsulated in his governance blueprint – the ARISE Agenda, which goes thus: Agriculture, Rural development, Infrastructure, Security, and Education.

Through the ARISE Agenda, his government will focus on, among other things, reviving existing projects, leveraging the state’s gas resources, and promoting entrepreneurship, including making the Ibom Industrial Park functional, developing gas infrastructure for projects like methanol and fertiliser plants, and supporting local businesses through the ARISE MSME Grant.

Asked to shed light on the ARISE Agenda as in concerns industrialisation; present state of industries in the state, especially the new ones that stopped operations, as well as give definite timelines when they would recommence operations, the state commissioner for Trade and Investment, Capt Iniobong Ekong declined, insisting that he was in the process of documentation and stocktaking hence has no comment to make yet.
‘Much-trumpeted industrialisation drive a ruse’

BOTH Dr Iboro Nelson, a development economist, and Mathew Koffi Okono, the Founder, Open Forum Care for Humanity Foundation, are united in their submissions that the much-talked-about industrialisation of the state is at best a ruse.

Said Nelson: “My assessment of the industrialisation drive of the state is abysmal failure, and my assessment is predicated upon the fact that there have been disjointed policies of industrialisation in the state.

According to her, after Obong Attah began with revamping moribund industries and taking steps to start other industries, Akpabio was expected to continue revamping the remaining ones, or privatise them where possible.

“However, Deacon Udom Emmanuel had noble thoughts of industrialising, but his method was outright faulty. In this age and time, governments globally do not run businesses, but rather they buy equity in private ventures, which is what we had expected. Thanks to him for the Ibom Airline, but I think it is the approach to the industrialisation efforts that failed and should be revisited.

Okono, popularly known as Citizen MKO, alleged that a particular company that came as a civil construction firm ended up becoming the name behind a number of industries in the state.

“Things got suspicious when the Emmanuel-led administration started parading privately owned investments as state government industries/projects. Questions on government equity participations have not been answered to date. Curiously, however, within the first four years in office, some of the ‘industries’ attracted by Emmanuel had folded up, and at the end of his tenure, those who said that his ‘industrialisation agenda was a scam’ are celebrating their emergence as modern-day Nostradamus.

“The monumental failure of the industrialisation agenda that lacked a blueprint and transparency shall remain one of the worst calamities to befall Akwa Ibom State. Only a forensic audit of the episode will correct the anomaly to recover the people’s resources, salvage and reposition whatever is left from the locust years,” he said.

High mortality of state-owned, state-affiliated industries as a disincentive to FDIs
ASKED how much of a disincentive it is to attract foreign direct investment when state-owned or state-affiliated outfits close shop routinely, Dr Nelson, who is also a public policy analyst, responded thus: “It is a disincentive to the extent that it prevents and discourages other investors from taking up the space. It is also symptomatic of deep and unrestrained corruption because if, within the same system, private businesses thrive no matter how small, it is also expected that government-owned businesses should excel too and not excelling speaks volumes of the foundation upon which they were established.”

“The consequences of the collapse of state-run producing companies/industries on the people are numerous and dire, but generally speaking, it is the direct reason why we are where we are as a people; underdeveloped as a country. Other consequences are the high youth unemployment, over-reliance on the share of our resources, continued strain on available foreign exchange to meet imports to satisfy our craving for foreign goods, slow economic growth, among several others.

Lax accountability, docile Assembly imperil state’s industrialisation drive
AS reports filtered out last month that the Akwa Ibom House of Assembly (AKHA) was probing Emmanuel’s tenure in office, as well as the ownership of St Gabriel Coconut Oil Factory, JSM, Kings Flour Mills, and the plywood company, interest groups went to town, cautioning against selective investigation.

Pronto, the lawmakers released a statement denying any such move, while insisting that the reports “lacked factual basis.”
“The Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly wishes to state categorically that there is no scintilla of truth in the publication, in content and intent…” the assembly said in a recent statement signed by the Deputy Speaker, Kufre-Abasi Edidem.

This notwithstanding, many believe that considering the functionality level and mortality rate of the new industries, the assembly must put the executive’s feet to the fire on behalf of the 7.2 million people of the state.

For Dr Nelson: “We have lost and will continue to lose so much until we demand accountability. Even at that, accountable institutions like the state House of Assembly cannot initiate such investigations; the media is gagged, and the civil society is deliberately fractionalised, kept poor and made to be sycophants, singing the praises of the people in power, completely diverted from the main issues. Without word-mincing, Afiko insists that the AKHA is highly complicit in the apparent failure to account for billions of naira budgeted for industrialisation under Governor Godswill Akpabio’s administration (2007-2015). This complicity stems primarily from the legislative body’s alleged failure to effectively exercise its constitutional oversight function and a systemic issue of executive dominance over the legislature in the Nigerian political context.