The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has identified betting platforms, fintech platforms, the use of wire transfers and crypto exchanges, and spare part businesses, among others, as channels used in moving proceeds of Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) in and out of the country.

Other channels include livestock, the use of cash in moving KFR, the use of bank accounts, and the use of formal and informal sectors.

Although the names of the platforms, businesses, and individuals were not disclosed by the NFIU, alphabetical representation described the ugly trend inside the analysis.

This development was contained in the NFIU’s analysis of typologies for money laundering through KFR in Nigeria, where it affirmed that Nigeria has strong laws at both federal and state levels, along with counter-terrorism and money laundering regulations, to address the issue of kidnapping for ransom.

The analysis read in part: “A betting platform, Platform X, filed a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) with the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) concerning a customer identified as Customer A.

“Customer A is a 24-year-old male residing in Bwari, Abuja. He received a sum of N351,000 in his betting wallet, which was ransom money paid by the families of a kidnap victim. The payment was instructed to be deposited into the betting wallet.

“After receiving the funds, Customer A attempted to transfer the money to his bank account at Bank A, but the platform declined the transaction.

“The NFIU reviewed the STR and forwarded the intelligence report to a law enforcement agency for further investigation.

“A law enforcement agency made a request for information to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) on a subject herein referred to as Mr. A, who is said to have received ransom on a kidnap victim via his account on Fintech Platform A.

“NFIU analysis revealed that, upon receiving the funds in his fintech account, Mr. A went ahead to transfer the funds of the kidnapped individual’s ransom to a number of individuals through conventional bank accounts in smaller tranches.

“The NFIU analysed the request and disseminated the intelligence report to the requesting LEA for further investigation.

“A law enforcement agency (LEA) requested information from NFIU regarding Point of Sale (POS) transactions linked to a kidnap-for-ransom case.

“A victim was kidnapped, and a ransom of N200,000 was paid into his account. The kidnappers withdrew the funds via POS terminals in smaller tranches to multiple fintech accounts.

“The victim was killed after the ransom payment. NFIU flagged the transactions and placed Post No Debit (PND) restrictions on the accounts receiving suspicious payments.

“The NFIU received a request from a local law enforcement agency (LEA) investigating the kidnap of a subject, Mr. X, a Nigerian, in which a ransom was demanded to be paid into the account of Miss UX in an Asian country.

“The LEA requested the NFIU to reach out to its counterpart FIU in the Asian country for further information. The FIU in the Asian country reported that the total ransom amount sent from Nigeria was withdrawn in cash.

“Notably, before this transaction occurred, the account holder who received the ransom had previously engaged in transactions with individuals identifying as having Nigerian names.

“The NFIU checked these names in its database and found positive matches. Further analysis revealed that the identified individual had received funds nearing the ransom amount from a cryptocurrency exchanger three days after the ransom was initially sent from Nigeria.

“The NFIU forwarded these findings to the LEA for further investigation.

“Following a recent kidnapping incident involving several individuals, the Commissioner of Police ordered a joint special operation.

“This operation included the Anti-Kidnapping Unit, collaborating with the Brigade of Guards from the Nigerian Army, the Department of State Services (DSS), and local vigilantes.

“They targeted the kidnappers’ hideouts in Gidan Dogo Forest and Kweri Forest in Kaduna State, as well as Gauraka Hills in Niger State, successfully dislodging the bandit camps.

“During the operation, intelligence gathering led to the arrest of several suspects, including bandits, informants, and logistics suppliers at their hideouts and residences.

“The team dismantled all bandit camps in Gidan Dogo Forest, Kweri Forest, and Gauraka Hills, recovering various exhibits including police and military camouflage, three jungle hats, 14 cows, and three Point of Sale (POS) machines.

“Acting on intelligence, the team arrested two suspects along the Gida Dogon route while they were en route to supply foodstuffs to the bandits. They also apprehended a wanted informant and logistics supplier for the bandits, recovering N810,000 in cash.

“Additionally, the team conducted operations in Guto Village in the Bwari Area Council, Mpape Daji Village via Kagarko in Kaduna State, and Tafa Daji Village in Niger State, resulting in the arrest of three more suspects.

“Investigation efforts extended to Sabon Gari Bwari, leading to the apprehension of two additional suspects for supplying dangerous drugs and food to the bandits.

“A raid at the market resulted in the arrest of eight male suspects believed to be connected to the bandits. The team also conducted searches in various houses and hideouts linked to the suspected bandits to apprehend them.

“The joint team is maintaining active patrols along identified routes and hideouts, implementing proactive measures to address the threat, and continuing rescue operations to locate and free hostages in custody.”

According to the intelligence unit, despite the existing laws, the practice continues to thrive in the country, revealing that, since 2019, there have been 735 mass abductions in Nigeria, with 3,620 people abducted in 582 kidnapping cases between July 2022 and June 2023.

It further revealed that an estimated N5 billion ($3,878,390) was paid in ransoms during this period, maintaining that to effectively combat these issues, it is essential to track the financial transactions of those involved in these activities.

This, the agency noted, requires a coordinated effort involving financial regulators, other financial institutions, non-financial businesses, security agencies, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the judiciary to ensure the detection, investigation, and conviction of the individuals responsible for these crimes.

On the geographical heatmap for kidnapping and hostage keeping in Nigeria, the NFIU noted: “According to the DIA respondent, the most vulnerable states for kidnapping for ransom are classified into Northern and Southern regions.

“States identified in the Northern region include Kaduna, Zamfara, Katsina, Niger, Kogi, and Borno, while states in the Southern part are Ondo, Rivers, Delta, Imo, and Edo.

“The respondent also identified the most abused routes for kidnapping for ransom in and out of Nigeria according to regions: Northern region – Zamfara, Sokoto, Gusau road, Katsina–Birnin Kebbi road, Kaduna–Abuja road, Niger–Abuja, Abuja–Lokoja highway.

Southern states – Benin–Lagos highway, Port Harcourt–Owerri road, Enugu–Onitsha, Ibadan–Lagos, Ibadan–Ilorin highway.

“Based on DIA experiences, the modes of transporting hostages for kidnapping for ransom in and out of Nigeria are the use of motorcycles through densely forested areas and the use of vehicles through forested areas that provide cover and concealment.

“Additionally, the modes and techniques of hiding hostages include the use of isolated houses within a village or community, isolated motels, built-up areas at night for safekeeping, and criminal caves that are difficult to penetrate.

“According to Nigerian Police Force respondents, Niger, Imo, Kaduna, Anambra, FCT, Kogi, Katsina, Zamfara, Rivers, Delta, Borno, and Yobe are the most vulnerable states for kidnapping for ransom.

“The modes of transporting hostages for kidnapping for ransom in and out of Nigeria, based on NPF experiences, are via illegal porous land borders. The modes and techniques of hiding hostages identified include deeply forested regions, especially abandoned forest reserves.

“Respondents from NFIU stated that Kaduna, Niger, Kano, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba are the most vulnerable states for kidnapping for ransom. The most abused routes, according to NFIU, are Abuja–Kaduna, Zaria to Funtua, Abuja–Mina, Zamfara–Sokoto, Okene/Benin, Kaduna/Abuja, Kaduna/Birnin Gwari, Makurdi/Katsina-Ala/Jalingo, Lagos/Benin, Katsina/Jibya/Kaura Namoda, Funtua/Gusau/Sokoto, Owerri/Port Harcourt, Enugu/Aba/Port Harcourt, Minna/Zungeru/Kontagora highways.

“Based on NFIU experiences, the modes of transporting hostages for kidnapping for ransom in and out of Nigeria are motorcycles and by foot. NFIU respondents also stated that most of the techniques and modes that kidnappers use for their hideouts for hiding hostages are villages far from town or on mountains in some places.

“To buttress the above responses, the Organised Crime in Nigeria: A Threat Assessment Report 2023 reported that in December 2020, 344 schoolboys were kidnapped in Kankara, Katsina State, and in a similar incident in February 2021, 277 schoolgirls were abducted from a boarding school in Jangebe, Zamfara State.

“Similarly, a series of further attacks occurred in schools across Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, and Zamfara States.”