Withdrawal from ECOWAS takes effect one year after notification of withdrawal to the secretariat, during which period the withdrawing member is still subject to the Treaty. In this case, Niger cannot simply become a non-member by declaring its membership non-existent at the time of the political crisis.
ECOWAS could still legally intervene in Ner until the passing of one year when Niger’s withdrawal would be complete.
The proposals to intervene in Niger did not materialise as sanctions were soon lifted to allow a forum for negotiations and peace-building ‘on humanitarian grounds’ according to the ECOWAS. In fact, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso which threatened to exit the bloc have been re-invited for negotiations with motherly affection. It is whispered in many corners that the sanctioning ECOWAS states started to feel the pain of Niger’s countersanctions in their respective crippling economies and advised themselves to eat the humble pie.
Whatever the motive behind rescinding the sanctions and threats were, Nigeria, especially, has taken a foreign affairs beating: firstly, the quick rescind indicates that perhaps the initial and immediate sanctions were simply not tactical and perhaps, were borne out of the excitement of new regional leadership. Second, West Africa’s military rulers did not seem to care about the olive branch extended by ECOWAS.
Put simply, democratic governments have not been reinstated, nothing has changed and in fact, ECOWAS’ poor showing in the Niger situation may be indicative of a truly failing regional bloc. For if the purpose of ECOWAS is to promote regional integration and stability based on economic, cultural and social cohesion, then military rule in the Sahel area defeats the 1975 objective.
Recommendations
The threatened failure of democratic governance in West Africa is a major challenge for the ECOWAS but certainly not the only one. Trade, which is the major objective of the ECOWAS is lagging across West Africa. Intra-regional trade is challenged by largely informal, scarcely documented and non-diversified products.
ECOWAS may take this as a challenge to improve regional capacity by eliminating the factors that slow down trade. These factors stare us in the face and have thrived for too long. Insurgency and insecurity, the proliferation of small weapons and unchecked smuggling of persons and goods in West Africa are problems over which ECOWAS must cease to remain silent. Granted, as the territorial integrity of states cannot be eroded by its participation in a regional forum, the trans-border nature of banditry and other offences stultifies the chances for progress in the region.
However, the ECOWAS is legally empowered to facilitate the control of trans-border crime by promoting close cooperation among the security services of its members. Even the Lomé Protocol mandates the harmonisation of domestic laws with the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition, sharing of resources, intelligence and communication, and enforcement against perpetrators.
This mandate was followed by a coalition of police chiefs in the region through the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) in 2001, but while the coalition exists, trans-border crime is at its peak. Between Bawku in Ghana, Cinkassé in Togo, the Lake Chad Basin, North Kivu, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe of Nigeria, several jihadist groups have reigned supreme.
Insecurity spills over to our maritime zones and parts of the Gulf of Guinea are now listed as high-risk areas for global shipping. These terrorist groups have managed to create a profitable venture from the kidnapping, displacing and killing of indigenous peoples around these regions, laying communities desolate and largely unproductive.
This is the time for ECOWAS members to direct their policies towards eliminating threats to the survival of the region. Only then can we progressively dream of a politically and economically stronger West Africa where the objectives of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty are fully achieved.
Nigeria’s foreign policy has gone through phases since independence. It is expectedly so.
However, let us be reminded that this is a country that championed the creation of continental and regional cohesion through the AU and ECOWAS, drove the non-aligned movement in 1962, and supported the independence and emancipation of many African states through political and military interventions (for instance through the African National Congress of South Africa and during the Congo Crisis). Nigeria also supplied aid to neighbours plagued by natural disasters directly or through the Liberation Fund of the OAU in the 1970s. Nigeria deserves its flowers for its commitment to the growth of the region and continent, but accolades can last only too long.
It is time for the country to look inward again and renew its focus for the survival of a slowly disintegrating region. The breakaway of some states would worsen ECOWAS’ chances of solving trans-border problems. All hands are needed, and Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso should be welcomed back to the fold.
Concluded.
Nwarueze is a Lawyer, Rhodes Scholar and international law researcher at University of Oxford. She can be reached via: elizabeth.nwarueze@law.ox.ac.uk.
