We must begin the introduction of new outlooks in the search for a new Nigeria. – Professor Ayo Olukotun, Columnist and Political Scholar
The enthusiasm that greeted the Not Too Young to Run movement was anchored in a simple promise that lowering age barriers would translate into meaningful youth inclusion in political power. For a problem so deeply entrenched, significant victories cannot be expected in two election cycles, however, the situation where the Nigerian youth do not occupy elective positions in proportion to their demographic majority might actually linger if youth mobilisation in politics does not address questions around geographical proximity of educated and upwardly mobile youths to their constituencies – a reality enhanced by modernisation and increasing urban migration.

Since the accent of the Not Too Young to Run to an Act of Law by President Muhammadu Buhari on May 31, 2018, available data underscores a disturbing stagnation in the progress of youths emerging as candidates for elections. Yiaga Africa reports that despite being the largest demography on the voters’ register, overall youth candidacy declined from 34% in the 2019 general elections to 28.6 % in 2023. For House of Representatives, the decline was from 27.4% in 2019 to 21.6% in 2023. Even for State Houses of Assembly where youth candidacy is usually most visible, a decline was recorded from 41.8% in 2019 to 35.6% in 2023.

The above culminates in the reality that despite a population structure in which Nigerians under 35 form a decisive majority, the architecture of political power remains firmly in the hands of the old elite. The Senate currently has no youth representation. In the House of Representatives, only 14 out of 360 members are under 40, accounting for a mere 3.92 %. Even this modest figure represents only a marginal increase from 2019.

At the executive level, the picture is no better. Nigeria’s youngest serving governor Ahmed Usman Ododo of Kogi State emerged at 43 years old, a full 14 years older than the upper youth threshold defined in the National Youth Policy as 29 years and far above the age benchmarks of 35 years that animated the 2018 constitutional amendment. This is not the trajectory of a reform gaining momentum. It is the profile of an intervention whose symbolic success could easily outpace its tangible outcomes. As the current political establishment consolidates power ahead of the 2027 elections, there is little indication that this imbalance will self-correct.

Predictably, the underwhelming electoral outcomes have reopened familiar debates about youth readiness, capacity, and seriousness. In an era of social media dominance, where young Nigerians excel at digital mobilisation and narrative framing, it is tempting to attribute their electoral underperformance to apathy or poor organisation. After all, youths constitute roughly 75 % of the population. In a digital age that lowers the barriers to visibility and self-branding, their failure to convert demographic strength into electoral power is often read as a leadership deficit.

This interpretation is flawed. Modern democracies, particularly those operating within Nigeria’s political economy, do not function as simplistic numerical games. Electoral success is not determined by population size alone, nor does social media popularity automatically translate into votes. Nigerian politics is structured around dense networks of ethno-religious identity, patronage, party control, and local legitimacy.

Demographic numbers do not always move as a homogenous bloc, and digital reach does not substitute for offline trust. If the mechanics of power were that simple, the youth population would already dominate legislative houses and executive offices, especially given the widespread distrust of government among young Nigerians.

In fact, young people have demonstrated remarkable political capacity. The 2020 #EndSARS movement, which erupted barely two years after the Not Too Young to Run Act was signed into law, revealed a generation capable of large-scale self-mobilisation, agenda setting, and sustained civic engagement across multiple states. Coordinated largely through digital platforms, the protests exposed both the organisational strength of Nigerian youths and the structural constraints that limit their translation into formal political power. Youths remain the engine of mobilisation in politics and civil society alike, even if they rarely occupy the commanding heights.

The missing variable in most analyses of youth political exclusion is geographical proximity of the upwardly mobile youths to constituencies where those youths that are educated, economically empowered, socially networked and interested can emerge as viable candidates.

Politics in Nigeria is intensely local whereas work opportunities are largely urban and distant. Leadership legitimacy among local constituencies is built through proximity, repetition, and long-term presence. Yet Nigeria’s economy systematically pulls young people away from the very communities where political capital is accumulated.

The National Bureau of Statistics and the International Organisation for Migration, indicate that over 60 per cent of Nigerian youths engage in internal migration in search of employment, moving primarily from rural areas and smaller towns into state capitals and major urban centres such as Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Kano.

This pattern of labour driven mobility reflects economic necessity, yet political inclusion has not followed demographic reality. Lagos State, Nigeria’s most cosmopolitan labour destination, illustrates this contradiction starkly.
To be continued tomorrow.
Ukwenga is the Executive Director of Africana League and executive producer of Nigeria House of Commons.