By Rasheed Ojikutu

The article titled “Nigeria: Poverty of statistics and statistics of poverty” in The Guardian Newspaper of April 15, 2026 provided an interesting reading material in many ways. A beautiful article that catalogue contemporary travails of the Nigerian nation erected on the platform of economic theory. The caption itself may sound rhetorically redundant but there is indeed a fundamental epistemological divide between the two phrases in development economics.

Though, it seem the author applied the terms for emphasis rather than as two technical categories yet, the clear position is that there are differences between the two and therefore, it is important that a rigorous economic critique must integrate both. While the article raised valid concerns about poverty and structural weaknesses, it exhibits inconsistencies in statistical usage and selective framing.

Poverty statistics measure deprivation and refers to quantitative measures used to assess the level, depth and severity of poverty within a population while statistics of poverty interrogate how the deprivation is defined, represented, and understood and generally refers to the critical interpretation, and evaluation of the data. It examines the method of poverty data collection and assumptions guiding its measurement. Also, it looks at the political or institutional framing of statistics and whether they reflect lived reality.

In this regard, Amartya Sen, the celebrated Indian economist and philosopher, Nobel laureate, and a leading authority on welfare economics, argued that “poverty is a form of capability deprivation, not just income deficiency” while Sir Angus Stewart Deaton, the British American Economist proposed that measurement choices shape policy conclusions.

The argument that “President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is his own best cheerleader and that statistical parameters and indicators do not peep beyond the calculating machine” is a pedestrian expression because the author seems to ignore the fact that reform often takes time and that short-term hardship does not invalidate long-term policy direction. Also, he seems not to appreciate the fact that economic reforms particularly the fuel subsidy removal and foreign exchange liberalisation are expected initially to worsen living conditions before long-term gains. This is usually the model of reality.

The position that “the macro is mending, but the micro is hemorrhaging.” is more like the conventional pathway of the adjustment because macro indicators often respond faster than micro conditions. Therefore we must realise that the administration of Bola Tinubu cannot force a reversal of this conventional process.

Moreover, the article seems to confuse two terms that are not directly comparable. As a writer of a technical paper, he ought to realise that monetary poverty is not the same as multidimensional poverty .The author’s security concern and its effect on agriculture though valid is too generalised.

While the article correctly identifies structural constraints—such as persistent power supply deficiencies, elevated cost of credit, and a fragile manufacturing base—it under-specifies the role of critical macroeconomic adjustments, notably fiscal consolidation and exchange rate realignment, in restoring overall economic stability.

The author’s characterisation of the current trajectory as “growth without development” is theoretically defensible within the broader literature on uneven development; however, its analytical force is diluted by insufficient engagement with empirical macroeconomic indicators, particularly Nigeria’s positive, albeit modest, GDP growth in the range of 2–3 percent. This omission weakens the argument by failing to reconcile structural critique with measurable aggregate performance.

Furthermore, the analysis appears to adopt a largely static perspective, underestimating the inherently lagged nature of structural reforms. Economic reforms, especially those involving fiscal tightening and currency adjustments typically impose short-term welfare costs before yielding medium- to long-term efficiency gains. Consequently, the presence of transitional hardship should not be interpreted as prima facie evidence of policy failure, but rather as a predictable phase within the adjustment process.

The statement—“While the statistics may point upward, the reality on the ground is a vertical drop into deprivation…” though, rhetorically forceful but analytically imprecise.

Its reliance on broad, emotive language introduces a degree of exaggeration that undermines its evidentiary value. In particular, the phrase “statistics may point upward” is insufficiently specified as it does not clarify whether it refers to GDP growth, government revenue, investment inflows, or other macroeconomic aggregates. This ambiguity weakens the claim, as each of these indicators captures distinct dimensions of economic performance.

More importantly, the argument conflates different levels of analysis. The cited “upward” statistics are, by implication, macroeconomic indicators, whereas poverty is fundamentally a microeconomic and welfare-based measure, typically assessed at the household or individual level. Without explicitly bridging this macro micro divide through, for example, distributional analysis or welfare metrics the juxtaposition of improving aggregates with worsening deprivation risks being conceptually misleading rather than analytically illuminating.

It is important to note that macro improvement and human suffering can coexist during reforms since growth can rise while real incomes temporarily fall due to inflation or adjustment shocks.

The presentation of a poverty rate of poverty rate of 63 and 140 million Nigerians are largely projections based on models and therefore cannot be taken as definitive measurements. As earlier mentioned different poverty metrics exist, including monetary poverty and multidimensional poverty. Collapsing these into a single figure gives an exaggerated sense of precision and crisis.

The article has ignored that fact that poverty levels in Nigeria has been in significant upward movement before the administration of Bola Ahmed Tinubu and that the current increase did not originate solely from recent reforms. It is therefore unfair to wrongly attributes a long-standing structural issue to a short-term policy period.

The article seems to regard reforms as purely harmful ignoring that fact that major reforms such as fuel subsidy removal and exchange rate unification are widely regarded as necessary structural adjustments. Even if they cause short-term hardship, they are intended to stabilise the economy and create conditions for long-term growth.

A contradiction of the aforementioned, would amount to what the Yoruba of South west Nigeria would refer to as “Olorun maje ki a je aiye awon omo wa mo aiye” literally it is a prayer that means “May we not enjoy life and leave only the detrimental suffering and hardship for our children”.

In this regard, I hope the author is not suggesting that “ Ki omo to je ogun, maa je ogbon” . That is “ Before my children eat 20, I would have consumed 30.” Which in all ramifications is not in the character of Africa.

The article seems to ignore government efforts aimed at mitigating hardship, including social intervention programmes and attempts to redirect savings into development. The author’s analysis is biased as it presents only the negative effects results.

In many areas of its discussion, the article amplifies perception without providing adequate measurable economic insight. For instance, the author writes “……the fundamental flaw in our current reformist zeal is the obsession with “numbers.” We parade growth rates as trophies while ignoring the fact that our labour market is a hollowed-out shell. Over 90 per cent of our workforce is trapped in informal, precarious work. Our youth, vibrant and educated, are mired in underemployment, their potential curdling into frustration…”

The passage reads more as a normative reaction than a rigorously grounded empirical claim.

Estimates of the share of the workforce in the informal sector are highly sensitive to definitional choices such as enterprise-based versus employment-based definitions, data sources, and survey methodologies. As such, wide variation across studies is expected and does not, in itself, substantiate a claim of recent policy-induced deterioration.

Furthermore, the prominence of informality is a long-standing structural feature of the Nigerian economy rather than a short-term outcome attributable to the current administration. High levels of informal economic activity often estimated at well over 80–90 percent of total employment is a reflection of deep rooted factors such as regulatory capacity, labour market segmentation, and barriers to formal firm entry.

The statement is also analytically problematic in that it conflates distinct concepts. A high incidence of informality does not necessarily equate to economic collapse, rather, it indicates the predominance of low-productivity, weakly regulated economic activity. By the same token, poverty statistics capture welfare outcomes (income or consumption shortfalls relative to a defined threshold), whereas informality measures the structure of employment. Treating these as interchangeable obscures the analytical distinction between labour market composition and welfare conditions.

The dismissal of numbers with a wave of the hand is dangerous. Numbers can mask lived hardship if interpreted narrowly. Yes, it may be true that the macroeconomic indicators can improve when real incomes fall, when inflation erodes purchasing power and even when inequality widens.

However, dismissing numbers the way the article has done is intellectually flawed because numbers are the basis of rational policy. Afterall, without quantification, you cannot measure poverty, you cannot track inflation and you could hardly evaluate whether policies work. We should not forget that without numbers there will be no accountability.

Numbers are antidotes for exaggeration and over simplification of problems. Without numbers, comparisons become difficult, debate becomes driven by emotion, anecdotes, and ideology and it will be difficult to know whether “things are worse” or “things are better” without quantification.

The contradiction in the article is that the author condemns reliance on numbers but use them to make dramatic claims in the article.

As earlier mentioned, the article did its best to review the economic problems and policy issues that had plagued the Nigerian nations for decades but implicating and blaming the present government of Bola Tinubu for the negative consequences of a long time policy mismanagement and ineffectiveness weakens its quality as a good paper because trend analysis will enable us to comprehend where we are coming from, where we are and where we are likely to be in the not too distant future.

In the overall assessment of its content, the article may be rhetorically compelling but analytically uneven. It mixes valid concerns with statistical inconsistency and incomplete economic framing. A more balanced assessment would integrate both short-term social costs and long-term structural gains.

Read the remaining part of this article on www.guardian.ng

Ojikutu is a Professor of Statistics (retired), University of Lagos.