Friday, 29th March 2024
To guardian.ng
Search
Law  

Decision of a court is founded on ratio decidendi – Part 4

In reply to the above submissions, learned senior counsel for the Respondents submitted that learned senior counsel for the Appellants did not fault the principles of res judicata ...
Court

Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
HOLDEN ATABUJA
ON FRIDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF APRIL, 2015
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

IBRAHIM T. MUHAMMAD JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
MUHAMMAD MUNTAKA-COOMASSIE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
MARY U. PETER-ODILI JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
KUDIRAT M. O. KEKERE-EKUN
JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
CHIMA C. NWEZE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT SC. 42/2005
BETWEEN:
1. CAPTAIN SHULGIN OLEKSANDR
2. TYRKIN ANATOLIY APPELLANTS
3. COLUB ANALOLIY
4. VLASYUK GENNADIY
5. TIMCHENKO VOLODYMYR AND
1. LONESTAR DRILLING COMPANY LTD RESPONDENTS
2. CHIEF H.I.S. IDISI

In reply to the above submissions, learned senior counsel for the Respondents submitted that learned senior counsel for the Appellants did not fault the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel as stated by the lower court nor did he fault the finding that the parties in the appeal in England are not the same as the parties to the instant appeal. He submitted that the Appellants were not parties to the case in England and therefore the plea of issue estoppel or estoppel per rem judicatam is not sustainable.

He relied on the case of: Oshodi v. Eyifunmi (2000) 7 S.C. (Pt. II) 145. He submitted that apart from the parties not being the same, the claims in the two suits were also different: the claim at the trial court being for the enforcement of the Appellants’ fundamental rights while the claim before the court in England was in respect of the sum of US$3 million deposited in an escrow account in the UK pursuant to an agreement between the owners of the vessel, Dubai Valour and the Respondents in this appeal.

On the contention that the decisions of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal in England constitute concurrent findings of facts, learned senior counsel submitted that in the circumstances of this case where the parties and issues in the two cases are different, the decisions cannot qualify as concurrent findings of fact. He also noted that the Court of Appeal in England made no independent findings of its own but merely adopted the findings of the Federal High Court.

He submitted further that the Appellants tendered the judgment of the English court as evidence to be relied upon by the lower court and not as a judgment creating judicial precedent. He submitted further that in so far as the issue in contention before the court in England was the detention of the vessel and not the detention of the Appellants, any reference to the Appellants’ detention was obiter and therefore could never be of persuasive value.

The principle behind the doctrine of estoppel perremjudicatam was explained by this court in: Yusuf v. Adegoke & Anor. (2007) 4 S.C. (Pt. I) 126 per Aderemi, JSC., thus:
“It has now become well entrenched in our civil jurisprudence that once a matter has been finally and judicially pronounced upon or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, neither the parties thereto nor their privies can subsequently be allowed to relitigate such matter in court. A judicial decision properly handed down is conclusive until reversed by a superior court and its veracity is not open to a challenge nor can it be contradicted.

The term derives its force from good public policy which says there must be an end to litigation. The maxim is interest reipublicaeut sit finis litium.”
A successful plea of estoppel per rem judicatamousts the jurisdiction of the court before which it is raised.The conditions precedent to a successful plea of res judicata were amply set out by this court in the case of: The Honda Place Ltd. v. Globe Motors Ltd. (2005) 7 S.C. (Pt. III) 182 as follows: (a) There must be an adjudication of the issues joined by the parties. (b) The parties or their privies as the case may be must be the same in the present case as in the previous case. (c) The issues and subject matter must be the same in the previous case as in the present case. (d) The adjudication on the previous case must have been by a court of competent jurisdiction. (e) The previous decision must have finally decided the issue between the parties, that is the rights of the parties must have been finally determined. The parties to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal in England, as shown at Page 548 of the record are: 1. Gulf Azov Shipping Company Limited. 2. The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited And 1. Chief Humphrey Irikefe Idisi 2. Lonestar Drilling Nigeria Limited 3. Lonestar Overseas Limited.

Of the parties listed above, only the 1st and 2ndRespondents in this appeal were parties to the proceedings in England. As rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the Respondents, the claim before the court was in respect of losses incurred by the Plaintiffs/ship owners against the Defendants arising from the detention of the vessel in Nigeria. Interestingly Exhibits GO1-G095 were tendered before that court in proof of the period for which the vessel was detained by showing the supply of food, water, bunkers and other necessities for the period. I am in full agreement with their Lordships of the court below that neither the parties nor the subject matter of the two cases is the same. The detention or otherwise of the present Appellants was not in issue in that case. In any event, as observed earlier, there is no appeal against the finding of the trial court that the Nigerian Immigration Service was responsible for the Appellants’ detention. I agree with their Lordships that the Appellants failed to establish the conditions for the application of the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel in this case. 5. This issue is accordingly answered in the negative and resolved against the Appellants.

Issue 3: Was it right for the Court of Appeal to have relied on what it called “fresh evidence” produced before the English Court alone, without more to conclude that the Respondents did not deny the Appellants supply of food, bunkers and provisions? Learned senior counsel for the Appellants argued that there was a plethora of documentary evidence besides Exhibits GO1- G095 that proved the wrongful acts of the Respondents. He relied on his earlier submissions under Issues 1 and 2 above with regard to emails, fax messages and letters written by the Protective Agency, vendors who were unable to discharge products and the letter of distress from the Master of the vessel. He contended that even if the fresh evidence established that necessary items were supplied to the ship, they only covered five out of the twenty months the Appellants were detained.

He maintained that there was ample evidence showing denial of access to the ship and crew and that it was only after the trial court granted the Appellants’ application compelling the Respondents to allow them to be supplied with provisions that the Respondents yielded. He submitted that apart from the documents referred to, the court failed to consider the far more important aspects of the breach of the Appellants’ fundamental rights to personal liberty and freedom, degrading and inhuman treatment and right to life.

In reply, learned senior counsel for the Respondents submitted that the issue as to who was responsible for the Appellants’ detention had already been resolved by the trial court when it held that the Immigration Authority breached their fundamental right to liberty by seizing their passports and seamen’s passbooks. That the issue in contention was the allegation that the Respondents denied access to vessel for the supply of provisions. He submitted that Exhibits GO1-G095, which cover the period from October, 1997 to June 1998, showed that all necessary supplies were made to the vessel during that time. He submitted that the finding of the lower court in this regard is unassailable.

I dealt with this issue while resolving Issue 1 infra. As observed by learned senior counsel for the Respondents, the documents show the delivery of necessary provisions to the ship before and up to the time the application was filed.

These are the same documents tendered before the court in England by the ship owners to prove the length of time the vessel was detained by showing that it had to be supplied with provisions throughout the period. The finding of the lower court is not perverse as it is clearly based upon a proper appraisal of the evidence before it. I find no reason to disturb the said finding. 4. This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

Having resolved Issues 1, 2 and 3 against the Appellants, it becomes unnecessary to consider Issue 4, which is based on the failure of the court below to award monetary compensation in their favour.In conclusion, I hold that the appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs in the appeal.

0 Comments