The fundamentals of techno-nationalism traverse the economic ‘militarisation’ of supply chains; decoupling of global supply chains; reshoring and proximate-shoring; muscular government interventions; technological diplomacy; trade realpolitik; and the contested paradox of strategic collaboration versus illicit acquisition of classified trade secrets on the grounds the national interests.

Although the latter is highly controversial and unethical, nevertheless, techno-nationalism’s realpolitik suggests that the practice is rampant in the quest to outperform rivals in technological dominance.

According to DeepStrike, cybersecurity threats are growing exponentially as hackers persist in exploiting global technological vulnerabilities. Given the rise of advanced persistent threats (APTs), ransomware attacks, and state-sponsored hacking, some countries are more vulnerable than others on the premise of their economic prowess, technological advancements, and geostrategic importance.

For instance, the top-ten most targeted countries in 2024 were USA (where a major cyberattack in the health-care industry compromised patients’ personal data and financial records costing the firm over $20 million in ransom payments); China (where well-orchestrated phishing scams compromised major AI research firms, culminating in breaches of proprietary algorithms); Russia (where cyber attacks resulted in major outages across the country), India, UK, and Germany. Other targets were France, Brazil, South Korea and United Arab Emirates.

Quite apart from the intellectual capabilities and rare knowhow, the battleground for techno-nationalism includes the quest for advanced minerals or rare earth minerals using top-end stealth defence weaponry, advanced manufacturing robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), aerospace, biotechnology, 5G and 6G wireless broadband, the internet of things (IoT), space-based internet and low earth orbit (LEO) constellations; energy including biofuels, electric batteries, hydrogen, photovoltaics and solar modules.

It extends to propulsion, quantum, robotics, and navigational technologies. Crucially, semiconductors are indispensable to these vital technologies which only accentuate their demand and therefore competitionfor access therein using orthodox and unorthodox means.

That exponential demand is evident in budgetary allocations to techno-nationalism by China and the G7 economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Japan, U.S., and the EU – its non-enumerated member), which together warehouse 60 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2023). In the three years to 2023 China, the European Union, and United States allocated approximately $6 trillion for technology-based programmes and programmes, which of course advance techno-nationalism goals.

In the final analysis, the geoeconomics, geopolitics and realpolitik of techno-nationalism establishes the fragmentation of global supply chains and bifurcation of markets towards pro-China or pro-West (U.S., UK, European Union) countries. That thesis is reinforced bythe UK’sfar-reaching trade deals with the European Union, India, and the United Statesin 2025, worth circa $60 billion by 2040.

The techno-nationalism campaign is reinforced by the U.S. (and its allies’) ban on China’s tech firm, Huawei, in 2019 on the grounds of national security; the UK ban on Huawei from its 5G networks in 2020 citing national security and concerns about the firm’s nexus to the Chinese government; and in 2022, Canada, also banned Huawei from its 5G network, again, citing, national security concerns.

Notwithstanding, the Asian leader has strategically responded with the Made in China (MIC) 2025 industrial policy, which seeks to catalyse its aerospace, AI, electric vehicles, high-speed rail, renewables, photovoltaics, robotics, high-technology sector by substantial investments in research and development, and stimulating domestic demand in a humongous market with over a million people.

Plus, China has invested $trillions into infrastructure and development projects traversing Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and Oceania over the years under the prospectus of the strategic Belt and Road Initiative, geared towards the country’s global competitiveness, economic leadership and commanding gross domestic product.

Inevitably, the BRICS, Global South, and Latin American countries face a challenge –turn to China or the West. Russia is already imperilled by Western sanctions and for the short to medium term at least, it appears to have a robust geostrategic nexus with China.

Again, decisions on strategic alliances relative to techno-nationalism will be guided be overriding national interests but squaring that circle will not be easy.

Regarding Nigeria, its bilateral trade with China exceeded $20 billion in 2024 and the prognosis suggests enhancements across automobiles, technology, transport and infrastructural development.

Noteworthy, as part of Nigeria’s industrialisation strategy, China will over the short to medium term, establish electric vehicle factories in Nigeria – which Western nations have consistently failed to do for many decades – yet, nature abhors a vacuum!

In all of this, the African Development Bank has a pivotal function in the continent’s industrialisation in pooling and targeting resources to technological projects to boost economic growth minus geopolitical complexities. Its $1.9 billion digital transformation programme over the years is instructive,but more can certainly be done.

Because, the techno-nationalism economic warfare is real and here to stay, sovereigns should choose reliable strategic partners, committed to knowledge transfer, whilst investing intelligently in organic and collaborative technology development.

Concluded.

Ojumu is the Principal Partner at Balliol Myers LP, a firm of legal practitioners and strategy consultants in Lagos, Nigeria, author of The Dynamic Intersections of Economics, Foreign Relations, Jurisprudence and National Development (2023).