The Federal Government under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said it would not disclose to the Nigerian people – and continued victims of terrorism – persons known and identified as financiers of that heinous crime because, according to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mr Lateef Fagbemi, such revelation may jeopardise further investigation and the arrest of collaborators. It is noteworthy that the minister said this while attending the 27th Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). It is ‘a specialised institution of ECOWAS and a FATF Style Regional Body that promotes policies to protect member States’ financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. That Mr Fagbemi chose this occasion and this event to declare that financial backers of terrorism already known to government would not be named to be shamed speaks volumes of the lack of seriousness of the administration he represents to decisively deal with a clear, real, and present threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria.
It is difficult to not construe this stand as a lack of will (unlike the rest of the world) to confront terrorism with every legitimate means including naming and shaming. Besides, it is a statement that diminishes all that GIABA stands for and works to combat. It is no wonder then that, in a 202 country-specific not so positive report on Nigeria, the body said ‘although Nigeria recognises the wide range of both Money Laundering (ML) and Terror Financing (TF) threats and vulnerabilities it faces, the depth and sophistication of its understandings of key ML risks, including of corruption and fraud, legal persons (including free zone enterprises (FZEs) and politically exposed persons (PEPs), are underdeveloped considering their complexity, materiality and scope. Nigeria’s understanding of TF risks is significant, but could be improved in material respects, e.g., with regards to cross-border flows and formal financial sector vulnerabilities.’
GIABA went further as follows: ‘the use of financial intelligence by LEAs remains limited due to the (i) low level of LEAs’ feedback to the NFIU, (ii) limited scope of entities that file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) (iii) lack of reporting on cross-border movement of bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs) and inbound cross-border movement of currency disclosures due to the low level of implementation of these systems; and (iv) the limited scope of institutions from which the NFIU requests additional information to support its analysis.’ ‘The country did not demonstrate effective seizure and confiscation of all types of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, including TF’. ‘Nigeria has a significant but incomplete understanding of its TF threats and risks. It lacks adequate insight into Boko Haram/ISWAP’s international linkages and abuse of the formal financial and commercial sector. The authorities do not prioritise TF investigations, as there are only a few TF prosecutions and convictions which do not reflect Nigeria’s TF risk profile. The Department of State Services (DSS), Nigeria’s lead counter-terrorism agency, has significant ability to identify and investigate TF activity.
It conducts parallel financial investigations in conjunction with terrorism investigations. However, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of such efforts. The content of TF- related STRs submitted to the NFIU have not been of demonstrable value, appearing to add little to Nigeria’s CFT efforts. Nigeria has extended AML/CFT requirements on the Not-for-profit (NPO) sector which is not in line with the FATF requirements and does not reflect a risk-based approach. j) Nigeria does not implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) without delay, and reported no frozen assets of designated terrorists. Nigeria has not conducted a sectoral risk assessment of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse in line with the risk-based approach. Authorities’ understanding of NPOs’ TF risks do not justify their categorisation and regulation as DNFBPs. Nigeria’s implementation of TF-related TFS is inconsistent with its TF risk profile. There is no legal framework for TFS related to proliferation financing (PF). Nigeria does not otherwise implement such measures effectively considering its ML/TF risks and materiality.’
Late February, the Financial Action Task Force reportedly put Nigeria and South Africa on its ‘grey list’ of countries that were considered not doing enough to fight financial crimes that include money laundering and terrorism financing. The cumulative consequence of these negative observations by the international organisations cannot be helpful to investor confidence and indeed other benefits that Nigeria may wish to derive from belonging to the community of nations.
The extant laws on terrorism is clear and copious in Section 3 on what is an act of terrorism, and in subsequent sections, the financing, or aiding in any way or form this exceptionally criminal act. Sections 2, 13 -22 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022 address this copiously. Section 2 (1) says ‘All acts of terrorism and the financing of terrorism are prohibited’; 2 (2) (d-f) say that anyone who (d) assists or facilitates, or funds the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism, (e) participates, as an accomplice, in or contributes to the commission of an act of terrorism or offences under this Act, (f ) assists, facilitates, organises, or directs the activities of persons or entities engaged in any act of terrorism or is an accessory to any offence under this Act’.
Furthermore, Section13 (1) states that ‘A person who knowingly and directly or indirectly, solicits or renders support— (a) for the commission of an act of terrorism, or (b) to a terrorist group, commits an offence, and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of at least 20 years and up to a maximum of life imprisonment’.
Terrorism is defined by the United Nations as ‘criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations…’. UN Resolution S/REA/1377(2001) says unequivocally ‘terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century’. The 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly recommended that terrorism must be condemned in all its forms and manifestations. Nigeria is an active member of this world body and subscribes to its decisions and recommendations. It is inconceivable – except in Nigeria it seems – that any government within the global community will pull punches in confronting such a grave act of criminality.
To be continued tomorrow.
