Jos: The ceaseless bleeding on the plateau

Plateau State Governor, Caleb Muftwang

By Bolutife Oluwadele

For more than two decades, the city of Jos, capital of Plateau State, has become shorthand for Nigeria’s unresolved tensions, faith, identity, and belonging colliding in endless cycles of violence. Once celebrated as a cool and cosmopolitan hilltop retreat, Jos today bears scars of division that run through markets, neighbourhoods, and memories.

The losses are hard to quantify. Thousands dead, tens of thousands displaced, homes burned, entire streets renamed by religion. But what is clearer each time blood is shed is that Jos’s crisis is not simply religious. It is deeply political, rooted in colonial history, economic inequality, and a state structure that has failed to give all Nigerians a sense of equal citizenship.

A city born of migration
Jos was built by movement. When British miners discovered tin on the Plateau in the early 1900s, they drew labour from across the northern region, including Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, and Kanuri Muslims. These migrants worked alongside local ethnic groups such as the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta, whose farmlands framed the young mining town.

Colonial authorities organised daily life by ethnic and occupational lines. The indigenous communities were largely confined to the surrounding hills, while migrants occupied the lowland mining settlements and commercial centers. The British also administered most of northern Nigeria through Muslim emirs, but the Plateau’s mainly non-Muslim peoples resisted such rule. Jos thus became a special territory, outside the emirate hierarchy that defined other northern provinces.

That historical arrangement gave birth to two enduring notions: the indigene, whose ancestors claim ownership of the land, and the settler, who is seen as a guest, even after generations. The divide was bureaucratic at first; over time, it hardened into identity.

Independence and injustice
After independence in 1960, Nigeria consolidated these categories rather than healing them. Every state determined who its “indigenes” were, linking access to public jobs, school scholarships, and land ownership to ancestral origin. In Plateau State, where Christians dominate local government, Hausa-Fulani Muslims, whose families have lived in Jos for over a century, were classified as settlers.

The pattern repeated across Nigeria, but in Jos, it became explosive because religion, ethnicity, and politics overlap so closely. Political scientist Adam Higazi calls the result “a civic apartheid,” one that simultaneously excludes, humiliates, and provokes.

As Jos expanded through the 1970s and 1980s, competition intensified. Minor disputes over farmland or business licensing sometimes turned violent. Politicians, aware of the emotional power of belonging, often mobilised communal loyalties for electoral gain.

The spark of 2001
Everything changed in September 2001. The crisis began over a minor administrative appointment, the nomination of a Muslim official to coordinate a federal poverty-reduction program in the Jos North Local Government Area. Demonstrations escalated into street fights. Within hours, entire districts were engulfed in flames.

For five days, residents turned on neighbours they had lived beside for years. Churches were torched; mosques were razed. Human rights groups estimate that more than 500 people were killed, though locals believe the toll was higher. When the army finally restored calm, the city had become divided. Christians retreated to the south and west, Muslims to the north and east.

The sense of normalcy that followed was an illusion. In 2008, violence returned after disputed local elections. In 2010, rural clashes spread to nearby Kuru Karama, where scores were massacred. Each wave of bloodletting deepened suspicion, creating invisible borders that still define daily life.

The pattern of failure
Successive governments pledged “never again,” yet every promise has collapsed into what Plateau residents call government by condolence.

A series of commissions, including the Ajibola Panel (2001) and the Presidential Panel on the Plateau Crisis (2004), identified political provocateurs and recommended prosecutions. None of the reports were made public, and no high-profile figure was punished. The cycle became predictable: violence, inquiry, silence.

Security forces have fared no better. Residents accuse both police and soldiers of partisanship. Muslim groups allege that troops raid their neighbourhoods disproportionately; Christian communities claim that security agencies turn a blind eye when their churches are attacked. Some soldiers deployed under the Joint Task Force were later implicated in extrajudicial killings. The state’s authority eroded as trust vanished.

Meanwhile, political leaders have used the divide to consolidate their bases. Plateau’s largely Christian administrations portray themselves as defenders of indigene rights, while Hausa-Fulani leaders, backed by northern political allies, frame the conflict as evidence of religious marginalisation. The result is a city where justice is negotiated along identity lines.
To be continued tomorrow.

Dr Oluwadele is an Author, based in Canada. He can be reached via:[email protected]

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