Philosophically, the essential ingredient of political realism is that power is the ultimate objective of statecraft whether in domestic or international affairs. The statement invokes the thesis that the key dramatis personae in statecraft, that is, democratically elected leaders, absolute monarchs, military dictators, and their loyalists, execute or seek to execute that objective.

Afterall, a nation state in itself, as contradistinguished from its tangible territory is, in a sense, an abstraction. For instance, a sovereign state, A, can never vote at the United Nations General Assembly in pursuance of its national interests, except, through a nominated human or, in future, a non-human agent deploying artificial intelligence and related robotics.

Political realism therefore chimes with the paradigms evinced by Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Napoleon Bonaparte et al, which, bluntly stated means: might is right.

Political realism assumes that interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power, and that the world is characterised by competing power bases. The principles underpinning political realism were further expounded by the University of Chicago political science and modern history scholar, Professor J. Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1973). In that treatise, Morgenthau argued inter alia that “nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them”.

This necessarily invokes the inference that issues pertaining to the survival of the state, ceding territory, the exercise of power amidst competing domestic and international interests, are vital to the state and therefore cannot, ordinarily, be negotiated upon. What, after all, is power if these vitals are ceded in multilateral or bilateral negotiations?

Set in that context, is the reality of political power bases and those who wield real power, in the sense that they possess the means of militarily enforcing their will, can, and from time to time, do, subvert the will of the people and established political order, especially in developing countries through coup d’états. The nom de guerre often deployed includes elite guards, guards brigade, republican guards, revolutionary guards, royal guards, presidential protection squad, secret service, special forces etc. For simplicity, they are collectively referred to as the “national guard” here.

The premise for national guards is the duty to protect the president or de facto leader and safeguard the “national interest”. Oftentimes, the national guard is separated from the mainstream traditional military comprising the army, air force and navy. The rationale for that separation affords interesting arguments and counter arguments.

On the plus side, the argument is that the mainstream military ought to focus on the overriding constitutional obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of the country. This encompasses protecting the country against internal and external threats, ditto from external aggression on land, air and sea at all times. Reassigning the military to national guard duties, the argument goes, is that such a reassignment blunts the overarching responsibilities of national defence and therefore its core competence.

The counter argument is that the mainstream military does not and is not intended to operate in silos. On the contrary, it is expected to function with a high degree of competence, effectiveness, efficiency, nimble interoperability and precision, in all tasks concerning national defence and national security. Accordingly, protecting the de facto leader ought, reasonably, be part and parcel of that function and not an added extra! In short, the case for a distinct national guard is not compelling and therefore pointless.

Weaving this into the political realism construct, yields the proposition that because the national guard is primarily charged with the duty of protecting a country’s de facto leader, they owe their loyalty to the incumbent, are often better armed and better remunerated than the mainstream military. This phenomenon creates mutual suspicion and rivalry between the established military and national guard.

For example, who takes the lead in a crisis? Is there a compelling rationale for a competing national guard? Is the risk of state capture not heightened by the de facto “separateness” of the national guard? Doesn’t this impede operational efficiency and the muddling of core objectives? In that, if the core objective is the security of the de facto leader and the national guard is sidetracked by political calculations and scheming to usurp power, what exactly is its raison d’etre?

Compounding these complexitiesare the mutable constants of political realism. That is, power, and the allureof greater power, which is almost always subject to the metaphorical pincers of the adage that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.The perception of invincibility, however misguided; the notion that what a de facto national leader can do, the head of the national guard can also do and do better. The net result of all these variables, is what often drives attempts at coup d’états in the developing world. The word “often” is used advisedly because there is scant evidence of a completely altruistic rationale for a usurpation of power by any national guard.

These propositions are reinforced by some striking illustrations of national guardleaders seizing power in classic instances of political realism.

First, is the most recent Nigerien coup d’état of July 26, 2023,spearheaded by the national guard or presidential guard commander, General Abdourahame Tchiani. Tchiani deposed the democratically elected leader Mohammed Bazoum (leader from 2021 to 2023), and quickly proclaimed himself national leader, prompting widespread condemnation from the international community and the 15-bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Since then, the latter has been reviewing its options for military intervention. Strikingly, Tchiani headed the Nigerien presidential guards for 12 years from 2011 to 2023.

Second, almost two years ago, on October 1, 2021, Corporal Mamady Doumbouya, former head of the Guinean national guard, created by erstwhile President Alpha Conde, removed the latter in a coup d’etat and appointed himself as national leader! Third, on May 28, 2021, Colonel Assimi Goita of the Malian national guard, deposed President Bubcar Keita in 2020 and again seized power from Bah Ndaw in yet another 2021 coup d’etat, pronouncing himself interim leader.

Again, in Mauritania, Colonel Abdel Aziz, who headed the presidential guards for 15 years, was pivotal in two coup attempts on August 3, 2005 (which toppled President MaaoyaOuld Taya), and on August 6, 2008 (which displaced President Abdallahi). Aziz installed himself as de facto leader; and ruled for a decade from 2009 to 2019.

Another historical example of the national guard seizing power was in Liberia. The bloody coup of 1980 in which the democratically elected President William Tolbert (1913-1980), and most of his cabinet members were brutally murdered by Master Sergeant Doe (1951-1990), himself a leading member of President Tolbert’s national guard and member of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Doe later ruled Liberian as a brutal dictator from 1980 until 1990 and ultimately encountered his own Waterloo at the hands of Prince Yormie Johnson of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

Earlier in Nigeria, on July 29, 1975, Colonel (later Brigadier) Joseph Nanven Garba, then head of the Brigade of Guards “national guard”, Dodan Barracks (then seat of absolute power), Lagos, with responsibility for protecting the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, “ironically”, announced the coup d’etat which toppled the General Gowon, whilst the latter was attending the 12th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (the precursor to the African Union), in Kampala, Uganda.

Whilst there have been numerous examples of coup d’etats around the world, that phenomenon per se, is not the focus of this piece. Rather, the focus is on the political realism and power dynamics of the national guard. So, the above examples highlight the paradoxical and powerful role of the national guard in state capture and statecraft in specific African countries. Paradoxical, because on the one hand, the national guard exists to safeguard the national interest and defend the incumbent leader.

In practice, there is a critical question as to whether the national guard truly serves the national interest or the parochial self-interest of the leaders of the national guard closest to the de facto leader of a given country and seat of power. And power dynamics, because the allure of power, and the trappings of power, have the potential to enchant even the most apolitical of the extant dramatis personae.

Quis custodiet ipso custodes? Who guards the guards? Who will guard the national guard? Self-evidently, the deduction from the above case studies, are barely likely to fill any de facto leader with confidence that he can inexorably rely upon the unimpeachable loyalty and support of the national guard. At best, that would be strategic naivete taken to the extreme. At worst, that could well be a recipe for a political hara-kiri and or violent coup d’état.

Then again, political realism whether in an absolute monarchy, civilian democracy, civilian/military diarchy, military dictatorship, theocracy or other constitutional configuration, will necessarily, encompass a critical role for the military given their overarching obligation and doctrinal orthodoxy of safeguarding the national interest and its leadership. It will never be perfect and risks will remain.

Nevertheless, the summative contention is that the national guard ought to be integrated into the mainstream military and should not be a discrete quasi-independent paramilitary force outside the established military architecture. However, if the realpolitik in a given sovereign nation that is predisposed to these unsettling variables justify the retention of the national guard, assuredly, the key dramatis personae ought to be periodically altered to mitigate the risks of power usurpation in a credible democratic construct.

Because power belongs to the people not the national guard and national development scarcely blooms from instability. The national guard cannot, rationally, be a law unto itself because national security demands an objective, not a subjective characterisation, in name and deed, in pursuit of effective statecraft.

Ojumu is the Principal Partner at Balliol Myers LP, a firm of legal practitioners and strategy consultants in Lagos, Nigeria.