In the midst of Nigeria’s prolonged battle with terrorism, particularly in the northern regions, the government has adopted a strategy that many find deeply troubling: the reintegration of self professed “repentant” terrorists back into society. This policy, packaged under the banner of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR), has sparked outrage and concern among victims, security experts, and communities ravaged by terror. It represents a profound miscalculation in the approach to counter-terrorism and national security.
The logic behind DDR, as adopted globally, often applies to post-conflict environments where warring factions agree to lay down arms after negotiated settlements. However, Nigeria is not in a post-conflict phase. The country remains under active siege by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and numerous bandit factions. These groups continue to raid villages, massacre civilians, ambush military convoys, kidnap schoolchildren, and destabilise entire regions. Under such circumstances, the reintegration of former fighters is not only premature but potentially perilous.
A Betrayal of Victims At the heart of the opposition to reintegration is a moral and ethical concern: justice for victims. Thousands of Nigerians have lost their lives, families, homes, and futures to terrorism. In communities across Borno, Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and beyond, survivors live with permanent trauma, many of them in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. For them, the idea that perpetrators can simply renounce violence and be accepted back into society is deeply offensive. It is a betrayal of their pain and an affront to the memory of those who were slaughtered. True reconciliation cannot occur without justice.
Yet, the DDR process bypasses trials and accountability. Rather than being prosecuted under Nigeria’s anti-terrorism laws, many captured or surrendered terrorists are enrolled in “rehabilitation” programmes that include vocational training and psychological counselling. They are then released to rejoin the very communities they once attacked. This model robs victims of closure and denies them the right to see justice served. The Illusion of Reform Proponents of reintegration argue that many fighters were conscripted or brainwashed and deserve a second chance. While it is true that some recruits may have joined under duress or economic desperation, this does not excuse the atrocities they committed.
The problem is further compounded by the lack of transparency in determining who qualifies as a “low-risk” combatant. Without a rigorous and independent verification system, the risk of releasing hardened, unrepentant terrorists is dangerously high. There have already been documented cases of so called rehabilitated individuals returning to the battlefield or acting as informants for active terror cells.
Such lapses pose serious national security threats. Given the porous borders, poor surveillance infrastructure, and the vastness of Nigeria’s rural terrain, tracking former terrorists after release is a near-impossible task. Reintegrating fighters in the absence of a stable security environment only serves to recycle the cycle of violence.
Undermining the Rule of Law The DDR approach, as currently practiced, conflicts with the legal and constitutional framework governing criminal justice in Nigeria. Acts of terrorism—including murder, kidnapping, rape, arson, and armed insurrection—are severe crimes under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act.
This law provides for stringent penalties, including life imprisonment and the death sentence, depending on the nature of the crime. Bypassing judicial processes in favour of administrative reintegration effectively undermines the rule of law and sets a dangerous precedent. It signals to the public, especially to law-abiding citizens, that there are two standards of justice: one for civilians and another for those who took up arms against the state.
It also risks normalising impunity. If terrorists can avoid prosecution simply by surrendering and pledging allegiance to the state, what incentive is there for others not to follow the same path—commit crimes, escape justice, and later be rewarded with reintegration?
Public distrust and alienation
One of the most damaging consequences of the DDR initiative is the erosion of public trust. Communities that have borne the brunt of terror attacks are left out of the conversation. They are not consulted on reintegration plans, nor are they provided with resources to cope with the psychological and economic aftermath of attacks. Instead, they are expected to accept former enemies into their midst, often without protection, preparation, or choice. This breeds resentment and suspicion.
People begin to view the state not as a protector of citizens but as a facilitator of impunity. The gap between the government and the governed widens. When the state fails to demonstrate that it is serious about justice and security, vigilante groups and community defence militias often emerge, filling the void in ways that can spiral into further violence.
A misguided strategy with poor results
Despite claims of success by government officials, the reintegration programme has done little to halt the spread of terrorism. Armed groups continue to expand their influence, launch deadly raids, and recruit new fighters. The presence of DDR camps and rehabilitation centres has not translated into reduced insurgent activity. If anything, it appears to have emboldened terrorist groups, who now see surrender as a strategic option—not a defeat but a pause, with the opportunity to regroup and re-enter the fray.
Reintegration, when not backed by a comprehensive and transparent peace process, becomes a loophole for tactical exploitation. Fighters can use it to escape difficult conditions or battlefield losses, only to reemerge stronger. The lack of consequences undermines deterrence and suggests that terrorism can be a risk-free enterprise with state-sponsored offramps.
Global comparisons and Nigeria’s unique context
In some parts of the world, DDR strategies have yielded positive outcomes—but always under very different circumstances. In post-genocide Rwanda, former perpetrators were reintegrated only after facing community-based trials, public confessions, and years of reconciliation efforts. In Colombia, FARC fighters returned to society as part of a negotiated peace deal that included a detailed transitional justice framework, involving truth-telling, reparations, and prosecution for serious crimes. Nigeria, by contrast, has no such framework.
There is no peace agreement, no national reconciliation plan, no public truth commission, and no clear path for victims to seek redress. The security situation remains volatile, and the ideology driving terrorism remains potent. In such an environment, reintegration lacks both moral and practical justification. It cannot serve as a shortcut to peace in the absence of genuine conflict resolution and state legitimacy.
An alternative path: Justice, support, and prevention: Rather than investing in DDR camps for terrorists, Nigeria should redirect its resources toward a justice-centered and victim-oriented approach. First, suspected terrorists must be prosecuted in accordance with the law. Trials must be transparent, fair, and based on strong evidence. This would reaffirm the rule of law and deter future crimes. Second, victims must be acknowledged and supported.
Establishing a national victim support programme is critical—one that offers counselling, economic rehabilitation, resettlement assistance, and legal aid. Victims deserve more than to be forgotten while their tormentors are “rehabilitated.” Third, prevention must take centre stage. The root causes of terrorism—poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, religious extremism, and lack of state presence in rural areas—must be addressed.
Investing in education, community policing, intelligence gathering, and border control would do more to reduce terrorism than any reintegration programme ever could. Finally, any future reintegration efforts must be preceded by a credible peace process, clear benchmarks, and community participation. Reintegration cannot be a secretive state initiative. It must be built on public dialogue, mutual trust, and accountability.
No peace without justice
The idea of disarming and reintegrating terrorists may appear humane and progressive on the surface, but in the context of Nigeria’s ongoing insurgency, it is misplaced and dangerous. True peace cannot be built on the foundation of injustice. Releasing unrepentant killers into the very communities they destroyed is not reconciliation—it is state-sanctioned amnesia.
The Nigerian government must take a hard look at its counter-terrorism strategy. The message must be clear: terrorism is a crime, not a career path with exit packages. Justice must be served, victims must be honoured, and security must be restored. Anything less will only prolong the agony of a nation that has suffered far too long.
Udenka is a social and political analyst. He can be reached via: #AfricaVisionAdvancementTrust CEO : Igbo Renaissance Awakening.
