Middle east and the superpowers
While the transition from the great powers era to bipolarity is well-known, the post-World War II era has impacted the Middle East crisis. The region soon became a new turf for geopolitics and resource extraction. U.S. foreign policy actors invoked what they call the ‘grand area plan’, aptly captured by Chomsky in a 2004 interview with Hawzheen O. Kareem on the subject of the U.S. control of the resources of the Middle East. According to Chomsky (2004):

In the 1940s, U.S. planners recognised that (in their words) Gulf energy resources are “a stupendous source of strategic power” and “one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” Naturally, they intended to control it — though for many years they did not make much use of it themselves, and in the future, according to U.S. intelligence, the U.S. itself will rely on more stable Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa and the Western hemisphere). Nevertheless, it remains a very high priority to control the Gulf resources, which are expected to provide 2/3 of world energy needs for some time to come.

Quite apart from yielding “profits beyond the dreams of avarice,” as one leading history of the oil industry puts the matter, the region still remains “a stupendous source of strategic power,” a lever of world control. Control over Gulf energy reserves provides “veto power” over the actions of rivals, as the leading planner George Kennan pointed out half a century ago. Europe and Asia understand very well, and have long been seeking independent access to energy resources. Much of the jockeying for power in the Middle East and Central Asia has to do with these issues.

The Soviet Union’s superpower status inclined it towards improving and aggrandising power in a hostile global environment. The rulers of the Soviet Union plotted a world of advantage over the U.S. and its allies while expanding their own sphere of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. Therefore, “The main target is the acquisition of real political influence in countries regarded as important by the Soviet Union. Soviet military power serves to impress these countries with Soviet strength” (Mackintosh, 1981, p. 5).

In the October 1973 Arab Israeli war, the superpowers were on opposite sides of the crisis. The Soviets gave economic aid and military hardware to both Syria and Egypt, with propaganda commitment to the Arab cause. The Soviet Union established military bases in Egypt and carried out air surveillance of the Mediterranean. In the 1970s, the bases served the Soviets’ anti-NATO schemes (Mackintosh, 1981). The U.S. also airlifted military aid to Israel.

To shore up the shifting military fortunes of the Arab army in the October War, the Soviet Union was ready to dispatch troops to Egypt. This set the two superpowers on a path of confrontation and, later, cooperation. In sum, the Arab-Israeli Conflict was somewhat an elixir to the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East and was therefore in its interest to perpetuate the crisis. This is perhaps why Treverton (1981, p. 2) notes that, “The specific conflict between the Arab states and Israel cannot be separated from superpower relations or from access to oil resources”.

Dove of peace among the ruins
The phrasing of this subheading is borrowed from Roger Martins, then the Middle East Editor of Financial Times, who reflected on the situation in the Middle East in the wake of the first Gulf War, had in his piece, so titled, advised a diplomatic solution that harnesses the streams of peace instead of an enforced military solution to the Middle East crisis (Martins, 1991). I pose the question: how may we find the dove of peace to resolve the Middle East conflict? In my search for the dove of peace, I am not offering anything new, perhaps a rather nuanced insight to shape our positions on the way forward to a lasting peace in the Middle East.

The literature on the Middle East crisis is rich in options for the peaceful resolution of what is post-war, the most enduring crisis and threat to global security. Some are multi-lateral pragmatic options, others are theoretical in nature. In what follows, I focus on the peace options at two levels. One is the Arab-Israeli peace deal, and the other is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Also, I argue that the first leg of the Middle East crisis has been considerably moderated. Beyond Resolution 181, the post-Six-Day War period has seen several United Nations Resolutions foundational to the resolution of the crisis. For example, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 which was unanimously adopted in 1967 after the Six-Day War for the resolution of the Middle East peace based on the “land for peace” principle.

The resolution established the principle of “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security” and called on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the war in exchange of recognition by its Arab neigbours, end of the state of war, freedom of navigation through international waterways and settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem (UNSC Resolution 242 (S/RES/242).

The UNSC Resolution 338 adopted on October 22, 1973, during the October War, otherwise known as Yom Kippur War, it was a demand for cessation of hostility between Israel and the Arab states and a re-affirmation of Resolution 242. The UNGA Resolution 151 affirmed permanent sovereignty over natural resources by the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The above provides the bases for negotiations and agreements since the Camp David Accords.

Jimmy Carter, the U.S. President (1977-1981) mediated the Camp David Accords, which were signed by President Carter, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel in September 1978, and culminated in a formal treaty in March 1979.

Firstly, it established a dual framework pertaining to the principles of a bilateral peace agreement and self-government for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. The outcome was the withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai Peninsula. The drawback was the absence of a clear road map for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute through automisation of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. However, it set the tone for future Arab-Israeli dialogue (Sher, 2018a; Sher, 2018b).

The Oslo Accords (1993-1995) were a second major route travelled in the quest for lasting peace in Palestine. It was born out of secret negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, beginning in Oslo in December 1992.  Finally, it was signed in Washington in 1993 and led to mutual recognition by the parties in dispute. PLO recognised Israel’s sovereignty, and Israel recognised PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in Palestine.

It resulted in a framework for a five-year interim period of Palestinian self-governance and final resolution of complex issues such as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.   In October 1998, Clinton hosted Netanyahu and Arafat at the Wye River Plantation, where the agreement on Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank was conducted.

To be continued tomorrow.
Akhaine is a Professor in the department of Political Science, Lagos State University (LASU). He delivered this Lecture (excerpts) at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs on December 2, 2025, as part of the Institute’s Foreign Policy Lecture Series.