Good morning, Mr. President. This is a continuation of the matter of strong institutions, which I started last week by way of enlightenment. The nature of our institution is only intelligible in the context of a comprehension of the nature of the Nigerian state and its historical context.

The Nigerian state derives its origin and structure from colonialism. Even after 1960, the state only changed its complexion. In revised Fanonian terms, it is White skin, Black Mask. In other words, the fundamentals of the state remain the same—neo-colonialism (Akhaine, 2011).

Neo-colonialism for Eskor Toyo is a “continuation of the colonial economic heritage which represents a compromise between the indigenous and alien economic interests” operationalised in ways that the ex-colony remains “a controlled source of raw materials as well as market for investment and sale of goods manufactured both in the metropolitan countries and overseas by local subsidiaries of foreign firms” (cited in Madunagu, 1984, p. 8). Sixty-four years on, this characterisation of the Nigerian State has not changed. Like all neo-colonial states, Nigeria “lives to fulfil the accumulation goals of the metropoles as well as the compradoral bourgeoisie. By its nature, it is incapable of unleashing the dynamics of development” (Akhaine, 2011, para 18).

In the same vein, Claude Ake would argue that “to assume that there had been a failure of development was misleading because development was never on the table as the political conditions render it nugatory” (cited in Akhaine 2011, para. 18).

Nigeria, being a rentier state, merely collects rents on oil sale and correspondingly shares among the institutionally weak tiers of government through statutory appropriation.

Given the prevalent weak institutions, the resources meant to serve the people, are either misappropriated or stolen by actors in government to the detriment of their well-being. As I have observed elsewhere, “… it is the struggle to access the oil wealth that has made politics akin to warfare, or, in the words of the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, ‘a do-or-die affair’… Again, this type of state is roguish and is incapable of engendering development.” (Akhaine 2011, para. 19).

The Nigerian state and its elite continue to serve the interest of the former colonisers and their allies. This explains why the World Bank and IMF loans have defined the developmental footpath of the country from regime to regime.

Momoh (2011) once noted that laws and policies in Nigeria were designed to suit the whims and caprices of the ruling elite; in effect, the interest of the metropolitan elite. The received policies from the latter, include structural adjustments, currency devaluation, and de-statisation of welfare-oriented programmes such as the maintenance of subsidy regimes in certain aspects of the national economy.

These policies have not only caused a trust deficit in government, they have overly delegitimised successive governments. As is well-known, the rule of law and accountability in government are the first casualties. What follows is an exemplification of weak institutions, in other words, a focus on weak institutions.

David-Barrett (2023) has told us that state capture runs on a tripod of swaying the formation of laws and policies; meddling in the implementation process and promoting impunity by hobbling institutions of accountability, both vertical and horizontal.

The operationalisation of David-Barrett’s tripod has dire consequences for the state. It means that institutions are constrained while the government goes roguish. Offe (2006, p. 10) has argued that “Institutions often impose constraints on what actors are permitted to do…Violations of institutional rules can result from an actor’s interest, and are not just a mistake.”

We find copious examples of institutional violations in the policies and programmes of successive governments in the state sphere. Here, we look at the executive arm of government and its occupiers.

Under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration, in his second coming, between 1999 and 2007, there was a major violation of the basic law of the land. Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution as amended on the secularity of the Nigerian state was rudely violated by the introduction of sharia law in some states of the Nigerian federation. Section 10 states that “The Government of the federation or State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.”

By this heinous and singular violation of the constitution, a religious/ ethnic crisis was unleashed on the country that resulted in egregious loss of lives. In clear violation of Chapter Four of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the state was the culprit in gross violation of the human rights of Nigerian citizens. Massacres took place in both Odi and Zaki-Biam in pursuit of some national security principles. Men and women of the Fourth Estate of the Realm were also hounded.

As Reporters Sans Frontieres rightly observed, “…under former military figure, President Olusegun Obasanjo, has protected them from political persecution by the infamous State Security Service”. He undermined democracy and the rule of law by imposing military sole administrators in some states of the federation, especially Plateau and Ekiti States.

To crown the inanities of his administration, President Obasanjo attempted tenure elongation, the so-called, third term, that miraculously failed on the floor of the “long parliament” on May 16, 2006 (Akhaine, 2006).

Yar’adua administration, 2007-2010 perpetrated the extra-judicial execution of Mohammed Yusuf, who was the leader of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, in 2009.
In defiance of the rule of law, he caused the nation a low-intensity insurgency that has exacted its toll on lives and the sovereignty of the state. When the president became ill-disposed, he reneged on an orderly transfer of power to his vice in clear violation of the basic law thereby causing a constitutional conflict only absurdly resolved by the “doctrine of necessity”, a symbolic fulfilment of the intent of the constitution, paving the way for his vice’s ascent to power.

The Jonathan administration was somewhat benign, the president absorbed dissent while corruption had a free reign in complete disregard of the rule of law. Nigeria became one of the most dangerous places in the world to live due to uninhibited kidnapping, particularly in the South.

Oil pirates and crude oil thieves became lords and Jonathan’s solution was to hand over protection of the pipelines to the militants, a dangerous solution that postponed the evil day. Yet, according to Ibekwe (2015), “Instead of the theft of oil to decrease, it remained a major drain of resources.

According to the then Chief of Naval Staff, Usman Jibrin, the country lost crude valued more than N1.18 billion daily to oil thieves (N433.62 billion annually).” This discourse will continue next week. Enjoy the rest of the week, sir.
Akhaine is a professor of Political Science at the Lagos State University.