By Akinbobola Odelusi

By September 22, when the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt resumes proceedings in the case involving Moreplex, the dispute will have acquired another layer of significance. Moreplex is facing criminal proceedings following allegations that it intercepted and retransmitted MultiChoice signals without authorisation. The matter arose from a 2024 petition by MultiChoice to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and led to Moreplex’s arraignment in June 2026. The allegations have not been proved and Moreplex remains entitled to the presumption of innocence.

But the case did not begin in a courtroom over alleged signal interception. It started much earlier, with a commercial disagreement over access to television channels. That distinction is important because the framing of Moreplex’s argument is like a six footer pistol-whipping a dwarf. In this version, MultiChoice is the six footer, while Moreplex is the dwarf simply asking for a chance to compete.

MultiChoice is a dominant player and there is nothing illegal about that. There is also nothing inherently wrong with wanting to take it on. The country would benefit from stronger Nigerian-owned businesses investing in broadcasting, creating employment, developing local programming and giving viewers alternatives.

But there is another question that cannot be wished away in the name of competition. Where does the content come from and who actually owns the rights to it? That question takes the dispute back to 2020, when Metro Digital Limited approached MultiChoice seeking access to 54 channels. The company based its request on the Sixth Edition of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Code, including the controversial provisions requiring sublicensing.

MultiChoice refused. Its argument was not that Metro Digital was unworthy of competing, but that it did not own the rights necessary to grant the requested licences to Metro Digital. Granting them, it said, could expose it to claims from the actual rights owners and could ultimately jeopardise the channels themselves. Metro Digital challenged that position in court. In June 2021, the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt found that Metro Digital had not established that MultiChoice possessed the rights it was being asked to sublicense. Metro Digital appealed. The regulatory foundation on which these demands rested was also tottering.

The NBC had amended its Sixth Edition Code in 2020 to introduce compulsory sublicensing. The amendment was challenged and in May 2022, the Federal High Court held that the Commission had exceeded its authority, nullified the amendment and restrained the NBC from enforcing it.

MultiChoice subsequently instituted its own action against the NBC. In January 2024, the Federal High Court again struck down the amendment and restrained the Commission from enforcing it.

There was yet another twist. In July 2022, the Court of Appeal directed the NBC to commence a process for resolving the Metro Digital dispute under the same Code. MultiChoice challenged that decision at the Supreme Court, where the matter remains pending.

This history is important because it shows that the argument was never as simple as “MultiChoice refuses to share its channels with Nigerian competitors.” There was a prior and unresolved question about whether MultiChoice could legally provide what it was being asked to provide in the first place.

Moreplex entered this already complicated terrain in January 2021, when it sought sublicensing for 10 channels from MultiChoice. Like Metro Digital, it relied on the disputed NBC Code and like Metro Digital, it was told that MultiChoice did not possess the relevant rights.

The issue resurfaced in March 2023, when Moreplex again sought sublicensing, this time citing the Court of Appeal judgment and an NBC directive. MultiChoice maintained its refusal, pointing to the nullification of the amended Code and its lack of ownership of the relevant rights. Moreplex then went to court against MultiChoice, the NBC and the Minister of Information. It sought an order compelling MultiChoice to provide the channels and claimed ₦500 million in damages. The court, in March 2024, held that MultiChoice was required to sublicense the requested channels under the Code and awarded Moreplex ₦200,000 in damages. MultiChoice appealed, meaning the matter was not thereby brought to a final conclusion.

But even if Moreplex ultimately succeeds in its argument over sublicensing, that does not answer the entirely separate question of signal interception. This is where the current criminal proceedings become significant. During the earlier litigation, MultiChoice told the court that the channels Moreplex wanted were available through competitive bidding with their respective owners. In other words, there was another route to obtaining the content. This entails approaching the actual owners and negotiate for the rights.

That may be a more expensive or difficult route. It may even be one Moreplex believes should not be necessary. But commercial inconvenience is not the same thing as a licence to use somebody else’s property. The Metro Digital case again provides a useful backdrop. In 2024, MultiChoice petitioned the National Copyright Commission over what it described as unauthorised rebroadcasting by Metro Digital. It also went to the EFCC over alleged unlawful interception and retransmission of its signals. Criminal proceedings were subsequently brought against Metro Digital under the Cybercrimes Act.

MultiChoice later made a similar complaint against Moreplex. The EFCC subsequently instituted criminal proceedings against the company, producing the case now before the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt.

None of this means that Moreplex is guilty. It does, however, mean that the debate should not be conducted as though the only issue at stake is whether Nigeria’s smaller pay-TV operators should be allowed to compete with MultiChoice. They should. The more difficult question is the method by which that competition is pursued.

There is a reason broadcasters spend extraordinary amounts of money acquiring premium programming. Sports rights cost money. Movies cost money. Technology costs money. Transmission infrastructure costs money. Local productions require producers, writers, actors, technicians and other professionals to be paid. Somebody must carry those costs before a viewer ever sits down in front of a television. If another platform can simply take the finished signal and sell it to its own subscribers without paying for the underlying rights, the investment model becomes difficult to sustain.

Consider premium football. A broadcaster spends heavily to acquire the rights and then builds a subscription business around them.

If another operator can simply pick up the broadcast and redistribute it, the original investment is effectively being used to subsidise a competitor. The same principle applies to Nigerian films, television series and other locally produced content.

Nigeria says it wants a vibrant creative economy. It wants more filmmakers, producers, broadcasters and technology companies. It wants international studios and rights owners to see Nigeria as a serious market. Those ambitions require confidence that intellectual property will be respected. Otherwise, the incentive to invest begins to disappear.

Moreplex should compete. It can negotiate with content owners, acquire rights directly, commission its own programmes, develop its own catalogue and compete through pricing, innovation, service and quality.

It can also continue to challenge MultiChoice through the courts and regulators where it believes the company has breached its obligations. That is what competition looks like. What competition cannot mean is that a company acquires a regulatory licence to operate a distribution platform and thereby assumes that it has acquired the right to distribute content belonging to someone else. Those are two different rights. The distinction may sound technical, but it is actually central to the future of the industry.
If Nigeria gets the balance wrong, the consequences will extend far beyond MultiChoice and Moreplex.

Rights owners will become more reluctant to invest. Broadcasters will think twice before paying for expensive content. Producers will have less confidence that their work can be monetized and the country’s much-vaunted creative economy will be standing on trembling foundations. The Moreplex case, therefore, should not be viewed simply through the lens of who is bigger or who is Nigerian.

The more useful question is what rules should govern competition in a content business. The answer should be straightforward. Companies should be free to compete aggressively. They should be free to challenge incumbents, demand regulatory reform, take disputes to court and pursue better deals for consumers. But the rights attached to content must remain protected while they do so.

If Nigeria wants a television and creative industry capable of attracting serious investment, content cannot become a free-for-all. The fight for market share is legitimate. The fight over who owns the content is even more important.