By Dr Wole Olaleye

Sir: Can Nigeria win its asymmetric wars against terrorism, banditry and kidnapping? The answer depends on what we mean by “winning”.

Victory cannot realistically mean the permanent military elimination of every terrorist cell, bandit gang or kidnapping network. In asymmetric conflict, victory is better measured by whether armed groups lose territory, leadership, financing and freedom of movement; whether citizens can travel, farm, attend school and worship without fear; and whether legitimate government, rather than armed groups, determines everyday life.

Judged by that standard, Nigeria’s security record in 2026 offers grounds for cautious optimism. There have been significant operational successes. In June, security forces rescued 360 men, women and children held by Boko Haram fighters in the Mandara Mountains of Borno State. In August, another 308 abducted people were rescued from the Kainji Lake National Park forest, including victims kidnapped in Kwara and Niger states. Days later, troops freed another 33 abductees in Zamfara.

The successful rescue in Ori-ire Local Government Area of Oyo State deserves particular attention. On 10 July, security forces freed 39 schoolchildren and six teachers kidnapped when gunmen attacked three schools on 15 May. One teacher had tragically been killed in captivity. Eight suspected kidnappers were arrested. The operation ended 56 days of captivity and showed that the state could sustain a rescue operation even as organised kidnapping spread into the South-West.

Earlier in January, troops also rescued 62 captives from a bandit hideout in Zamfara. These operations suggest improving use of intelligence, surveillance, inter-agency coordination and targeted operations—the capabilities asymmetric warfare requires.

There have also been battlefield gains. In March, troops killed dozens of armed bandits following an attack around Danmusa in Katsina State. Later that month, Nigerian troops, supported by air power, repelled a major Boko Haram and ISWAP assault on a military position at Mallam Fatori in Borno State, reportedly killing scores of insurgents.

Perhaps the most strategically important development came in May, when a joint Nigerian-American operation killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, described by both governments as a senior Islamic State leader involved in coordinating international operations and financing. His removal demonstrated the value of intelligence-sharing against networks that do not respect national borders.

These successes matter because they show that the Nigerian state is neither helpless nor strategically paralysed.

Security agencies are rescuing hostages, penetrating forest sanctuaries, disrupting insurgent formations and degrading militant leadership.

But tactical success is not the same as strategic victory. Armed groups continue to mount attacks, conduct kidnappings and exploit large weakly governed spaces. The Oyo school abductions themselves were a warning that organised kidnapping can migrate into areas previously regarded as comparatively secure.

Nigeria’s deeper challenge, therefore, is not simply whether the military can win battles. It clearly can. The more important question is whether those gains can be converted into lasting security and legitimate state authority.

That brings governance to the centre of the war. Research by the United Nations Development Programme on recruitment into violent extremist groups in Africa found that government action was the most frequently cited trigger among respondents who identified a specific event that pushed them towards extremism. It also found very low levels of trust in national government among many voluntary recruits.

The implication for Nigeria is clear. Abusive security practices, injustice, unemployment, exclusion and weak public services can recreate the conditions military operations are trying to destroy.

Nigeria therefore wins strategically only when the removal of an insurgent camp is followed by effective administration; when liberated communities have functioning schools, health services, justice systems and livelihoods; when security personnel behave lawfully; and when citizens no longer depend on armed groups for protection.

Citizen participation is equally important. Traditional rulers, religious leaders, women’s organisations, youth groups and community networks can provide early warning, challenge extremist narratives and mediate local grievances. But community participation must strengthen lawful state authority, not produce uncontrolled vigilantism.

Regional cooperation is also indispensable. Terrorist and criminal networks cross borders and exploit instability across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Nigeria cannot defeat a transnational threat through national action alone.

So, can Nigeria win? The evidence from 2026 supports a more confident answer than simple pessimism. Nigeria is demonstrating that it can rescue hostages, disrupt armed groups, defeat major attacks and remove important militant leaders.

But the country has not yet won. Nigeria will know it is winning when successful military operations consistently produce secure roads, functioning schools, cultivated farms, safer communities and citizens who no longer negotiate with armed men for the right to live ordinary lives.

The Nigerian state is showing that it can hurt its adversaries. The harder task is to ensure that every security success permanently shrinks the political, economic and social space in which terrorism, banditry and kidnapping regenerate. That is how an asymmetric war is ultimately won.

Dr Wole Olaleye, a public policy and evaluation specialist, wrote in from Johannesburg, South Africa.