As mobile phone numbers become some of the most sensitive digital credentials Nigerians possess, the loss of over N12 billion to telecom-related fraud is a wake-up call to authorities, as the menace gradually erodes public trust in digital platforms and undermines identity systems. ADEYEMI ADEPETUN reports that, with mobile numbers central to banking, identity verification and government services, criminals are ruthlessly exploiting this reliance to fleece millions of unsuspecting Nigerians, underscoring the need for strict enforcement of extant rules and regulations to curb Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card infractions.

In April 2025, while observing the mandatory National Youth Service Corps programme in Akure, Ondo State, 24-year-old Mariam Titilayo Ibrahim bought a “new” Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.

Upon acquiring the Airtel SIM card from an authorised vendor, Ibrahim, as required by law, registered it using her National Identification Number (NIN). For six months, she used the line daily, unaware that the string of digits assigned to her carried a dark, hidden history.

On October 16, 2025, detectives from the Force Intelligence Department (FID), Abuja, tracked her to her location in Akure, where she was arrested. Her iPhone 12 Pro Max, an Itel mobile phone and her Wi-Fi router were seized.

During the investigation, Ibrahim was allegedly linked to a high-profile kidnapping and murder case that had occurred in January 2024, months before she purchased the SIM card.

The police revealed that the phone number now linked to Ibrahim’s NIN was the same number used by a kidnapping syndicate to negotiate ransoms and coordinate the murder in January 2024.

Investigation, however, revealed that after a suspected criminal abandoned the SIM, it remained dormant for over 12 months. Following the Nigerian Communications Commission’s (NCC) rules, Airtel deactivated the line and returned the number to the pool for reassignment.

Crucially, while the telco assigned the number to Ibrahim in 2025, the police tracking systems still had it flagged in connection with the 2024 crime. To the investigators’ automated systems, the person currently holding the SIM was the person they had been hunting for nearly two years.

Ibrahim was forcibly moved to Abuja from Akure on November 20, 2025, to clear her name.

“They claimed the line was used for kidnapping, N50 million ransom was collected, and the victim eventually died. I told them I bought the SIM in April 2025, while the incident happened in January 2024,” she stated.

“Even after records at the telco office confirmed that I bought the SIM card after it was put back in the market, the police still didn’t believe me. They harassed me and almost sent me to prison for what I knew nothing about,” Ibrahim lamented.

It took the intervention of her lawyer, assistance from activist Omoyele Sowore, and Airtel’s eventual confirmation of the SIM’s activation date for her to walk away free.

Nnenna Okorie (not her real name), who recently returned to the country from Dubai, where she was based, lamented how fraudsters drained over N3 million from her bank account after compromising her SIM card.

Her post, laden with grief and disbelief, highlighted the growing incidence of digital theft that has left countless Nigerians vulnerable, as SIM-swap fraud blossoms into a thriving racket, fuelled by weak safeguards within telecom networks and lax oversight in the banking sector. Fraudsters often collude with insiders at mobile service providers to gain unauthorised access to customers’ phone numbers, which can then unlock bank accounts and confidential data.

Despite repeated warnings about the growing menace, regulatory agencies have struggled to enforce stricter controls, leaving ordinary citizens exposed to sophisticated schemes.

For victims like Okorie, the consequences of such incidents go beyond financial loss. The trauma of watching years of savings vanish in minutes is compounded by the slow, often indifferent response of institutions meant to protect them. Many are left battling depression, distrust and a sense of helplessness in a system that seems rigged against the average customer.

Okorie said: “They have taken my money, all my savings from 2022. I was supposed to have about N3 million in my Access Bank account, but when I came back from Dubai, UAE, to check, I couldn’t find even N1,000. I was told my SIM card was given to someone else, and the person has been withdrawing N20,000 from the account since 2024.”

She disclosed that when she took her case to the MTN office, she was informed that her SIM card had been resold because it had remained dormant, with no income-generating activity on the line for over a year.

Okorie was, however, lucky, as her cries attracted public sympathy and the attention of social media critic Martins Vincent Otse, popularly known as Very Dark Man (VDM). Earlier in September, it was learnt that while documentation was ongoing between VDM and Okorie, Access Bank returned the stolen money to her account.

Earlier, in 2020, a Delta State-based trader, Anthony Okolie, was detained by the Department of State Services (DSS) for 10 weeks. His offence was that he had innocently activated an MTN SIM card previously used by Hanan Buhari, daughter of the late former President Muhammadu Buhari.

“I was labelled a criminal overnight,” he told Economic Confidential in a 2025 retrospective.
The growing vulnerability of mobile numbers

ON the one hand, a mobile phone number is a unique sequence of digits assigned to a mobile phone or SIM card that enables the device to make calls, send text messages and connect to a mobile network. In reality, however, it does much more, especially as technology evolves rapidly. It serves as a digital identity, a gateway to banking and government services, and a key to everyday transactions. It has also become an important security tool.

As of July 2026, Nigeria’s telecoms sector had over 300 million connected lines, of which 195 million were active. However, as telecom operators routinely reassign old numbers to new users, some reassigned numbers retain links to financial services, social media accounts and government portals belonging to their previous owners. Fraudsters are exploiting this to impersonate previous users, resulting in identity theft and financial losses.

Fraudulent SIM registrations also remain rampant. Using fake or stolen identities, criminals create digital personas that undermine Nigeria’s national identification system and compromise the integrity of banking services. For victims, reclaiming stolen identities is often a long and difficult process.

The growing importance of mobile phone numbers can also be seen in the increasing range of attacks they face, from SIM-swap fraud and recycled numbers to fraudulent registrations. Increasingly, criminals are exploiting loopholes in telecoms and financial systems to siphon millions of naira from unsuspecting citizens.

Despite regulatory interventions, Nigerians continue to suffer devastating losses, while fraudsters “smile to the bank”.

One of the most common forms of SIM-related fraud is SIM-swap fraud. Here, criminals trick telecoms staff or exploit weak verification processes to hijack victims’ phone numbers. Once they successfully intercept one-time passwords (OTPs), they can gain access to bank accounts and drain available funds.

Another major menace is recycled numbers. This has become commonplace in Nigeria, as established earlier in this report.
Telecom fraud costs Nigeria N12.5 billion in four years
DESPITE investments, public enlightenment and various regulations aimed at curbing telecom-related fraud, the global community has suffered losses of over $38.95 billion in the last four years, confirming that the problem extends beyond Nigeria.

In Nigeria, data showed that telecom-related fraud cost the country N12.5 billion within the same period.

The figures were revealed by PwC, which cited the Nigerian Communications Commission for Nigeria’s data. The firm called on telecom companies in Nigeria to invest in sophisticated anti-fraud tools that employ machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance detection and response times, while conducting regular audits to ensure that their systems remain up-to-date and effective.

In a 16-page document on AI fraud in the telecoms sector, PwC noted the dual role of AI as both a threat and a shield, highlighting the need for Nigerian telecom operators to adopt the technology deliberately and strategically.

Some of the frauds listed by PwC include SIM-box fraud, SMS phishing, SIM-swap fraud, subscription fraud, scam calls and international revenue-share fraud.

According to PwC, the telecommunications industry faces diverse fraud threats, most of which are cyber-enabled. PwC’s Global Crime Survey found that nearly two-thirds of technology, media and telecommunications companies had experienced fraud, the highest rate across all industries, with half of those incidents being cybercrimes.

The firm noted that the growing adoption of AI would likely reshape the fraud landscape, adding that its intersection with financial services amplifies the risks for telecom operators, which enable digital payments and banking partnerships.

Calling for a deeper understanding of how technological disruption is transforming fraud risks and how those risks may evolve, PwC said that in Nigeria, where 59 per cent of e-banking customers had fallen victim to scams, telecommunications providers could face mounting pressure as key infrastructure for digital financial services.

How SIM deactivation and recycling work
UNDER the Nigerian Communications Commission’s Quality of Service Business Rules 2024, a prepaid mobile line that fails to generate revenue for a continuous period of six months must be deactivated. If the inactivity persists for another six months, bringing the total period of non-usage to 12 months, the line becomes eligible for recycling and subsequent reassignment to another user.

Revenue-Generating Events (RGEs) encompass various activities, including outgoing and incoming voice calls, SMS and MMS, mobile data usage and USSD transactions.

The NCC is currently consulting on a new proposal that would introduce a 12-month grace period, allowing subscribers to reclaim unused airtime or data from deactivated lines, provided they can furnish proof of ownership. The proposed rule seeks to balance consumer rights with the operational realities of telecom providers. It would also require telcos to audit all churned numbers and meticulously document any unclaimed and unutilised recharges, while explicitly stating that such credits cannot be monetised by operators.

While the NCC’s proposed grace period for airtime reclamation represents a step towards greater consumer protection concerning telecom credit, it does not directly address the more serious financial fraud risks associated with recycled numbers linked to banking services. The proposal primarily focuses on the recovery of unused airtime or data. This could point to a regulatory gap or a phased approach in which the broader financial security implications of number recycling have yet to be fully integrated into telecom recycling policies.

Who owns a mobile number?
THE Nigerian Communications Act 2003 grants the NCC the authority to protect the rights and interests of both service providers and consumers in the telecommunications sector.

The SIM Card Registration Regulations 2022 define “subscriber” and “subscriber information” and provide for the establishment of a Central Database containing information on all registered subscribers. The database is explicitly designated as the property of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, while licensees (MNOs) retain the right to utilise subscriber information on their networks.

Despite concerted efforts to enhance security and traceability through the mandatory linkage of National Identification Numbers to SIM cards, a dormant line remains eligible for recycling regardless of its NIN linkage status.

This situation reveals a fundamental gap in the management of digital identities across sectors. The government’s ownership of the Central Database for SIM registration and the mandatory NIN-SIM linkage are intended to create a robust and traceable digital identity system, making effective coordination between the systems essential.

However, the fact that NIN linkage does not prevent SIM recycling, while MNOs are permitted to recycle numbers without explicit provisions for purging associated financial data, creates a significant disconnect. The system is designed to identify the current user of a number, but does not adequately ensure the complete dissociation of the previous user’s digital footprint from a recycled number. Consequently, “ownership” of a number for telecommunications purposes does not automatically translate into secure management of the digital identity linked to sensitive financial services.

The Chairman of the Association of Licensed Telecom Operators of Nigeria (ALTON), Gbenga Adebayo, explained that mobile subscribers do not actually own the SIM cards they use, describing this as a global standard. He said operators bear both the procurement and recurring costs associated with every registered line.

According to him, telecom companies routinely recycle SIM cards to prevent number exhaustion and reduce the cost of producing and maintaining new ones. “SIM cards are reassigned to reduce dormant subscribers, as telcos are profit-oriented organisations,” he stated.

How other countries manage SIM recycling
GLOBALLY, telephone numbers are finite public resources. To prevent telecom operators from holding on to numbers indefinitely, regulatory bodies enforce policies governing their reassignment.

In other countries, a SIM or mobile number with no revenue-generating activity, such as calls, texts or data usage, for a specified period may be classified as dormant. The period varies by jurisdiction, ranging from about 30 to 90 days in some cases in the United States and the United Kingdom, and extending to 180 to 360 days in some African countries.

A quarantine period may then apply. Once the dormancy period expires, regulators or telecom operators may require the number to be placed in “quarantine” for a specified cooling-off period, often ranging from 30 to 90 days. This is intended to reduce the risk of the previous user continuing to receive calls or messages and, where applicable, gives them a final opportunity to reclaim the number.

After the quarantine period, the number can be removed from the operator’s active inventory and eventually reassigned to a new customer.

Why SIM fraudsters are still thriving
TELECOM expert Kehinde Aluko is of the view that, despite regulatory initiatives, fraudsters continue to thrive because of weak enforcement. He emphasised that telecom operators often fail to fully comply with regulations, leaving gaps for exploitation.

According to Aluko, a former NITEL staff member, the real issue is not when SIMs are recycled, but how they are recycled, stressing that it is the “how” that needs fixing.

He said that without coordinated delinking across telecom networks, financial institutions and digital platforms, a recycled number remains a gateway to legacy data.

In effect, Aluko said Nigeria risks simply delaying the problem rather than solving it. He stressed that, because of low consumer awareness, many Nigerians remain unaware of SIM-related risks, making them easy targets.

According to him, with mobile numbers central to banking, identity verification and government services, criminals are ruthlessly exploiting this reliance. He added that the impact of SIM infractions extends beyond financial losses, as it erodes trust in Nigeria’s digital economy and undermines national development goals.

Sharing Aluko’s views, the President of the National Association of Telecom Subscribers of Nigeria (NATCOMs), Deolu Ogunbanjo, placed more blame on MNOs and their agents, who, he said, often compromise SIM registration, with “some of them even using other people’s photographs and passports for registrations.”

According to him, subscribers also bear significant responsibility for the persistence of the problem because many prefer the convenience of roadside agents to the longer formal processes at accredited outlets with Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) facilities “to properly clear and authenticate a SIM,” he stressed.

NCC, CBN step up fight against SIM fraud
WHILE the NCC is mandated to investigate and sanction regulatory breaches and violations of the terms of operators’ licences, banks are required to identify unscrupulous staff who collude with fraudsters to perpetrate fraud and hand them over for prosecution.

Recognising the scale of the crisis, the NCC and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) have stepped up efforts to combat SIM-related fraud and other identity risks.

In March this year, the NCC launched the Telecom Identity Risk Management System (TIRMS), a platform that allows banks, fintechs and regulators to verify SIM status in real time. It flags suspicious numbers, blocks fraudulent devices and helps prevent the misuse of churned or recycled SIMs.

The following month, April 2026, the NCC and the CBN signed a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen coordination in responding to fraud. The pact introduced a Telecom Identity Risk Management portal and established joint committees on consumer protection and payment integrity.

The Executive Vice Chairman of the NCC, Dr Aminu Maida, warned that fraudulent SIM use is “eroding public trust in digital platforms and undermining identity systems painstakingly built over the years.”

He emphasised that without decisive action, Nigeria’s digital economy ambitions could be derailed.

The CBN Governor, Olayemi Cardoso, described the NCC-CBN pact as “a practical statement of national interest”, stressing that collaboration is imperative to protect consumers and safeguard financial integrity.

Lawmakers seek 18-month wait before number reassignment
WORRIED by the litany of problems affecting Nigerians through this route, the House of Representatives has urged the NCC to extend the waiting period before inactive phone numbers are reassigned to new users to one year and six months (18 months).

The lawmakers said the move would strengthen compliance with the Data Protection Act 2023 and protect Nigerians from fraud, identity theft and wrongful criminal allegations linked to reassigned phone numbers.

The resolution followed the adoption of a motion sponsored by the member representing Orhionmwon/Uhunmwode Federal Constituency of Edo State, Billy Osawaru, during plenary.

Osawaru proposed that the additional six months should allow inactive numbers due for reassignment to be publicly announced in national newspapers and reported to the police once or twice a year.

He said the measure would improve transparency and make it easier to resolve criminal or fraudulent cases arising from the reassignment of phone numbers.

The House further observed that the NCC’s Telecom Identity Risk Management Policy allows network operators to deactivate and recycle inactive numbers after a defined dormancy period, a policy operators defended as necessary for operational and financial sustainability.

Experts seek real-time safeguards for reassigned numbers
FOR the Chief Digital Officer of Lotus Bank, Akin Adegoke, reallocated SIMs must be de-linked from previous users to curb fraud, even as he maintains that the solution to the menace lies in coordination, rather than more customer warnings.

Banks and telcos, he said, should establish a secure, real-time notification system through which any SIM swap or number reassignment automatically triggers a status update to the linked bank.

Adegoke said that before authorising sensitive transactions, the bank should be able to confirm whether the SIM has recently been recycled. “If it has, the system can temporarily step up authentication or restrict high-risk activity. This does not require reinventing infrastructure. It requires agreed standards, shared responsibility and regulatory backing to make real-time information exchange mandatory rather than optional,” he stated.

Further, he said: “If a SIM card is reassigned without the previous owner de-linking their Bank Verification Number (BVN), the bank’s system should automatically treat that number as high-risk the moment its status changes. Digital banking cores can trigger a temporary freeze on high-value Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) transfers, block profile changes, and require stronger re-verification before any sensitive transaction is approved. This should be automatic, not customer-driven. Once a SIM tenure is reset or a swap is detected, risk controls must activate immediately to protect the account until identity is properly confirmed.”

From his perspective, fintech specialist Goke Adekanmbi said that to curb the losses, Nigeria must evolve its digital public infrastructure (DPI) from a collection of static databases into a network of interoperable systems.

He said the “handshake” must become mandatory and instantaneous. According to him, the moment a SIM swap is initiated, a DPI-enabled signal should automatically trigger a 24-hour “Financial Deep Freeze” on that number across all Nigerian banks.

Adekanmbi said that, instead of a telco agent simply looking at a NIN slip, the swap should require a real-time biometric match against the user’s BVN record. He said if the fingerprints did not match the bank’s record, the swap should be denied.

“Banks should be required to query the NCC registry before processing any USSD transaction above a certain threshold (e.g., N50,000) to ensure the SIM hasn’t been swapped in the last 48 hours … Also, before any SIM is reassigned, telecom operators should be required to trigger a system-wide delinking process, cutting off the number from banking systems, government databases, and digital services,” he stated.

On his part, Chief Corporate Services and Sustainability Officer of MTN Nigeria, Tobechukwu Okigbo, said the risk inherent in slipshod SIM card management extends beyond telecommunications. Operators, he said, have zero tolerance for non-compliance and work only with NCC-licensed entities, stressing that numbers are federally owned and recycled in line with guidelines.

According to him, the convergence of telecommunications and financial services has transformed phone numbers into some of the most sensitive digital credentials Nigerians possess. “The phone number has effectively become part of the password,” he said.

Okigbo admitted that one of the biggest vulnerabilities lies in what happens after phone numbers are recycled.

He explained that although telecom operators may legitimately reassign inactive numbers, many banks, fintech companies, merchant platforms and online services continue to retain the previous owner’s phone number in their systems.

“Even if the original user changes their number, not all systems update instantly. Some banking records, fintech profiles and merchant services may still hold the old number,” he said.

He therefore advocated stronger collaboration between telecom operators and financial institutions so that whenever numbers are recycled, financial institutions receive immediate notifications and can automatically de-link old accounts before fraud occurs.