Olu Ojedokun is a Professor of Law at Lead City University, Ibadan and the Vice-Chancellor of the Protestant University of Rwanda (PUR). In this interview with ROTIMI AGBOLUAJE, the Fellow of the Nigerian Institute of Management (Chartered) examines the Electoral Act 2026 and its implications for the 2027 general elections. He warned that the provision allowing a reversion to manual result sheets when electronic transmission fails could create room for result manipulation, while calling for reforms to strengthen INEC’s independence, improve enforcement of electoral laws, restore voter confidence and enhance the credibility of Nigeria’s electoral process.

As a Nigerian law professor based in Rwanda, how would you assess the Electoral Act 2026 and its capacity to deliver credible elections in Nigeria?

The Electoral Act 2026 represents a transformative moment in the evolving framework of Nigerian electoral law. It introduces appreciable reforms aimed at enhancing transparency, strengthening internal party democracy and improving the use of technology in the electoral process. However, there are critical legal and practical questions regarding its consistency with constitutional provisions, enforceability and the potential for unintended consequences. The introduction of new technological requirements, for instance, is commendable, but technology by itself cannot guarantee credible elections. Its effectiveness depends on the capacity of the institutions responsible for implementing the law.

Therefore, the capacity of these innovations to ensure credible elections in Nigeria will depend on how effectively they are implemented, the institutional capacity available to enforce them and how the courts interpret the provisions of the law.

The law must be clear enough to minimise uncertainty and discretion, particularly in areas that can directly affect the credibility of election results. Where there are ambiguities, those ambiguities could become the subject of litigation after the elections.

In the previous elections, vote-buying was commonplace. Does the Electoral Act 2026 adequately address vote-buying, electoral violence, voter intimidation and other forms of malpractice?

The Act certainly seeks to address these problems, but implementation presents several challenges. There are a few requirements relating to voter identification, including the use of passports, National Identification Numbers, birth certificates and other forms of identification, as well as requirements relating to the downloading of voter cards from the website. There is also the requirement for electronic transmission of results to IReV, with a provision for reverting to the EC8A result sheet where electronic transmission fails. This is where one of the major problems lies.

Many people are concerned that the electronic system could easily be made to fail, thereby removing some of the safeguards intended to prevent manipulation. If the electronic transmission process is allowed to fail without an independent mechanism for establishing whether the failure was genuine, the system could create opportunities for manipulation.

There are therefore concerns about the hierarchy and legal status of electronically transmitted results. These are issues that should be addressed before the 2027 elections. Another concern is the reduction in the timeline for releasing funds to INEC from 12 months to six months. This could affect the commission’s financial independence, its ability to plan adequately and its preparedness for elections.

What are the implications of not making real-time electronic transmission of polling-unit results mandatory for the 2027 elections?

There are concerns about the hierarchy and legality of electronically transmitted results if real-time transmission is not made mandatory. The old practice of manipulating election results between the polling unit and the final collation stage could return. The whole essence of introducing electronic transmission is to reduce the opportunities for human interference and manipulation between the polling unit and the final collation of results. If the law permits a reversion to manual result sheets whenever electronic transmission is said to have failed, there must be a clearly defined procedure for determining what constitutes failure. Otherwise, the provision could become a loophole. The concern is not simply whether technology works or does not work. The bigger question is who determines that the technology has failed, what evidence is required to establish that failure and what happens to the affected results afterwards. These issues need to be clearly addressed to protect the credibility of the electoral process.

Does the new Act sufficiently strengthen INEC’s independence, or does it give the Commission excessive discretion in critical areas such as result transmission?

I rather think that the reduction in the time required to release funding for INEC’s operations from 12 months to six months could hamper the commission. Yes, discretion is given to INEC, but this is partly because the Act seeks to consider the unreliability of our network infrastructure. However, this discretion could be subject to abuse since INEC alone determines whether the network is stable or not. There should be an independent mechanism for determining whether a network failure has genuinely occurred. If INEC is both the institution conducting the election and the institution determining whether the technology used to transmit the results has failed, there could be questions about accountability. The law should therefore provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the discretion given to INEC does not undermine the integrity of the process.

What weaknesses in the new Act could become major sources of electoral litigation after the 2027 elections?

There are several weaknesses that Nigeria needs to address urgently if we are to create a free and fair voting system.

One is the perceived lack of independence of the electoral commission. The difficulties surrounding the candidate selection process have also not been fully addressed. Voter apathy is another concern. Although voter apathy is not necessarily justiciable, it could affect the credibility and legitimacy of elections if sufficient safeguards are not put in place to curb violence and other factors that discourage citizens from participating. There is also a weakness in the punishment for vote-buying and the tendency for law enforcement agencies to turn away from prosecuting it. If people engage in vote-buying and are not adequately prosecuted and punished, the law loses its deterrent effect. These issues could generate litigation after the 2027 elections, particularly where political parties and candidates believe that the electoral process has not been properly administered.

From your experience in Rwanda, are there aspects of its electoral and legal system that Nigeria could adapt to improve election administration and credibility?

I think there is little basis for direct comparison because Rwanda is a much smaller country, with a population of about 13.4 million, and without the level of divisions and complexities that Nigeria has. However, what helps Rwanda is the intentionality of government in ensuring transparency and citizen participation through initiatives such as Umuganda.

Umuganda is a monthly national community service day where citizens gather to build infrastructure and clean neighbourhoods. It encourages citizens to participate directly in the development of their communities. There is also Umushyikirano, the yearly National Dialogue Council, which acts as a form of participatory democracy where citizens and leaders discuss national issues. I have taken part in this initiative, representing my university, the Protestant University of Rwanda.

Another initiative is Ubudehe, a community-driven system used to classify households according to vulnerability levels to facilitate the fair distribution of social benefits. There are also power-sharing rules. The national Constitution provides that the political party with a majority in the Chamber of Deputies cannot hold more than 50 per cent of cabinet seats. All these initiatives contribute to credibility, participation and sustainability within the system.

While Nigeria cannot simply copy Rwanda because of the differences in our political, demographic and constitutional circumstances, there are lessons to be learned from the intentionality with which institutions and citizens are encouraged to participate in governance.

Does the 2026 Act strike the right balance between the use of technology and the need to protect electoral integrity?
I think the Act assumes the worst of Nigerians by assuming that we cannot have a stable and reliable internet network. The balance and onus ought to have been placed on INEC to prove that it cannot transmit electronically when this occurs.

If INEC is unable to transmit electronically, such results should be nullified. The law should not create a situation where failure of an electronic system automatically provides an avenue for reverting to a manual process without clear and independently verifiable conditions. If technology is introduced to strengthen electoral transparency, the law must also ensure that technological failure does not become a convenient route back to the weaknesses that the technology was designed to address.

Is Nigeria’s problem primarily inadequate electoral laws or poor enforcement of existing laws?

I think it is the enforcement of the laws and, sometimes, inconsistency in their interpretation by the courts. Elections are sui generis, meaning they are of their own kind. There is considerable leeway for the courts not to follow particular precedents, and sometimes this minimises our adherence to the electoral laws. The existence of good laws is not enough. Institutions must be willing and able to enforce those laws consistently. Where electoral offences are committed but the offenders are not prosecuted, or where provisions of the law are interpreted inconsistently, citizens lose confidence in the electoral process. Therefore, the challenge is not necessarily that Nigeria does not have laws. We must also ensure that those laws are effectively enforced and consistently interpreted.

If you could recommend key amendments to the Electoral Act 2026 before the 2027 elections, what would they be and why?

The credibility of any electoral process is tied to the independence and capacity of the electoral management body. The first amendment I would recommend concerns the appointment of the head of the electoral commission. The President should not be the one to appoint the head of the commission. Several suggestions have been offered, including the recommendation of the Uwais Committee that the appointment should be made by the National Judicial Council or a multi-stakeholder appointment committee. What matters is that the process should be competitive and open. The credibility of the electoral management body begins with the process through which its leadership is appointed.

Secondly, the loophole in the Act that permits the use of a manual form to send results where electronic technology fails needs to be addressed. The law does not define what constitutes “failure”, nor does it establish an independent process for certifying such failures. This needs to be addressed because the ambiguity recreates the discretion that contributed to the widespread failures of 2023, when only a fraction of results were uploaded promptly. There must be a clear definition of technological failure and an independent process for determining whether such failure has genuinely occurred.

Thirdly, we need to address the steady decline in voter turnout. Voter turnout declined from 52.3 per cent in 1999 to an alarming 26.72 per cent in the 2023 general elections. This is a threat to Nigeria’s democratic legitimacy.

Restoring voter confidence requires showing that votes count. One way of doing this is through electronic transmission of results in a manner that is transparent, verifiable and difficult to manipulate. Electoral offenders must also be prosecuted and punished through meaningful sanctions. If vote-buying and other electoral offences are committed without consequences, it will be difficult to build public confidence in the system. Overall, judicial decisions must respect voter intent rather than being overly focused on technicalities. The ultimate purpose of an electoral process is to ensure that the will of the people, as expressed through their votes, is respected. If we want credible elections in 2027 and beyond, we must strengthen the independence of the electoral management body, close loopholes around electronic transmission, enforce electoral offences and restore citizens’ confidence that their votes will count.