• Continued from yesterday
AND we saw that the chairman of a tribunal can be peremptorily removed halfway through a proceeding and his replacement asked to continue from where he stopped and even rule on applications he never heard! In any proper judicial process this would have been the death knell unless trial was begun de novo. The principles of natural justice are immutable and cannot be overridden by the argument that election petitions are sui generis, and this is the clear intendment of paragraph 25 (2) of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act.

And we saw that only in Rivers did the card reader assume a primacy never before seen anywhere, nor seen anywhere else after, in determining accreditation and voting. Indeed, we saw that the Court of Appeal derogated from its own decision in Agbaje v Ambode in Lagos wherein it laid down the principle that the card reader is a new innovation not within the contemplation of the Electoral Act, and a petitioner cannot rely on it to nullify an election thus affirming the supremacy of the provision of s.138(2) of the Electoral Act. Interestingly, however, the Court of Appeal returned to re-affirm its decision in Ambode’s case in the later case of Emehor v Okowa in Delta. And although it did not directly consider the question, but upheld its broad principles in the two other cases of Gankon v el-Rufai  (Kaduna) and Ladoja v Ajumobi (Oyo).

And we saw that in all cases related to Rivers State, particularly the governorship, the INEC Guidelines and Manual suddenly acquired a new legal imprimatur which even overrode the Electoral Act! We saw that the Court of Appeal devoted a large portion of its judgment on the Rivers State governor’s appeal extolling the importance of the Guidelines and declared it “mandatory”. But the same Court of Appeal had before now emphatically dismissed the Guidelines as “a mere directive” which “does not have the force of law… and there is no sanction for breaching it”. (see Agbaje v Fashola L.E.R. 2008 CA/L/EPT/GOV/01/2007 at p.16).

And we saw also that the Court of Appeal can in one fell swoop annul all of 12 House of Representatives and 3 Senate elections in Rivers, and in another strange instance, needed only a few minutes to cancel 12 state’s House of Assembly elections without bothering with the reasons for their decision in very terse judgments! The circumstances that led to those bizarre decisions were the subject of a petition to the President of the Court of Appeal, the contents of which were the subject of media publication and do not bear repeating here.

These illustrations paint an unedifying picture of our judiciary and in many ways constitute a serious breach of our laws. Such decisions are capable of provoking social upheavals of unimaginable dimensions consequent upon a despairing public losing confidence in the system. It is pertinent to state that the law is not some esoteric alchemy incapable of any degree of exactitude and dependent on the caprice of a judge’s sleight of hand. That is why reliance is placed upon statutes and stare decisis (case law or precedent). Indeed, in the manner of Widdercombe’s bewilderment, one can be forgiven for concluding that we operate a one-court system because too often, the courts below create the impression that they are incapable of delivering justice, and that it is their inexorable destiny to flounder and double-down on error whereas it is the Supreme Court’s bounden duty to deal with it.

It is against this background that the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Mahmud Mohammed recently spoke condemning the whimsical character of the judgments coming from the Court of Appeal and, the ensuing confusion in the judicial landscape. Chief Justice Mohammed’s condemnation has rekindled hope. The Supreme Court has a unique and historical duty to straighten our laws, redeem the integrity of our judiciary and strengthen our democracy. It has never shirked from that responsibility. Its decision a few days ago in the case of Aliyu Shinkafi v Abdulazeez Yari in the Zamfara governorship appeal wherein it restated that “The law requires the petitioner to lead evidence from the polling unit in order to show alleged over-voting” or other corrupt practices, is a heartening re-statement of the law and a re-affirmation that its decision in Kakih v PDP (supra) remains the position of the law on the subject. This decision could not have been more timely given the confusion and contradictions occasioned in many instances by the willful rejection of binding precedents by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court has once again taken a commendable step and risen above the fray to save the judiciary.
• Concluded
• Bob, a lawyer, wrote in from Abuja.