The argument about what Section 83 of the Electoral Act 2026 really means is unfolding.

The section of the Act is supposed to stop courts from getting involved in disputes within political parties. But a top lawyer, Monday Ubani (SAN), is warning against taking this rule too far, saying it’s not what the constitution intended.

He opines that this interpretation is not sustainable and goes beyond what is allowed.

Ubani’s intervention comes in response to remarks by fellow lawyer, Festus Okoye, who suggested that lawyers have increasingly become scapegoats in intra-party disputes due to their frequent recourse to the courts.

At the heart of the disagreement is whether Section 83 effectively shuts the doors of the judiciary against disputes arising from the internal affairs of political parties.

While Section 83(5), read in isolation, appears to bar courts from entertaining such disputes, Ubani argued that this interpretation fails to align with the broader constitutional framework.

According to him, no legislation enacted by the National Assembly can override the judicial powers expressly granted under Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which empowers courts to adjudicate on all matters concerning civil rights and obligations.

He further points to the supremacy clause in Section 1(3) of the Constitution, noting that any statutory provision inconsistent with constitutional guarantees must give way.

“Any attempt, however framed, to exclude judicial intervention where legal rights are violated remains constitutionally questionable,” he maintained.

Drawing on established judicial precedents, Ubani highlighted a consistent pattern in Nigerian jurisprudence that resists efforts to oust the courts’ jurisdiction.

He references landmark decisions such as Lakanmi v AG (Western State), AG Federation v Abubakar, and Abaribe v Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly, where courts firmly asserted their authority and expressed reluctance to recognise legislative attempts to shield institutions from scrutiny.

Although courts have traditionally exercised restraint in matters concerning party politics, as seen in cases like Okafor v Onuoha, Ubani insisted that such restraint is guided by prudence rather than an absolute prohibition.

“Once disputes transcend internal party mechanisms and involve breaches of statutory provisions, constitutional rights, or electoral laws, judicial intervention becomes not only appropriate but necessary,” he said.

He warned that interpreting Section 83 as an absolute bar could have far-reaching consequences, effectively leaving aggrieved party members without remedy in cases of exclusion, manipulation of primaries, or outright illegality.

Such an outcome, he argued, would undermine the foundational legal principle (ubi jus ibi remedium) – where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

Ubani proposes a more balanced reading of the provision, suggesting that its true intent is to discourage frivolous litigation, curb forum shopping, and promote internal dispute resolution mechanisms within political parties and not to extinguish the courts’ constitutional mandate.

The senior advocate also raises concerns about the penal implications of the section, particularly provisions that appear to target lawyers and litigants who seek judicial redress.

He questioned the practicality and fairness of sanctioning legal practitioners based on the outcome of cases, noting that litigation inherently involves uncertainty.

“Who determines what constitutes an appropriate case?” he asks, warning that penalising lawyers for pursuing claims, especially in complex political disputes, could have a chilling effect on access to justice and legal advocacy.

While acknowledging instances of abuse within the legal system, including forum shopping and conflicting ex parte orders, Ubani cautions against overcorrection.

“Two wrongs cannot make a right,” he noted, emphasising that reforms must not come at the expense of constitutional safeguards.

In conclusion, Ubani firmly rejected any interpretation of Section 83 that suggests the judiciary can be sidelined in electoral matters.

“So long as the Constitution endures, judicial power remains intact,” he asserted, warning that any contrary view risks eroding the rule of law itself.

He called for continued engagement among legal scholars and practitioners, underscoring the importance of robust debate in resolving what he describes as a critical constitutional question.