Five leaders and the wheel of fate

One of the ifs of Nigerian history is whether the Civil War that claimed more than one million lives could have been avoided. I am fascinated by the interest of young people in the convoluted events that led to the assassination of General J.T. U Aguiyi-Ironsi and Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the first military governor of the defunct Western Region.

A young man, who just finished his NYSC, confessed he did not know any Nigerian Head of State had been assassinated in the past. It was the 50th anniversary of that assassination that brought the information to his attention. Well, I told him and his colleagues, that all Nigerian rulers, except one, before General Olusegun Obasanjo became military ruler in 1976, were killed in office. The exception was General Yakubu Gowon who was toppled in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975. Gowon’s two predecessors, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa and Ironsi were killed in office. Gowon’s successor, General Murtala Muhammed, was also killed in office during the abortive putsch of February 13, 1976.

With the benefit of hindsight, one cannot but ruminate whether with a different cast of actors, perhaps Nigeria would have been spared the horrors of the Civil War. Many Nigerians welcomed the coup of January 1966. The coup wiped away the pillars of the First Republic including Prime-Minister Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the defunct Northern Region; Chief Ladoke Akintola, the Premier of the defunct Western Region and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance. I would like to examine the roles of five leaders who could have averted the war if they acted differently.

BALEWA
The politics of intolerance played by our leaders of the First Republic made the coup possible. When the opposition Action Group Party, tried to remove Chief Ladoke Akintola as Premier, the Federal Government of Balewa saw the opportunity to have a foothold in the West. The subsequent imposition of a State of Emergency on the West and the imprisonment of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of AG, and his leading lieutenants, for treasonable felony, led to a state of continuous political tension and violence which made the first coup inevitable. It is on record that the coup received widespread support across the country.

AZIKIWE
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the famous journalist, was the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces until the coup of January 1966. Though he reigned while the prime-minister ruled, it was his constitutional duty to announce the new prime-minister. He was on holiday in the Caribbean when the coup took place. Though he was later to condemn the coup, he failed to exercise his constitutional duty to announce a new prime-minister. Instead, Dr. Nwaifor Orizu, the acting President, announced that the rump of the Balewa cabinet has voluntarily ceded power to the most senior military officer, General Ironsi. It should be noted that Ironsi was not part of the coup and he was targeted for elimination by the mutineers.

IRONSI.
How General Ironsi became persuaded that he needed to take over power in order to deal with the mutineers was not clear. He could have helped in stabilising the democratic structures by insisting that the politicians address the grievances of the plotters. It was strange why he had to make relatively junior officers to be governors in the regions. All the four governors were lieutenant colonels. In the West, Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe and Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, were both senior to Fajuyi. The reason why he picked Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a lieutenant colonel, above many senior officers, to be the Chief of Army Staff, was not clear. Perhaps, he was considering that Gowon was the most senior officer from the North who survived the coup. His attempt to dissolve the federal structure and replace it with a unitary system with group of provinces met with disaster.

GOWON
General Yakubu Gowon became Nigerian military ruler at the young age of 32. He was then a lieutenant-colonel, with little experience outside the barracks. One of the puzzles of that period was why he refused to change the governors appointed by Ironsi. Fajuyi was killed and he replaced him with Colonel Adebayo, but the other governors; Hassan Usman Katsina, North, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, East and David Ejooh, Mid-West, retained their post despite the change of government. This was a grave error. He was only able to remove Hassan when he created the 12 states structure. Ejoor lost his job when he fled the Biafran invasion in 1967 and Colonel Murtala Muhammed, the General Officer Commanding the Second Division, appointed one of his commanders, Major Samuel Ogbemudia, as the acting governor. Gowon later confirmed the appointment.

However, the most critical error was Gowon’s decision to move soldiers to their region of origin. The Battalion, Enugu, originally commanded by Fajuyi, with the movement, was taken over by Igbo officers most of whom survived with tales of horrors which fueled Igbo fears. Realising his error, Gowon would not allow all Northern soldiers to move away from Lagos, the seat of government, or the critical military formations in Ibadan and Abeokuta, despite protests and resentments from the West. By allowing only officers of Eastern Nigerian origin to converge on the East, Gowon lost a critical leverage over Ojukwu.

OJUKWU
Ojukwu’s career as war leader shows that leadership is critical to the march of history. What would have happened if the military governor appointed for the East had been either Colonel Phillip Effiong or Colonel George Kurobo? I believe with either of these more temperate men, the war would have been avoided. Ojukwu had the sense of drama, the charisma, the knowledge, the talent and the self-assurance of a leader in crisis. It must have helped that he read history at the prestigious Oxford University in the United Kingdom.

Unlike the average soldier trained under British tradition, Ojukwu was politically ambitious. When he became governor in 1966, he appointed Sir Louis Ojukwu, his wealthy-transporter father, as the chairman of the Eastern Nigerian Housing Corporation. The Zikist press, based in Port Harcourt, criticised the appointment, saying it was unAfrican for a father to serve under the son. Ojukwu ordered that the newspaper be closed. Zik and Sir Louis were hitherto friends.

By isolating himself and his regime from leading politicians like Zik, he deprived it of moderation and alternative sources of advice. This was in sharp contrast to Gowon who invited many experienced leaders like Awolowo, Malam Aminu Kano, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Joseph Tarka and Chief Anthony Enahoro, to join his government. When the Leaders of Thoughts Conference was called by Gowon in 1966, the delegation from the East was led by Prof. Eni Njoku, former vice-chancellor of the University of Lagos. They were ordered not to interact with other leaders and they came with a take-it-or leave it attitude. Moreover, every night, the Eastern delegation would head for the Ikeja airport. Ojukwu had directed that they must sleep in the East everyday.

What would have been the situation if the delegation from the East had been led by Sir Akanu Ibiam, the former governor or Dr. Michael Okpara, the former premier? The North was led by Sir Kashim Ibrahim, former governor of the Northern Region, the West by its first Premier, Chief Awolowo and the Mid-West by Chief Anthony Enahoro, former Minister of Information in the defunct Western Region. Both the North and the West came with proposals for Confederation. The East wanted dissolution of the union. The Mid-West wanted more balanced Federation.

One night, Tarka, a member of the Northern delegation, took Enahoro to meet Sir Kashim. Both Tarka and Enahoro were able to persuade Sir Kashim that the minority nationalities would prefer a federation where they would have their own states. Sir Kashim was persuaded and this was later sold to the Western delegation who bought the idea.

But the Eastern delegation was not in Lagos to negotiate. They wanted the dissolution of the union. Gowon disagreed. Said he: “We are soldiers and we do not have the mandate to dissolve the union. That should be left to elected leaders. Nobody elected us.” He said if the situation normalises, he would hand over power by 1970. In a huff, Ojukwu ordered the Eni Njoku delegation back to the East, citing security concerns. For him, the only alternative to peaceful resolution was war.

Of course, these are just Ifs of history about the road not taken. It shows that leaders are critical to the fortunes of nations and of political enterprises especially at critical times. Now that our great country is facing a different kind of war, perhaps a look into the past may suggest a ways out of the current jig-saw puzzle. There is nothing new under the sun, but new men and women must learn from the old ways to unravel the mysteries of new challenges. They must remove the veil of ignorance that allow leaders to fall into errors of judgment that could lead to dire consequences for generations yet unborn.

In Nigeria, we need to take the process of leadership recruitment more seriously instead of relying on the extraneous influence of ethnicity, religion, money and stomach infrastructure. After all, if a pilot is taking you from Lagos to Abuja, you don’t request to know his faith or his ethnic background. You want to be assured of his competence to fly the plane. Why should the competence of a leader be less critical to us?