Continued from yesterday

A Mature democracy requires competition: principled competition within a shared commitment to national survival and progress. Opposition parties are not enemies of the state; ruling parties are not owners of it. Institutions function best when political actors compete on ideas and performance while cooperating to protect the constitutional order, judicial independence, and democratic norms.
This shift from destructive rivalry to constructive competition is essential for Nigeria’s stability.

The judicial sentinel: Integrity, delays, and the perception of selective justice
Allegations of institutional politicisation have intensified, particularly regarding the judiciary and anti-corruption bodies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). A poignant case study emerges from Bauchi State Governor Bala Mohammed’s December 2025 accusations, where he claimed the federal government was deploying the EFCC for “political witch-hunt” against opposition figures, allegedly at the behest of FCT Minister Nyesom Wike. Mohammed, facing probes into his own past money laundering trial, argued that this represented vendetta politics, undermining the EFCC’s credibility. The EFCC swiftly dismissed these as “baseless,” emphasising its independence and recalling Mohammed’s pre-governorship legal entanglements.

For students of political science, this episode is a classic example of the fear of “lawfare”—using legal and judicial instruments as political weapons. The primary risk, and a core lesson in the study of state legitimacy, is that when anti-corruption bodies are perceived as tools of the ruling party—regardless of the truth of any single accusation—they lose the public trust essential for their function. Their institutional neutrality is hollowed out, and their ability to fight corruption legitimately is impaired.
This weakening of state institutions is mirrored by a parallel weakening of the political opposition itself.

The Africa Judges and Jurists Forum (AJJF) and other international bodies have noted that contemporary threats to judicial independence in Africa are often subtle, involving the intimidation of judicial officers and the manipulation of budgetary allocations. In Nigeria, the “commandist tradition” inherited from decades of military rule continues to influence the psyche of the citizenry and the behaviour of the political class, who often view the law as an obstacle to be bypassed rather than a framework to be upheld. Without urgent reforms such as the introduction of a jury system for serious criminal cases, the judiciary risks becoming a decorative rather than functional pillar of democracy.

Institutions must be defended not because they favour one side, but because they belong to the nation. In a country as diverse and contested as Nigeria, impartial courts and credible enforcement bodies are not luxuries; they are the glue that holds the federation together.

Nigeria’s military has reaffirmed loyalty to democracy, dismissing coup rumours in 2025 and aiding regional stability, as in Benin’s averted intervention. Drawing from the 1966 coup’s chaos, civilian supremacy remains paramount. N an era of Sahelian coups, professionalism and restraint are vital to prevent erosion of democratic gains since 1999.
The Ribadu doctrine: National security and the U.S.-Nigeria joint working group
The security architecture of the Tinubu administration has shifted from the purely kinetic approach toward a strategy of integrated intelligence and global partnership, led by National Security Adviser (NSA) Nuhu Ribadu. This “Ribadu Doctrine” recognises that Nigeria’s internal conflicts—insurgency, banditry, and mass abductions—are increasingly transnational and require sophisticated inter-agency coordination.

In late 2025, the administration launched the Nigeria Counter Terrorism Strategic Plan 2025–2030, which aims to transform the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) into a regional hub for the Sahel and West Africa. A key milestone of this strategy is the operationalisation of the Multi-Agency Anti-Kidnap Fusion Cell, developed with support from the United Kingdom National Crime Agency to address the resurgence of mass kidnappings in rural communities.

The formation of the U.S.-Nigeria Joint Working Group in November 2025 marks a significant escalation in bilateral cooperation. This group, which includes the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, focuses on intelligence sharing, border security, and counter-terrorism operations. This partnership is particularly critical given the United States’ recent designation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) over alleged religious freedom violations—a designation that Nigerian officials, led by Ribadu, visited Washington to challenge and resolve.

Despite a 160 percent increase in the security budget between 2023 and 2024, the results on the ground remain mixed. While there has been a slight reduction in terrorism-related deaths according to the Global Terrorism Index, the Northern region continues to bear the heaviest impact of rural banditry and terror group attacks. In April 2025, state governors, including Babagana Zulum of Borno, expressed profound concern that government forces were “losing ground” in some areas due to systematic violence.

Security remains the most immediate test of state legitimacy. The Tinubu administration’s shift toward intelligence‑led, inter‑agency and internationally coordinated security reflects modern realities. However, security is not only a matter of hardware and strategy. It is also social trust, economic inclusion, and local legitimacy. A nationalistic approach recognises that security failures wound the entire nation, regardless of region or religion, and that solutions require unity rather than politicisation.

Global realignment: The 4Ds, BRICS, and West African leadership
Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Tinubu has moved from “passive to active global engagement,” guided by the “4Ds” doctrine: Democracy, Development, Demography, and Diaspora. This framework seeks to leverage Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most populous nation and one of the continent’s largest economies to secure more ownership of international decisions affecting the continent.

The most consequential shift in this arena was Nigeria’s admission as a partner country into the BRICS bloc in 2025. This move signals “strategic hedging” or “pragmatic autonomy,” whereby Abuja deepens economic ties with China and the BRICS bloc while preserving security cooperation with traditional Western partners like the U.S. and the EU. Trade data from the first three quarters of 2025 underscores the impact of this engagement: trade with BRICS countries rose to over N5.41 trillion, outpacing exports to several traditional partners.

At the regional level, Nigeria’s leadership within ECOWAS remains central but embattled. The sub-region is confronting a convergence of “unconstitutional power transitions” in states like Niger, Burkina Faso, as well as Mali, and evolving security threats in the Sahel. Nigeria has maintained a principled position on democratic governance while engaging in “stabilising diplomacy” to keep channels open with key actors in neighbouring states.

The administration has also invested heavily in “soft power,” recognising the Nigerian Diaspora as a major economic actor. Remittances are a significant contributor to growth, and the government frames Nigerians abroad as “cultural ambassadors” who shape the global narrative of the country. This is coupled with a more assertive stance on international finance reform and Global South activism, particularly concerning UN Security Council reform.

However, analysts warn that overt alignment with a China-led bloc could alienate Western investors or complicate access to Eurobond markets, requiring a “calibrated strategy” to avoid the Great Power competition it seeks to navigate.Public confidence was tested further by controversy over a multimillion‑dollar international lobbying contract in early 2026. Critics argued that the expenditure appeared misaligned with pressing domestic needs in health, education, and security.

Foreign policy should not be read through partisan lenses, but through the prism of national interest: economic opportunity, security cooperation, and the welfare of Nigerians at home and abroad. Unity at home strengthens credibility abroad.

This debate should be understood not as an argument against diplomacy or reputation management, but as a reminder of sequencing and symbolism. In times of national strain, policy choices must visibly privilege domestic cohesion. A confident nation earns its reputation abroad primarily by delivering dignity, safety, and opportunity at home.

International eyes—media, investors, diaspora, governments—scrutinise Nigeria’s signals. Perceptions are improving: credit upgrades from Moody’s and Fitch cite policy credibility, and diaspora media highlights global relevance. Yet, handling dissent draws concern, with calls for restraint amid protests. Reputational costs from corruption or instability could deter FDI; benefits lie in projecting stability to attract partners in a multipolar world.

Nigeria’s current ordeal is not unique. Many nations have endured painful transitions on the path to stability and growth. What distinguishes success from failure is whether hardship fragments society or forges solidarity. This is a moment for national maturity: for citizens to criticise without delegitimising the state; for politicians to compete without undermining the nation; and for the government to lead with empathy, transparency, and inclusion.

Conclusion: Statesmanship and the sovereign ledger
As President Bola Ahmed Tinubu approaches the third year mark of his first term, the “Sovereign Ledger” of his administration presents a study in contrasts. There is an undeniable boldness in the fiscal and monetary reforms that have brought the nation back from the brink of distress. The technical merits of the 2025 Tax Reform Acts and the “willing buyer–willing seller” FX framework suggest a commitment to modernising the Nigerian state that is unprecedented in the Fourth Republic.

Yet, this modernisation is occurring within a fragile institutional shell. The “defection epidemic” and the decimation of the opposition, the persistent delays in the judiciary, and the resurgence of rural insecurity threaten to undermine the very stability that the economic reforms seek to achieve. The 2027 general elections will be a crucible for Nigerian democracy. If the administration continues to prioritise elite patronage and the consolidation of power over the rebuilding of the social contract, it risks entrenching a system of “individual opportunism” that will eventually alienate the populace.

A sobering, statesmanlike diagnosis suggests that Nigeria can still avoid the “failed-state” scenario if it acts decisively to rebuild legitimacy. This involves:
Fiscal Transparency: Implementing digital anti-corruption platforms to ensure that the improved revenues from subsidy removal actually benefit the most vulnerable.

Institutional Reform: Strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the EFCC to ensure they are not perceived as instruments of selective justice.

Human Capital Investment: Redirecting resources from elite subsidies—such as the Hajj and national parades—to healthcare and education to halt the “Japa” drain.

Regional Leadership: Using ECOWAS to contain regional instability, thereby raising the cost of external interference and Great Power rivalry.

Nigeria remains a “hybrid democracy” at a strategic crossroads. The remainder of the Tinubu years will determine whether the “Renewed Hope” agenda was a genuine blueprint for national reconstruction or a sophisticated rebranding of the old patronage-driven order. The state of the nation as it approaches 2027 is one of precarious potential; it is a nation that has the tools for greatness but remains haunted by the institutional ghosts of its past. For the administration, the challenge is no longer merely to reform the economy, but to save the soul of the democratic process itself.

Read the remaining part of this article on www.guardian.ng

Prof. Azaiki, former secretary to the Bayelsa State Government, was a member of the House of Representatives from 2019-2023.