By Chiwuike Uba

Continued from yesterday

Tinubu must also confront insecurity. For citizens, economic prosperity is meaningless if they cannot farm safely, travel freely or protect their families. Recent reporting indicates that insecurity remains a major concern and that economic hardship and insecurity dominate public anxiety. Tinubu’s campaign must therefore make 2027 a referendum not simply on reforms but on whether those reforms have begun to produce a safer, more productive and more prosperous Nigeria.

Atiku Abubakar faces a different strategic problem. He does not have to defend the record of the Tinubu administration. He has to persuade Nigerians that replacing it with him would produce a better outcome. That means converting anti-incumbency into pro-Atiku sentiment.

A voter saying “Tinubu has failed” has not necessarily said “Atiku should be president.” The first is dissatisfaction; the second is a mandate. Atiku must bridge that gap. His campaign therefore needs a credible counterfactual: What would Nigeria look like under an Atiku presidency? How would his economic philosophy translate into jobs, investment, lower business costs, stronger institutions, better infrastructure and improved living standards?

If his answer is private-sector-led growth and greater economic liberalisation, he must explain the mechanisms through which those policies will affect ordinary Nigerians. If he advocates institutional reform, he must demonstrate how it will improve public-sector performance. If he promises greater efficiency, he must identify where government expenditure can be reduced without weakening essential services.

Atiku also needs to address generational renewal. Nigeria’s electorate is overwhelmingly young. Experience can be an asset, but experience without a credible mechanism for generational transition can become a political liability.

Most importantly, Atiku must build a national coalition rather than simply inherit dissatisfaction with Tinubu. He must reach beyond his traditional constituencies to young voters, professionals, entrepreneurs, farmers, traders, workers and Nigerians who are politically disillusioned but not naturally inclined to support him.

His greatest danger is assuming that the weaknesses of the incumbent constitute the strength of the opposition. They do not. Atiku must earn the alternative vote.

Peter Obi’s strategic challenge is perhaps the most distinctive. His principal asset is the extraordinary political energy demonstrated by the Obidient movement. But the central danger is confusing *political enthusiasm with electoral capacity*. Crowds are not votes. Social-media influence is not geographical penetration. Endorsements are not organisation. A movement is not automatically an electoral machine.

Obi must therefore make the transition from *movement to organisation, from enthusiasm to turnout, and from personality to national coalition.*

His first task is geographical expansion. His support must move beyond the constituencies in which he has demonstrated exceptional enthusiasm and become genuinely competitive across the country. A presidential campaign cannot rely on the assumption that popularity among young, educated and digitally connected Nigerians will automatically translate into national victory.

Obi must know precisely where the votes required to win are located. He needs a state-by-state, senatorial-district-by-senatorial-district and LGA-level electoral strategy. He must understand where his 2023 support was concentrated, where turnout limited his performance and where relatively modest increases in support could produce significant electoral gains.

His second task is policy depth. The language of prudence, accountability, production and human capital is attractive, but Nigerians will eventually demand specifics. How will his government create jobs? How will it finance infrastructure? What will it do about electricity, security, agriculture, education and healthcare? How will it manage debt? How will it transform Nigeria from a predominantly consumption-driven economy into a productive one?

His third task is organisational. The Obidient movement has demonstrated an impressive capacity to mobilise people. The challenge now is to create an organisation capable of mobilising them where and when it matters electorally. That means credible local structures, trained polling-unit agents, grassroots intelligence, voter engagement and disciplined coordination.

Obi does not need bigger crowds nearly as much as he needs deeper organisation. If he can transform the Obidient phenomenon from a personality-centred movement into a national political coalition built around a coherent governing philosophy, he becomes a formidable contender. If he cannot, he risks remaining one of Nigeria’s most popular political figures without possessing the organisational architecture required to win the presidency.

The strategic imperatives are therefore clear. Tinubu must convert incumbency into a performance mandate. Atiku must convert dissatisfaction into a credible alternative. Obi must convert enthusiasm into electoral organisation. Yet the lesson applies equally to governorship and legislative candidates.

Every candidate should begin with the electoral map, not the campaign slogan. The critical questions are: Where are my votes? Where am I weak? Where is the election competitive? Which voters are persuadable? What prevents supporters from voting? What local issues determine political behaviour? What organisational capacity exists at ward and polling-unit level?

The successful campaign will integrate demographic information, socioeconomic conditions, previous election results, turnout patterns and local political structures into a single strategic intelligence system. The central mistake is to campaign to an imaginary voter.

Nigerian voters are not merely “youths”, “women”, “farmers”, “Northerners”, “Southerners”, “Christians”, “Muslims”, “urban voters” or “rural voters”. They are citizens whose political choices are shaped by economic interests, identity, security, expectations, experience and perceptions of leadership.

The candidate who understands these intersections will campaign more intelligently than the candidate who relies on slogans. Ultimately, the 2027 election should be understood as a contest among three competing propositions.

Tinubu is asking Nigerians to continue a reform trajectory. Atiku is asking Nigerians to change course. Obi is asking Nigerians to break more decisively with the established political order. The decisive question is not which proposition sounds most attractive at a rally.

It is which candidate can make his proposition credible to enough Nigerians, in enough parts of the country, and organise those citizens into an electoral majority. That requires more than popularity. It requires political intelligence, socioeconomic understanding, coalition-building, organisation and a credible governing programme.
Concluded.

Tinubu must demonstrate that the pain of reform is yielding tangible dividends. Atiku must demonstrate that he represents more than dissatisfaction with Tinubu. Obi must demonstrate that the Obidient movement is more than a powerful expression of political enthusiasm.

The 2027 election will therefore not be won simply by the candidate who can generate the greatest excitement. It will be won by the candidate who can most effectively connect Nigeria’s economic reality, the electorate’s expectations, the mathematics of the electoral system and the credibility of his governing proposition.

The fundamental strategic lesson is simple: Do not campaign merely to be popular. Build the coalition, organisation and governing proposition required to be elected.

For Tinubu, the question is whether Nigerians believe the reforms are finally beginning to deliver. For Atiku, it is whether Nigerians believe he offers a better alternative. For Obi, it is whether those who believe in him can be transformed from an enthusiastic movement into a disciplined national electoral force. And beneath all three questions lies the ultimate test of 2027: After years of economic hardship, insecurity and political disappointment, who can convince Nigerians that the next four years will produce not merely a different government, but a materially better Nigeria? That is the election that lies ahead.

Concluded

Prof. Uba is a development economist and public financial management expert.