By Adeolu Ojedokun

Kidnapping in Nigeria has evolved far beyond opportunistic banditry. It has become an organised criminal enterprise supported by intelligence gathering, arms supply chains, informant networks, financial negotiators and increasingly sophisticated logistics. Groups displaced by security operations in one region do not simply disappear; they adapt, relocate and exploit areas where forests provide concealment, inter-state coordination is weak and ransom payments remain profitable.

The expansion of kidnapping into the Southwest did not occur overnight.

For years, security analysts warned about the gradual southward movement of criminal networks and the growing vulnerability of the Ibadan–Ilorin, Ilesa–Akure and Akure–Owo corridors. Farmers, transport operators and rural communities repeatedly raised concerns about increasing criminal activity around forest reserves. Oriirewas therefore not an isolated incident. It was the predictable convergence of criminal adaptation and institutional inertia.

This is why a state-by-state response will remain inadequate. Forests linking Oyo, Kwara and Osun do not recognise administrative boundaries, and neither do the criminal organisations operating within them. Security operations confined to one state merely displace the threat into another jurisdiction, allowing criminal groups to regroup and return. Nigeria cannot secure interconnected forests through fragmented governance.

What is required is a fundamental shift from reactive security operations to proactive forest governance.

First, Nigeria should undertake a comprehensive national forest security audit. This should not become another committee report gathering dust on government shelves. Rather, it should be a technology-driven mapping of national parks, forest reserves and other ungoverned corridors vulnerable to kidnapping, banditry and illegal mining. Satellite imagery, drone surveillance, geographic information systems and community intelligence should be integrated into a continuously updated national database of forest security risks. We cannot effectively secure spaces we have neither adequately mapped nor consistently monitored.

Second, forest security must become a genuine partnership between the state and local communities.

Traditional rulers, religious leaders, hunters, vigilantes and forest-adjacent communities possess generations of knowledge about forest routes, water sources, seasonal movements and hidden pathways that rarely appear on official maps. Their participation should not be viewed as symbolic or ceremonial but as a strategic component of national security. Experiences from countries such as Senegal and Kenya demonstrate that community participation can strengthen the protection and governance of forested areas when supported by clear legal frameworks, adequate training and institutional coordination. Nigeria should adapt, not merely copy, such models to its own realities.

Third, the proposed forest guard initiative should be implemented with professionalism, accountability and inter-agency coordination. Recruitment alone will not solve the problem. Effective forest security requires specialised training, clear rules of engagement, modern communication equipment, intelligence sharing, adequate welfare and strong coordination among the military, police, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Park Service, Amotekun and other relevant agencies. Without these safeguards, the multiplication of security actors may simply increase institutional fragmentation rather than strengthen national security.

Finally, forest governance must be integrated with rural development and early warning systems. Many communities surrounding Nigeria’s forests continue to experience poor infrastructure, limited economic opportunities and weak state presence. Criminal organisations exploit precisely these conditions for recruitment, logistics and concealment. Investing in roads, telecommunications, schools, healthcare and sustainable livelihoods around forest communities is therefore not merely a development strategy; it is also a security strategy.

Equally important is the establishment of trusted reporting mechanisms through which local residents can safely communicate suspicious activities without fear of retaliation or official indifference. The lesson from Sambisa is clear: warning signs are valuable only when institutions are prepared to receive, verify and act upon them.

The rescue of the Oriire pupils should rightly be celebrated. It reflects the commitment of security agencies, government authorities, traditional institutions and local communities working together to save innocent lives. But rescue is not the same as prevention. If every kidnapping is treated simply as an isolated emergency rather than evidence of a deeper governance challenge, Nigeria will continue to win individual rescue operations while losing the larger struggle against organised criminal networks.

Ogbomoso has long been known for education, enterprise and stability. It is home to Ladoke Akintola University of Technology and occupies an important place in the history of the old Oyo Empire. Whether it continues to be associated with those achievements or becomes another symbol of Nigeria’s expanding kidnapping crisis will depend on whether policymakers see the Oriire tragedy as an isolated incident or as an early warning of a much larger problem.

Sambisa taught Nigeria a painful lesson: a forest ignored today can become a fortress reclaimed tomorrow only at enormous cost. Old Oyo National Park presents an opportunity to apply that lesson before history repeats itself. Every major security crisis begins somewhere the state stopped governing. Yesterday it was Sambisa. Today it is the forests around Old Oyo. Tomorrow it could be another corridor we choose to ignore.

The question is no longer whether criminals will use Nigeria’s forests. They already do. Nigeria still has the opportunity to prevent another Sambisa. Whether it does so depends on one question: who will govern the forests before the criminals do?
Concluded.

Ojedokun is a Ph.D Candidate in International Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University, Georgia, USA. His doctoral research focuses on the early warning signs and prevention of mass atrocities in postcolonial Africa. He writes on conflict, religion, governance, security and development in Africa.