While attending a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) leadership seminar with Ghanaian cabinet members in Accra, I noticed that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had kicked off its 50th anniversary celebrations.
ECOWAS, established in 1975, was the brainchild of Nigeria’s then-Minister of Economic Development Adebayo Adedeji, who went on to head the UN Economic Commission for Africa from 1975 to 1991. It was his vision of a borderless West Africa where goods, people, and services could move freely that ultimately united 15 countries across the region.
By 1990, ECOWAS had established a free-trade area, and West Africa recorded one of the world’s highest intra-regional mobility rates. In the following decade, it led two peacekeeping missions that helped end civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Under the leadership of Ghana’s Mohamed Chambas, the bloc supported the democratic transitions of Guinea, Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso. In 2015, it reached another milestone with the adoption of a common external tariff.
But these hard-won achievements are now at risk of being undone. Since the 2010s, jihadist insurgencies led by Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda affiliates – and partly fuelled by NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya – have devastated the Sahel. In 2024, the tri-border region of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso accounted for 3,066 of the world’s 7,555 terrorism related deaths; nearly five million people have fled to neighbouring countries.
The resulting insecurity has destabilised the region, triggering a wave of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea between 2020 and 2024. Meanwhile, the civilian governments of Togo, Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal became increasingly autocratic.
Compounding these problems, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS in January, accusing the bloc of serving neo-colonial interests. Nigeria’s close political and commercial ties to France have grown, even as French troops have been expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire amid often fierce anti-French protests.
With the departure of the three Sahelian countries, ECOWAS has lost 76 million people – roughly 17 per cent of its population – and nearly half of its territory. Now, the bloc’s survival depends on six of its founding members, most of which are mired in turmoil.
Nigeria, which accounts for over 50 per cent of ECOWAS’s population and 60 per cent of its economic output, was once widely viewed as the bloc’s stabilising force. But it has since become a source of instability, owing to its ongoing failure to contain the jihadist insurgency in the country’s volatile northeast.
In March, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu declared a “state of emergency” – which was recently lifted – in the oil-rich and politically unstable Rivers, suspending the state parliament and Governor Siminalayi Fubara for six months International and domestic observers, including the Nigerian Bar Association, condemned the move as unconstitutional amid growing concerns over creeping autocracy.
Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa’s second-largest economy, could also slide into autocratic rule. President Alassane Ouattara – a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund – oversaw average annual growth of 7 per cent between 2012 and 2023, accelerating infrastructure development and expanding electricity access. But he is serving an unconstitutional third presidential term and has manipulated state institutions to sideline political opponents, including opposition leader Tidjane Thiam, who was recently banned from running in this month’s presidential election.
In neighbouring Ghana, ECOWAS’s third-largest economy, President John Mahama has returned to power following a landslide election victory. His predecessor, Nana Akufo-Addo, left behind a legacy of economic turmoil, marked by corruption allegations and a 2022 sovereign debt default that triggered a $3 billion IMF bailout. The resulting austerity measures led to rolling power outages and a steep decline in living standards, paving the way for Mahama’s return from the political wilderness.
Meanwhile, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have embarked on an experiment in regional autonomy. Before withdrawing from ECOWAS, the three countries formed the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) – a mutual defence pact aimed at creating a joint counterterrorism force, establishing an investment bank, and collaborating on agriculture, energy, and infrastructure projects.
Despite these ambitions, all three remain part of the eight-member, French-controlled West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Each has curtailed democratic freedoms and announced five-year transitions to civilian rule while relying on Russian Africa Corps mercenaries for security support. Yet the shift in foreign backers has done little to turn the tide against jihadist insurgents, with large swaths of their territory still under militant control.
Political instability and climate change have underscored the structural vulnerabilities of ECOWAS’s heavily indebted member states, which remain largely dependent on mineral and cash-crop exports. Intra-regional trade accounts for just 12 per cent of total commerce, while 38.4 per cent of adults live below the poverty line. The bloc also suffers from high unemployment, especially among people under 25, who comprise 65 per cent of its population and account for many of the desperate migrants risking dangerous Atlantic and Mediterranean crossings to reach Europe. With limited resources to address infrastructure deficits, member states are acutely susceptible to climate-related threats like droughts, floods, and desertification.
Despite an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment, ECOWAS’s three largest economies – Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana – must take the lead in driving industrialisation and establishing a functioning customs union. With little international support, the landlocked Sahelian countries will struggle to create the economies of scale needed for rapid economic development. Moreover, they lack the capital and technical capacity to offer a viable alternative integration model.
Mahama and Senegalese President Bassirou Faye have made some progress in bridging the divide between ECOWAS and the AES. But reports suggest that Togo and Benin may join the emerging bloc, potentially inflaming an already volatile regional landscape. Encouragingly, ECOWAS and the AES have agreed to maintain the free movement of people, goods, and services across their shared borders.
While ECOWAS has left the door open for the return of its three prodigal members, its 50th anniversary is a reminder of Adedeji’s prescient warning.
“In the final analysis, it is politics and not economics that will ultimately determine the fate of regional integration arrangements.”
Adebajo is a Professor and a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship.
