By Salisu Maikasuwa

Nigeria’s security challenge has reached a point where improvisation is no longer enough. The country needs a security policy that looks beyond the crisis of today and anticipates the threat of tomorrow. This is why President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s decision to develop a National Threat Assessment and a rolling five-year Strategic Defence Operations Plan deserves attention. It signals an attempt to move Nigeria’s security architecture from reacting to emergencies to planning deliberately for them.

For years, one of the weaknesses in Nigeria’s security response has been the tendency for institutions to work around the same problems without always working from the same strategic picture. The military may have its operational priorities, intelligence agencies their assessments, and other security institutions their own concerns. President Tinubu’s new framework seeks to bring these strands together, and the message is straightforward: Nigeria cannot afford fragmented security planning when the threats confronting it are increasingly interconnected.

This is also where the appointment of Major General Adeyinka A. Famadewa (Rtd) has become politically and strategically significant.
When President Tinubu appointed Famadewa as Special Adviser on Homeland Security in May 2026, he was not merely filling a vacant position. He was bringing into the Presidency an officer whose professional background is deeply rooted in intelligence, strategic planning, counter-terrorism and inter-agency coordination.

Famadewa’s experience is particularly relevant to the direction the President is now pursuing. As Principal General Staff Officer to the National Security Adviser between 2015 and 2021, he was involved in strengthening intelligence coordination at the Office of the National Security Adviser. His role in the establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Centre brought together information from the Defence Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Agency, Department of State Services, Nigeria Police Force and the Armed Forces. That experience is precisely the kind of institutional knowledge required when the objective is to make Nigeria’s security agencies work as parts of one national system.

The importance of this cannot be overemphasised. In the fight against terrorism, kidnapping, banditry and organised crime, possessing information is not enough. The real advantage comes when intelligence is shared promptly, analysed properly and converted into action. A warning that remains inside one institution is of limited value. An intelligence picture shared across agencies can save lives. Famadewa understands this distinction, and it is one of the strongest arguments for the role he has been given.

President Tinubu’s emerging security model therefore appears to be built around coordination rather than competition among institutions. The composition of the committee handling the National Threat Assessment and Strategic Defence Operations Plan tells its own story. The National Security Adviser, Defence Minister, Service Chiefs and heads of the DSS and NIA are being brought into one strategic process. That is a recognition that Nigeria’s security problem cannot be solved by the armed forces alone or by any single intelligence agency.

Famadewa’s task is consequently bigger than producing another government document. He has to help translate the collective knowledge of Nigeria’s security institutions into a coherent national strategy. The threat assessment will identify what genuinely poses the greatest danger to the country, while the five-year plan will establish what capabilities are required to confront those dangers.

There is another reason Famadewa’s appointment to coordinate and provide secretariat support for the 11-man committee matters. His experience did not end with his military career. At the Nigerian Army Resource Centre, he continued to contribute to discussions on policing, civil-security cooperation and national security reform. That gives him an appreciation of a reality sometimes overlooked in security debates: that military strength alone cannot guarantee lasting internal security.

Effective policing, intelligence, community cooperation and public confidence are equally important. The Tinubu administration deserves credit for recognising that Nigeria’s security environment is changing.

The threats are no longer confined to conventional battlefields. Criminal networks exploit difficult terrain, terrorists adapt their methods, kidnappers use technology and intelligence, while economic and social vulnerabilities can create fresh opportunities for insecurity. A serious national security strategy must therefore be flexible enough to respond to both familiar threats and those that have not yet fully emerged.

Famadewa has now been tasked with the difficult responsibility of helping to build that flexibility into the national security system. His experience gives him an advantage, but experience alone will not be enough. The committee as a whole must be willing to challenge old assumptions, identify uncomfortable weaknesses and recommend capabilities based on actual threats rather than institutional preferences. National security planning must be about Nigeria’s needs, not about protecting bureaucratic territories.

The President’s directive also carries a political message. Tinubu is signalling that security should be treated as a long-term national project rather than a collection of disconnected interventions. That approach is consistent with the broader logic of his administration: that reforms may be disruptive in the short term, but they are intended to create systems that can function more effectively over time. In security, the same principle applies.

Nigeria needs structures that survive individual operations, commanders and political cycles.
Of course, Nigerians have heard ambitious security promises before. What will ultimately matter is implementation. A beautifully written threat assessment will not stop an attack, and a five-year plan will mean little if its recommendations are not backed by funding, equipment, trained personnel and political will. The test for Famadewa and the security leadership will therefore be whether strategy is translated into measurable improvements on the ground.

This is why Famadewa’s assignment should be viewed as one of the more consequential responsibilities within the President’s security architecture. He has been placed at the intersection of intelligence, defence planning and homeland security at a time when Nigeria cannot afford institutional silos.

If he succeeds in helping the administration establish a genuinely integrated threat assessment and a practical defence operations framework, he would be contributing not merely to Tinubu’s security agenda but to the long-term strengthening of Nigeria’s national security system. His background clearly suggests that he understands the terrain.

*Maikasuwa writes from Kaduna