By Muyiwa Jimoh

About two months ago, Professor Sylvester Odion Akhaine granted an interview to Sahara television on the likely turn of event in the 2027 general elections, especially the presidential. It is worth engaging with. It seems to me that the central question of the discussion is whether Nigeria’s opposition parties, despite their fragmentation, can collectively mount a credible challenge to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in the 2027 presidential election. Professor Akhaine’s analysis suggests that the principal weakness of the opposition is not simply its numerical strength but its lack of ideological cohesion, organisational capacity, political capital, internal coordination, and a convincing alternative programme of governance.

This argument is consistent with his earlier assessment that Nigeria’s opposition suffers from a weak political culture in which political parties frequently function more as instruments for acquiring political power than as institutions organised around coherent political ideas. The consequence is that political alliances can easily become arrangements based on personalities, individual ambitions and the distribution of political positions rather than shared principles or a clearly defined programme of government.The implication is significant. An opposition alliance does not automatically become an effective political alternative merely because several prominent politicians join forces.

For an alliance to defeat an incumbent president, it must transform individual political ambitions into a common political project capable of attracting voters across Nigeria’s diverse regions, ethnic groups, religious communities and socioeconomic constituencies. The success of such an alliance therefore depends not merely on the number of politicians involved but on the quality of the political organisation and programme that binds them together.

Another strong element of the interview is the discussion on the fragmentation of Nigeria’s opposition. Since the 2023 presidential election, several major opposition figures and political tendencies have been associated with attempts to develop an alliance or merger capable of challenging the ruling All Progressives Congress in 2027. However, these political actors do not necessarily share identical political interests, ideological commitments or strategic objectives.The opposition consists of politicians with different regional bases, personal ambitions, political histories and expectations concerning the distribution of political power.

Consequently, bringing them together under one political arrangement does not automatically resolve fundamental questions such as who should emerge as the presidential candidate, who should serve as running mate, how political offices should be distributed, what role each participating party should play, and what ideological or policy programme the coalition should pursue.

Akhaine’s observation concerning the weak ideological boundaries among Nigerian political parties is therefore particularly relevant. Where political parties are primarily vehicles for political advancement rather than institutions representing clearly differentiated political philosophies, defections, mergers and realignments become relatively easy. Politicians may move between parties without necessarily abandoning a clearly defined ideological commitment because such commitments are often weak or insufficiently institutionalised.

Akhaine calls attention the particularly important question of lack of strong ideological differentiation among Nigerian political parties. In a mature democratic system, political parties ordinarily provide citizens with competing ideas about how society should be organised and governed. They may differ over economic policy, social welfare, taxation, federalism, education, foreign policy, security, public ownership, market regulation and the appropriate role of government.Where ideological distinctions are weak, however, elections can become excessively personalised. Instead of asking what political programme a party represents, voters may be encouraged to focus primarily on which politician they prefer. Political competition consequently becomes a contest between personalities rather than a contest between alternative visions of governance.

This transformation from programme-based politics to personality-based politics creates serious problems for democratic accountability. When parties lack distinctive ideological and policy commitments, voters may find it difficult to evaluate them according to consistent standards. Elected officials can subsequently change political positions without necessarily being confronted with a clearly identifiable ideological commitment that they have violated.Akhaine’s criticism of what he regards as narcissistic and self-serving political behaviour among opposition politicians is relevant to this problem. His argument suggests that political actors may sometimes prioritise personal political advancement over the development of institutions and programmes capable of addressing Nigeria’s structural challenges.

Akhaine’s broader analysis raises the question as to whether a divided opposition can defeat an incumbent. He suggests that a divided opposition can, in principle, defeat an incumbent, but doing so would be extremely difficult under prevailing Nigerian political conditions. Nigeria’s political history demonstrates that incumbency does not guarantee permanent electoral victory. Political alliances can emerge, public dissatisfaction can increase, political calculations can change, and electoral circumstances can develop in unexpected ways.This is why Akhaine’s argument concerning political capital deserves particular attention.

Political capital cannot be created simply through the announcement of a political alliance. It requires sustained engagement with citizens, the development of political structures, the cultivation of trust and the ability to translate political support into organised electoral action.His emphasis on building political capital at the state level is therefore particularly significant. A presidential coalition without strong state and grassroots structures may have considerable visibility but remain organisationally weak. Presidential elections are national contests, but their results are ultimately produced through millions of individual votes distributed across polling units and local communities.

Another important element of the analysis is Nigeria’s complex regional political structure. Presidential elections in Nigeria cannot realistically be analysed without considering geopolitical divisions, voting patterns, ethnic affiliations, religious identities and historical expectations concerning the rotation of political power. Akhaine has argued that the informal expectation concerning the rotation of political power between northern and southern Nigeria could influence the political configuration of the 2027 election. This argument is significant because it recognises that Nigerian electoral behaviour is not determined exclusively by policy preferences.Nevertheless, there is a danger in treating regional voting patterns as fixed or inevitable. Nigerian voters are not politically homogeneous. Economic hardship, unemployment, insecurity, education, corruption, public services, candidate reputation, political performance and local interests can all influence electoral behaviour.

Regional identity should therefore be treated as one variable among several rather than as an unchangeable law of Nigerian electoral politics. Political candidates and parties capable of presenting a compelling national programme may transcend some established regional political boundaries.

Furthermore, the concept of political capital is central to understanding the discussion. Political capital can be understood as the accumulated capacity of a politician or political organisation to influence citizens, mobilise supporters, establish political networks, develop institutional relationships and convert public support into electoral results.A politician may possess considerable popularity without possessing sufficient political capital. Similarly, a political party may have a famous presidential candidate but lack the organisational structures necessary to convert the candidate’s popularity into votes.

This distinction explains why presidential popularity alone does not necessarily translate into electoral victory. Political capital must be transformed into organisational capacity. Akhaine’s emphasis on developing political capital at the state level is therefore particularly important. A serious opposition movement must establish a presence beyond major cities and political centres.

It must develop relationships with communities, local political actors, civil society organisations and ordinary voters.Political capital is consequently not merely a personal asset possessed by a political leader. It can also be understood as an organisational resource that must be built, maintained and converted into political effectiveness.

Institutional factor did not missed his analytical lens. The prospects of the opposition cannot be separated from the credibility of the electoral system itself. Professor Akhaine has expressed concerns about the independence and effectiveness of the Independent National Electoral Commission and has advocated electoral reforms relating to the transmission of results and the neutrality of security agencies. These concerns are important because the legitimacy of an election depends not only on who wins but also on whether citizens believe that the electoral process was sufficiently transparent, credible and fair. An opposition party can legitimately lose an election because another party has greater public support. However, citizens must have confidence that the electoral process accurately reflects the votes cast.

Therefore, the credibility of the 2027 election should therefore be examined through at least three interconnected issues, namely, the role of the media, INEC and voters. This issues were thoroughly trashed by the professor at the Fourth Lateef Jakande Annual Lecture of the Nigerian Guild of Editors held in Lagos on July 23. Akhaine harped on the shared responsibility of the media, INEC and voters for credible elections to happen. Democratic elections depend upon citizens having access to reliable information about candidates, policies, political parties and government performance.A media environment dominated by misinformation, propaganda, sensationalism or excessive partisan reporting can undermine citizens’ ability to make informed political choices. The media therefore performs an important democratic function by providing citizens with information through which political claims can be examined and competing programmes can be evaluated. The opposition does not merely compete against the governing party. It also competes within an information environment in which political narratives can substantially influence public perception.The media can therefore contribute positively to democratic development when it promotes investigative journalism, fact-checking, balanced political reporting and informed public debate. Conversely, politically motivated misinformation and sensationalism can distort electoral competition and weaken democratic accountability.

One of the major strengths of Akhaine’s analysis is that it does not reduce Nigerian politics simply to the popularity of individual presidential aspirants. It examines political parties, institutional structures, regional dynamics, political organisation and the broader democratic environment. His emphasis on the absence of strong ideological identities is useful for understanding why political defections, mergers and realignments are common in Nigerian politics. Where parties lack clearly defined ideological foundations, political actors can move between political platforms with relatively little ideological difficulty. The professor distinguishes political popularity from political organisation. Indeed, this is one of the strongest aspects of the analysis. A popular political candidate still requires an organisational structure capable of converting popularity into votes.Electoral victory requires more than public recognition. It requires mobilisation, coordination, communication, polling-unit structures and effective electoral representation. Equally, Akhaine recognises the importance of timing. For him, building an effective national opposition coalition requires time. Political alliances assembled primarily for the purpose of defeating an incumbent can encounter serious problems when negotiations begin too late. Early organisation allows political actors to resolve questions concerning leadership, ideology, policy, candidate selection and resource distribution before the intensity of the electoral campaign increases. The analysis does not treat elections merely as contests between politicians. Its broader emphasis on INEC, security agencies, the media and voters demonstrates that elections are institutional processes requiring cooperation among several actors.

However, there are a number of shortcomings in his analysis. For example, the claim that tt may be “Too late” can be Self-defeating. Political situations can change rapidly. Although opposition parties may face significant organisational difficulties, political realignment remains possible.Nigeria’s political history demonstrates that unexpected alliances and changes in voter behaviour can alter political calculations. Consequently, declaring the opposition incapable of defeating an incumbent too early could underestimate the possibility of political realignment.The more defensible conclusion is that the opposition faces substantial organisational obstacles rather than that its defeat is inevitable.

Also, voters should not be treated as permanently regionally determined. Regional, ethnic and religious considerations matter in Nigerian politics, but voters also respond to economic and governance conditions.An opposition candidate capable of presenting a genuinely national programme could potentially alter established voting patterns. Therefore, electoral analysis should avoid assuming that citizens will vote according to regional identity irrespective of political circumstances. A comprehensive analysis should devote greater attention to the relationship between government performance and electoral behaviour. Issues such as inflation, unemployment, poverty, insecurity, education, healthcare, infrastructure and the general cost of living can significantly influence citizens’ political choices. If voters experience worsening socioeconomic conditions, opposition parties may gain political opportunities even without perfect organisational unity.The reverse is also possible. An opposition coalition may be organisationally strong but fail to persuade voters if it cannot demonstrate how its policies would improve their material conditions. The point should be made also that opposition failure is not merely an elite problem. Political negotiations frequently occur among political elites, but electoral victory ultimately depends on citizens.Political parties may construct sophisticated alliances among political leaders, but those alliances must eventually persuade millions of Nigerian voters. The decisive question is therefore whether elite negotiations can be transformed into a convincing, citizen-centred political programme.

Nevertheless, Akhaine’s intervention requires deeper philosophical interpretation. The discussion can be interpreted through the philosophical concept of democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy requires more than winning political office. It involves obtaining and maintaining citizens’ consent through institutions that permit meaningful political participation, representation and accountability.

From this perspective, the 2027 election should not be reduced simply to a contest between Tinubu and the opposition. The deeper question is what kind of democratic political system Nigeria wants to develop. If political parties remain personality-driven, electoral competition may reproduce the same structural problems regardless of which individual wins. Changing political leadership without transforming political institutions may produce only a change of personnel rather than a fundamental improvement in democratic governance.If, however, political parties develop coherent programmes, internal democracy, ideological identities and mechanisms for holding elected officials accountable, elections can become instruments of genuine political choice. This gives the discussion significance beyond the 2027 presidential election. The deeper issue is whether Nigerian democracy can move from personality-centred political competition towards programme-based, institutionally grounded and citizen-oriented politics.

Jimoh was a former Deputy Majority leader in the Lagos State House of Assembly.