Get Guardian on GoogleThe recent intervention by the pioneer Managing Director of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), Mr Mustafa Chike-Obi, on the future of the Corporation has reopened an important debate about its relevance, its outstanding obligations and the circumstances under which it should eventually wind down.
In a podcast, Chike-Obi disclosed that he had developed a proposal for AMCON’s closure about six years ago, presented it to successive administrations and secured the acceptance of the immediate past Minister of Finance, Mr Wale Edun, before the proposal was reportedly rejected by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Mr Olayemi Cardoso.
He was emphatic: “The plan is still a good one, and it still works, and it pays off AMCON debt in a very secure manner.”
He explained further: “You close it down, you lay off, you place the workers in AMCON in various places, NDIC, for example, CBN, and other places, and then you basically reduce it to a 20-man workforce overseeing some equity investments.”
On the surface, that may sound like a straightforward administrative restructuring. But shutting down an institution created to resolve one of the country’s most complicated financial sector crises requires considerably more than a workforce redistribution plan and a two-year timetable.
The central question is not whether AMCON should eventually close. Nobody seriously argues that it should exist in perpetuity. The real question is whether Nigeria can afford to shut it down before its outstanding financial obligations, unresolved eligible bank assets and extensive litigation portfolio have been properly addressed.
This is where Chike-Obi’s argument raises more questions than answers.
*A Statutory Corporation, Not A Private Enterprise*
First, AMCON is not an ordinary government agency that can be closed through an administrative directive or an agreement between two government officials.
It is a statutory corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly in 2010. Its operations, powers, obligations and dissolution are governed by the AMCON Act, as subsequently amended.
Section 47 provides for the treatment of the Corporation’s assets upon dissolution. It requires the appointment of liquidators to wind up its affairs, realise its assets and ensure that unresolved eligible bank assets are transferred to designated institutions or entities. It also provides for the redeployment of existing staff to the CBN or NDIC.
These provisions make it clear that AMCON’s sunset is a structured statutory process, not simply a management decision.
Therefore, the reported acceptance of Chike-Obi’s proposal by a former Finance Minister does not, in itself, establish that it should automatically be implemented. Neither does its rejection by the CBN Governor constitute evidence that the latter is frustrating the Corporation’s mandate.
The CBN has supervisory responsibilities under the law, while the Corporation has its own statutory governance structure. The relevant question is whether the proposed closure arrangements satisfy the legal, financial and operational requirements of the Act.
A detailed proposal, however well-intentioned, cannot take precedence over legislation.
*The N3.5tn Question*
Perhaps the most significant omission in the argument for a two-year shutdown is the enormous financial and operational responsibility that AMCON still carries.
What happens to the outstanding assets? Who pursues the debtors? Who handles the pending court cases? Who takes responsibility for the assets that cannot immediately be sold or recovered?
In August 2026, AMCON disclosed that it had recovered N2.347tn from non-performing loans since inception but still had nearly 7,000 outstanding eligible bank assets valued at N1.167tn.
The Corporation also disclosed that approximately 2,000 cases were pending before the Federal High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Significantly, about 350 obligors accounted for more than 80 per cent of the loans acquired by AMCON, with nearly 300 involved in litigation.
These are not obligations that will disappear when the Corporation closes its offices.
There is also the separate liability owed to the CBN. The CBN’s 2025 Annual Report showed AMCON notes of approximately N2.709tn on its books at the end of that financial year.
These figures illustrate the complexity of the Corporation’s financial position. The value of outstanding eligible bank assets, the amount owed to the CBN and the total exposure associated with acquired loans are different accounting and recovery measures. None can be wished away by announcing a sunset date.
Indeed, if AMCON is closed without a credible framework for managing these obligations, the country risks transferring an unfinished recovery assignment to institutions that may have neither the specialised capacity nor the operational structure to handle it effectively.
*What Has AMCON Established? The Figures Answer Chike-Obi*
Interestingly, Chike-Obi himself asked a question that deserves an answer. He challenged Cardoso, asking: “In the two years since that plan has been rejected, what has AMCON established? What have they done, and at what cost?”
It is a legitimate question, but it should be answered with verifiable figures rather than assumptions about institutional inactivity.
The CBN’s 2025 Annual Report provides some useful evidence. It disclosed that AMCON’s cumulative recoveries stood at N2.535tn by the end of 2025, comprising cash repayments, other collections and additional recoveries.
During the year alone, the Corporation recovered N113.04bn in cash, alongside N39.29bn in investment income from treasury operations.
These are measurable results from an institution that critics increasingly portray as having outlived its usefulness.
Furthermore, AMCON’s Managing Director, Mr Gbenga Alade, had disclosed in December 2025 that the Corporation had repaid approximately N3.6tn to the CBN since its establishment, despite having spent about N1.7tn purchasing toxic bank assets.
He also reported that AMCON had achieved a recovery rate of over 87 per cent based on the original purchase balances of the acquired assets.
These figures demonstrate that AMCON’s operations have produced substantial financial recoveries and repayments. They also show why its remaining obligations require careful attention.
The more appropriate question, therefore, is not simply what AMCON has established since the proposed shutdown was rejected, but whether the institution has made sufficient progress towards resolving the assets and liabilities entrusted to it.
The available figures suggest that the recovery process remains active.
*The Cost Of Shutting Down Hastily*
Another important consideration is the potential financial consequence of a premature shutdown.
AMCON was established to remove toxic assets from the books of financial institutions, restore confidence in the banking system and prevent the banking crisis of 2009 from degenerating into a much bigger economic disaster.
At the time, non-performing loans accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the banking industry’s total loans, while the stock market had lost about 80 per cent of its value.
The Corporation acquired 12,743 eligible bank assets from 22 financial institutions at a purchase price of approximately N1.8tn. It also injected N2.2tn into intervened financial institutions to stabilise the banking system.
The intervention was not merely an administrative exercise. It was a major financial sector rescue operation with long-term implications for the economy.
Consequently, winding down AMCON without a sufficiently robust recovery mechanism could expose the CBN and the wider financial system to additional financial pressure.
It could also create the wrong incentive for obligors who have spent years resisting repayment through prolonged litigation and other legal strategies.
Would some of these debtors interpret the proposed shutdown as an opportunity to delay repayment further, hoping that the institution pursuing them would eventually disappear?
Would the transfer of unresolved assets to other agencies guarantee the same level of specialised attention and enforcement?
These are questions that any serious sunset proposal must answer.
It is not enough to say that AMCON’s employees will be redeployed to the CBN and NDIC. Personnel transfer does not automatically translate into the successful transfer of thousands of complex debt-recovery assignments.
Chike-Obi also questioned Cardoso’s decision to reject the proposal, suggesting that the CBN should publicly explain why it was opposed to the plan.
His call for better communication from public institutions is understandable. Nigerians deserve explanations for important policy decisions, particularly those involving institutions with significant financial obligations.
However, the absence of a public explanation should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that the CBN Governor acted against the national interest.
The fact that Edun reportedly accepted the proposal does not mean Cardoso was obligated to support it. Both officials could have approached the question from different institutional perspectives.
What remains missing from the public debate is the detailed technical assessment of the proposal, including its financial assumptions, transition arrangements, treatment of unresolved assets and risk allocation.
Until these details are available, it is premature to conclude that the rejection was unjustified.
More importantly, the CBN Governor should not be made the scapegoat for a statutory process that requires institutional coordination and compliance with the law.
*AMCON Must Close, But Not At Any Cost*
There is no compelling argument for keeping AMCON alive indefinitely. Its mandate is specialised, and its eventual sunset should remain a national objective.
Indeed, the incumbent management under Alade has expressed its commitment to achieving a realistic conclusion to the Corporation’s assignment.
But a responsible sunset requires measurable recovery targets, a credible resolution framework for outstanding assets, clear arrangements for pending litigation, a transparent accounting of liabilities and a legally compliant transfer of residual responsibilities.
It should also establish who will bear the financial risks of unrecovered debts and how the interests of the CBN, the banking sector and the wider public will be protected.
These are the issues that should determine the timing of AMCON’s closure, not simply the desire to reduce its workforce to 20 people.
Chike-Obi deserves credit for initiating the debate about AMCON’s eventual sunset. However, his former position as the Corporation’s pioneer chief executive does not make his proposed timeline the only viable solution to a problem that has evolved considerably over the years.
His proposal should be subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny expected of any major financial sector reform.
Ultimately, the objective should be to ensure that AMCON exits with its mandate substantially fulfilled, its outstanding obligations properly accounted for and its unresolved assets transferred under a credible framework.
Nigeria cannot afford to turn a debt-recovery institution into another unfinished government project.
The question is not whether AMCON should close. It is whether Nigeria can afford the consequences of closing it before the job is done.
By Ifeanyi ONUBA
Onuba, a Chartered Accountant wrote from Abuja
