It often defies logic when trivial bounties are offered for information leading to the arrest of high-profile terrorist leaders.

For security analysts observing the counter-insurgency landscape in Lake Chad, recent announcements by military authorities raise a fundamental question: Does the Nigerian Defence Headquarters (DHQ) truly grasp the massive financial backing enjoyed by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram, Lakurawa, and affiliated criminal syndicates?

This analysis is not intended to undermine the immense courage, selfless sacrifice, and strategic progress made by the Nigerian Armed Forces in their relentless counter-terrorism operations. Rather, it offers an objective assessment of current tactics to help chart a path toward sustainable peace and security across Nigeria.

On August 5, 2026, Captain Muhammed Goni, Acting Military Information Officer for the Northeast Joint Task Force, Operation Hadin Kai, announced a combined ₦60 million bounty on two prominent ISWAP figures: Abu Musa Al-Mangawi Baa Shuwa and Muhammad Jidda.

Both operate within the Lake Chad Basin and were identified through forensic analysis of devices seized during recent military raids. Promotional flyers distributed by the military broke down the offer: ₦50 million for credible information leading to the arrest of the ISWAP “governor” and ₦10 million for his deputy.

To understand why this offer falls short, one must examine who possesses the required intelligence. The individuals most capable of providing actionable information leading to a swift arrest are existing members of ISWAP’s internal structure.

However, much like a conventional military organisation, ISWAP operates under a strict, compartmentalised chain of command. A lower-enlisted fighter cannot simply walk into the office of a high-ranking commander.

Information regarding high-value targets resides almost exclusively within an elite inner circle. To expect members of this terrorist cadre to turn on their leadership for ₦10 million or ₦50 million — amounts that cannot even purchase a modest home in Lagos or Abuja — is unrealistic.

Open-source intelligence indicates that ISWAP’s internal security is tightly guarded. For example, lower-level operatives within their newly formed Artificial Intelligence (AI) unit are strictly denied administrative passwords and specialised technical training. Enticing individuals with access to such classified information requires a genuinely life-changing financial incentive.

The Scale of ISWAP’s Financial Empire: To appreciate why these bounties appear insignificant to the insurgents, the military establishment must look closely at ISWAP’s revenue generation mechanisms. The group levies systematic, illegal taxes on farmers, livestock owners, fishermen, and traders residing in areas under its influence.

According to a report highlighted by the U.S. Africa Command’s Africa Defence Forum (citing findings from The New Humanitarian), ISWAP generates approximately $191 million annually from informal taxation in the Lake Chad region alone.

To put this figure in perspective, the report noted that the Borno State Government generated roughly $18.4 million in internal revenue in 2024 — less than a tenth of ISWAP’s localised tax collections.

Crucially, that $191 million estimate does not include revenues from kidnap-for-ransom operations, territorial expansion in other zones, or equipment bonuses funnelled directly from core ISIS leadership.

Kidnapping for ransom continues to be a profitable source of income. Insurgent groups frequently kidnap travellers, local officials, and aid workers to secure large ransom payments. A stark example involved public commentary surrounding a video released by Boko Haram/ISWAP demanding a staggering ₦5 billion ransom for captives.

Reports by Vanguard News highlighted how local advocacy groups, including the Borno South Youth Alliance (BOSYA), engaged political stakeholders like Senator Ali Ndume regarding the crisis.

While Senator Ndume rightfully rejected negotiations and ransom payments, the episode highlighted the massive scale of ISWAP’s financial demands. Offering tens of millions of Naira to disrupt an empire operating in the billions is simply ineffective.

Furthermore, reports by African Security Analysis demonstrate that insurgent networks have diversified into natural resource extraction. Insurgents tax artisanal gold mining sites and high-quality charcoal harvesting operations throughout northern enclaves, trading security for direct cuts of valuable commodities.

Add to this direct plunder, core funding from international ISIS affiliates, and sophisticated money-laundering via traditional hawala brokers and cryptocurrency channels, and it becomes clear that ISWAP operates a complex, multi-million-dollar war economy.

The security challenges posed by ISWAP and its offshoots constitute a hybrid conflict that demands an equally adaptive counter-strategy. While the military’s recent tactical successes and neutralisation of key commanders are commendable, kinetic force alone cannot dismantle an entrenched insurgency.

Relying on impoverished local populations to provide high-level intelligence is a flawed assumption. Many of these communities live under the immediate threat of insurgent violence and have been coerced into economic dependency.

For military intelligence to break through, it must target the internal rifts that naturally occur within insurgent leadership. Financial incentives must be calibrated to match the reality of the threat environment.

A revised bounty scheme — offering modern, life-changing sums backed by robust witness protection and relocation guarantees — could exploit internal rivalries and incentivise high-level defections.

The Nigerian Armed Forces have made undeniable sacrifices in defending the nation’s territorial integrity. However, counter-insurgency tactics must evolve to reflect the financial reality of modern combat. Offering ₦10 million to ₦50 million for high-ranking ISWAP commanders fails to account for the financial ecosystem powering the insurgency.

To achieve sustainable peace and security in Nigeria, Defence Headquarters must recalibrate its strategy. Raising reward structures to realistic, high-impact levels while simultaneously rebuilding community trust will create the leverage required to disrupt ISWAP’s command structure from within.

Abiodun Ramon Oseni is a Fellow at the Institute of Security Nigeria, a former U.S. police officer, and a U.S. Army veteran. He specialises in international security studies at Harvard University and American Military University.