By Akin Monehin
“In public policy, being right is not enough. Evidence must also arrive in the right frame, at the right moment, for a problem government is ready to solve.”
Governments are not short of ideas; universities produce research, think tanks publish recommendations, committees investigate problems, development institutions generate evidence. Yet years later, many of the same problems remain, often surrounded by even more research explaining how they might be solved.
Then, occasionally, something different happens. An issue that has existed for years suddenly enters the national conversation. Policymakers pay attention. Institutions mobilise. Funding appears. Coalitions form. What was peripheral becomes urgent.
Why?
Perhaps the difference is not simply the quality of the evidence. Perhaps it is whether the problem has been framed in a way decision-makers recognise, and whether the evidence arrives when political priorities, public attention and institutional conditions make action possible.
For Nigeria, this matters. When useful evidence fails to influence public choices, the loss is not academic. It can appear as weaker policy, delayed reform, misdirected resources and public problems that remain unresolved despite available knowledge.
The conventional picture of research impact is deceptively tidy. Research is conducted. Findings are published. Policymakers discover them. Better decisions follow.
Reality is messier.
Evidence competes with budgets, electoral cycles, institutional interests, ideology, crises, public opinion and the limited attention of decision-makers. A compelling study can therefore be both correct and irrelevant to the immediate problem government believes it is solving. Another, perhaps no more rigorous, can arrive at precisely the moment society is ready to hear it.
Public-policy scholars describe such moments as policy windows; periods when recognition of a problem, credible solutions and favourable political conditions come together in ways that make change more possible.
A recent coffee conversation with renowned Professor Bukola Salami, Canada Research Chair in Black and Racialised Peoples Health at the University of Calgary, brought this idea into sharper focus for me. Her work has travelled beyond academic publication into public-policy engagement, including evidence before Canada’s House of Commons, and the government of Canada. One point from our conversation stayed with me; “researchers seeking policy impact cannot always wait until the intellectual journey is complete before beginning the policy conversation. Understanding emerging priorities and engaging those who may eventually use the evidence are themselves part of creating impact.”
That changes the question. Instead of asking only, “How good is the research?” perhaps we must also ask, “What policy outcome are we trying to influence, and how is the problem currently being understood?” The second question matters because problems do not simply announce themselves to governments.
In a policy paper Prof. Salami later shared with me, David Rochefort and Roger Cobb examine how problem definition shapes agenda access and policy choice. Their insight is uncomfortable but important: Public attention does not follow automatically from the objective seriousness of a condition. How a problem is described — its causes, severity, affected population, urgency and perceived solvability — can influence whether it gains political attention and what responses become thinkable. Essentially the same evidence can therefore travel differently depending on how the problem is framed.
A youth-employment study framed mainly as an academic labour-market question may struggle for attention. The same evidence connected credibly to productivity, insecurity, industrial competitiveness or fiscal pressure may enter a very different policy conversation; the evidence has not changed but its position within the decision-maker’s field of attention has.
I describe this as the Evidence Positioning Gap™: the distance between producing credible evidence and positioning that evidence so that it can be understood, considered and acted upon within the realities of policymaking. That gap becomes especially important when a window opens.
Some windows are difficult to predict. Crises can reorder priorities almost overnight. Public attention can move quickly. New evidence can suddenly change how an old problem is understood. Others are more foreseeable. Prof. Salami made an important distinction, “changes in government can create openings because political leadership often brings changes in ideology, priorities and perceptions of what constitutes an acceptable solution. An idea ignored under one administration may become relevant under another.
“The tragedy of unused knowledge is not that a report sits unread. It is that the answer can already exist while the problem continues.”
This is where the policy entrepreneur matters. A policy entrepreneur does more than produce evidence or advocate loudly. They recognise when an issue is moving, understand what decision-makers are trying to solve, translate evidence into usable choices, build legitimacy around the problem and connect knowledge to opportunity while the window remains open… because evidence does not walk into government by itself.
Nigeria’s challenge, therefore, is not simply to produce more policy-relevant research. It is to become better at positioning credible evidence inside the moments when national choices are genuinely movable.
That requires a different conception of research impact. Universities should remain places of independent inquiry; not every study should begin with an immediate policy application. But where policy impact is an explicit ambition, publication is not the end of the intellectual journey. The researcher must understand the system into which the evidence is expected to travel.
The pattern extends beyond universities; regulators, professional bodies, civil-society organisations and businesses all generate evidence intended to shape public choices. Their influence depends not only on what they know, but on whether they can connect that knowledge to the problems government is prepared to recognise and the choices it is prepared to make.
In public leadership, timing and framing are not substitutes for evidence, but part of how evidence becomes consequential. I believe that Nigeria possesses more answers than its performance suggests. The more consequential question may be whether our institutions are sufficiently capable of recognising the right evidence, framing the right problem and connecting both to the right moment.
A question worth leaving with
How much useful evidence already exists inside Nigerian universities and research institutions that could influence national policy … but may miss its moment because nobody positioned it for the window when government was ready to act?
Monehin is the best-selling author of Execution Is a Lie and Managing Partner of Praxis Execution Advisory.
