There is political tension in the North, particularly in the North-West Zone, a critical electoral stronghold ahead of the 2027 presidential election, where the opposition parties appear determined to ensure President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s defeat. They want to replicate the defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015, by the All Progressives Congress (APC), under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari.

The challenge for today’s opposition, however, is that they lack the cohesion and organisational strength that enabled the APC to pull off that historic victory. Across the seven states of the zone, the opposition parties are capitalizing on the discontent of the people on three major issues and grievances: the crushing economic hardship, the perceived political marginalisation of the North in federal appointments and, most crucially, the persistent security crisis.

It must be emphasised, however, that the security challenge is not confined to the North,and that in the rough-and-tumble of elections, opposition parties are entitled to turn public dissatisfaction into a weapon against the party in power.

While the economic crisis has adversely affected the rich and the poor alike, it is the existential threat of insecurity that has emerged as the opposition’s most potent weapon against President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Across the North, insecurity has become a powerful rallying point, uniting otherwise disparate political interests. The problem, however, is that opposition parties appear more interested in exploiting the emotional force of the security crisis than in explaining what they would do differently.

The truth is that the opposition has yet to demonstrate that it has a workable security strategy capable of defeating the terrorists. Instead, they appear more interested in exploiting public anger over the security challenges for their political ends. Their narrative seeks to portray the All Progressives Congress (APC), particularly President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, as so unpopular in the North-West that its members cannot safely campaign in most parts of the North. The attack on the convoy of Zamfara State Deputy Governor, Malam Mani Malam Mummuni, in Gwashi community, Bukkuyum Local Government Area, must be examined against this troubling political backdrop and of the politics of Zamfara State itself.

The State House of Assembly, it should be recalled, had initially suspended the chairmen of Bukkuyum and Kaura Namoda local government areas over allegations of financial misconduct before subsequently removing the Bukkuyum chairman. The removal no doubt has no doubt added to the political tensions in the area, particularly given the chairman’s claim that his disagreement with Governor Dauda Lawal is over his refusal to defect to the APC. Could this political dispute have contributed to the hostility directed at the Deputy Governor, who also hails from the area? What is clear is that the incident created an opportunity for the opposition to exploit public anger over insecurity to score cheap political points. It is therefore important to distinguish genuine public grievances from political maneuvering.

The background to the attack on the deputy governor is important. Reuters and the AFP reported that, on 10 and 11 October 2026, gunmen ambushed a convoy of traders travelling under military escort along the Gwashi route to Nasarawa Market in Bukkuyum Local Government Area. The reports gave differing casualty figures, ranging from 13 to at least 20 people, including soldiers, police officers and civilians. Although the security agencies didn’t release an official casualty figure, the withdrawal of the security personnel from the area reportedly triggered the protest.

Against this background, the attack on the convoy of Zamfara State Deputy Governor, Malam Mani Malam Mummuni, raises several troubling questions.

The Deputy Governor had visited the community to offer his condolences following the deadly attack in which the security personnel suffered heavy casualties. Why, then, did the youths attack his entourage and destroy the vehicles in his convoy? What can explain such hostility towards a government delegation visiting a community affected by insecurity? There is no doubt that the incident provided the opposition with an opportunity to advance its claim that members of the APC politicians cannot safely campaign in parts of the North-West ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

While the opposition parties are entitled to criticise the government over insecurity, their willingness to exploit the tragedy for political advantage raises a critical question: beyond condemning the government, what credible proposals are they offering to end the security crisis?

Any anger directed at the Zamfara State Government under Governor Dauda Lawal is misplaced. The governor has committed considerable effort to addressing the security crisis, despite the constitutional limitations on the state government’s control over the military and other federal security agencies. While the opposition is entitled to campaign with the issue, it cannot reasonably ignore the constitutional limitations that has prevented

the state government from doing more- engage mercenaries or arm it’s vigilantes with superior weapons. To place any burden of ending banditry on it is unfair.

It is easy for the opposition to claim that the APC has failed the North and must be voted out of power. But such claims do not explain the persistence of insecurity in Zamfara State, particularly when collaborators have continued to undermine efforts to defeat them. While it would be insensitive to dismiss the frustration of people who have endured years of attacks, kidnappings, killings and the destruction of livelihoods, the crisis should not be reduced to the action or inaction of government.

However, understanding their anger does not mean that every target of that anger is necessarily responsible for their predicament. The Deputy Governor and Governor Dauda Lawal operate within a constitutional security framework in which the military and other federal law enforcement agencies fall under the control of the Federal Government. State governments can provide logistical support, acquire security equipment, establish community protection initiatives and cooperate with security agencies, but they do not exercise direct command over the military or the police.

Even when state police are eventually established, not much may change immediately unless the fundamental problems undermining Nigeria’s security architecture are addressed. Creating state police is not, in itself, a magic wand that will end kidnapping and terrorism. The challenge goes beyond the absence of a decentralised policing system. It includes the activities of informants and collaborators who provide the terrorists with intelligence, as well as institutional weaknesses such as poor intelligence gathering, inadequate coordination among security agencies and the failure to prosecute those who finance, equip or facilitate criminal networks.

There are also concerns about individuals and networks that profit from the insecurity and have little interest in its resolution.

Governors of the 36 states of the federation have been pushed to the wall. Although they are regarded as the chief security officers of their respective states, they have no direct operational control over the military or the police. Because it is their people who are being killed, they have committed enormous public resources to funding military operations, purchasing security equipment and providing logistical support to federal security agencies whose commanders they cannot instruct. This is the constitutional and operational contradiction at the heart of Nigeria’s security crisis. If the youths who confronted the Zamfara State Deputy Governor are genuinely concerned about the persistent insecurity, their anger should also be directed at the Federal Government, which controls the principal instruments of coercive power.

Governor Lawal has not in any way shied away from his responsibility. His administration established the Zamfara State Security Trust Fund to provide a structured funding mechanism for security operations and created the Zamfara State Community Protection Guards to strengthen grassroots intelligence gathering and complement the work of conventional security agencies. The government also equipped the guards with operational vehicles and protective gear, while the first batch of 2,720 personnel was deployed across the state’s 14 local government areas.

Beyond these interventions, Governor Lawal’s administration has invested heavily in operational hardware—supplying over 200 patrol vehicles, specialized motorcycles, 25 Armoured Personnel Carriers and long-range surveillance drones to the military. These are substantial investments in the operational capacity of security forces, and Defence Minister Christopher Musa publicly commended the governor for them.

Against this record, the question the opposition who attacked the Deputy Governor must answer: What more do you expect Governor Lawal to do? Must he personally command the military and the police when the Constitution places those institutions outside his direct operational control? If the attackers are genuinely interested in ending the bloodshed in Zamfara State, they know where to direct their anger. Holding Governor Lawal responsible without considering the efforts his administration is deliberate mischief.

The regional dimension of the crisis is equally important. Terrorism does not respect state boundaries. Terrorist groups exploit gaps between states, they move across forests and take advantage of weaknesses in coordination among security agencies to escape. This is why the initiative of the North-West governors and broader cooperation among the 19 Northern states matter. Their efforts, including engagements at national and international levels, reflect the recognition that the crisis requires a collective response. The North-West governors’ engagement at the United Nations forms part of this wider regional effort to draw international attention to the security challenges facing the region and mobilise support for lasting solutions. Ultimately, no single state can defeat a security threat that operates across several states without sustained cooperation and coordinated action.

Insecurity will inevitably be one of the issues of the 2027 general elections, and rightly so. The opposition has every right to use it to challenge the ruling party. However, there is a difference between demanding answers from those in power and exploiting public frustration for political advantage. Nothing justifies the attack on the Deputy Governor.

The opposition must understand that the true test of leadership is not who gains the most political mileage from insecurity, but who demonstrates the commitment, sincerity and capacity to help bring it to an end. Rather than exploit the suffering of victims for electoral advantage, political leaders must put the safety of citizens above partisan interests. The Federal Government must fulfil its constitutional responsibility to protect lives and property, while all levels of government must work together to find lasting solutions.

By:Emmanuel Ado