Get Guardian on GoogleAuthor: F. Ajibola Dalley, SAN, FCIArb
Introduction
The Supreme Court, in the recent decision of Mene-Ejegi v. NBA & Anor delivered on Friday 26th June 2026, in a 5 – 2 decision, finally laid to rest the oscillating controversy over the Court’s jurisdictional powers to entertain direct appeals from the direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC). Apart from resolving the issue robustly, the decision signals one of the few occasions in which the Court refused to follow an earlier decision on the very same point. In Okike v. LPDC (2005) 3-4 SC 49, a full panel of 7 Justices had unanimously upheld the jurisdictional powers of the apex Court to determine direct appeals from the directions of the LPDC.
The reading of the lead Judgement, when juxtaposed with the dissenting Judgement, reveals a radical shift away from the conventional precedent based approach to a more pragmatic deference towards a simplified interpretation of statutes. Beyond this, the resounding lead and dissenting opinions of the Honourable Justice Mohammed Baba Idris, J.S.C and Honourable Justice Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru J.S.C respectively, appear to herald the resurgence of a vibrant and illuminating Supreme Court reminiscent of the 1980s and early 1990s. The excitement after reading the full Judgement is such that we must ask whether we are truly witnessing a judicial renaissance.
Facts
Mr Ben Mene-Ejegi, a legal practitioner in Warri Delta State, was accused of obtaining from one Tosan Olukpe the sum of =N= 1,600,000.00 (One Million Six Hundred Thousand Naira), under false pretences and refusing to refund the said sum. A complaint was lodged before the LPDC and upon conclusion of the proceedings the LPDC found him guilty on both counts and directed the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to strike his name off the roll of legal practitioners. He was also ordered to refund the outstanding sum within 30 days, via the Nigerian Bar Association.
The Decision
Dissatisfied with the decision, Mr Mene-Ejegi filed a Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 16th April 2018, before the registry of the Supreme Court. However, at the instance of the Court vide letter dated 8th April 2026, the parties were directed to address the issue “whether the Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the directions of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee”. The Court’s opinion on the determination of this issue forms the fulcrum of this article, therefore it is unnecessary to address the issues canvassed by the parties with regard to the substantive appeal. (Pages 12 – 13, Paragraphs D – F)
In the lead judgment, Mohammed Baba Idris, J.S.C expressed the need to raise, in limine, the issue of the Court’s jurisdictional powers to hear and determine direct appeals from the directives of the LPDC, as prescribed by Section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA). According to his Lordship in the earlier, but fairly recent, decision of Osuji v. LPDC (2025) 17 NWLR (Part 2014) 317, the apex Court resolved that appeals from the LPDC do not lie directly to the Supreme Court. The decision triggered fierce debates and divergent opinions amongst stakeholders in the legal community. Therefore, according to his Lordship “in view of the significance of the issue and its far-reaching implications for the legal profession and the administration of justice” the Court “considered it appropriate that the question be revisited at the earliest opportunity in order to settle the law with finality”. (Pages 12 – 13, Paragraphs D – F).
In his Lordship’s findings on the issue, pursuant to Section 233 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is confined, strictly and exclusively, to appeals arising from the Court of Appeal and no other Court, Tribunal or body is contemplated by the Constitution as a source of appeal to the apex Court. This proposition is buttressed when Section 233 is juxtaposed with Section 240 of the Constitution which deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.
According to his Lordship, the framers of the Constitution in this instance, not only provided for appeals, to the Court of Appeal, from the Federal High Court, National Industrial Court, the High Courts of the States and Federal Capital Territory, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, the Customary Court of Appeal of a State and Court Marshalls, they went on to further expand the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to include other Tribunals prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
The eminent Idris, J.S.C’s words on the issue were irrefutable when his Lordship said “When this provision is placed side by side with Section 233 of the Constitution, it becomes manifest that, while the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Constitution and extends to appeals from the Courts and tribunals specifically enumerated therein, as well as such other Courts or tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly, the provision relating to the Supreme Court is distinctly and more restrictively couched. In other words, the Constitution clearly contemplates a broader and more flexible appellate jurisdiction for the Court of Appeal, capable of statutory expansion, whereas the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is rigidly confined to appeals emanating from the Court of Appeal alone, with no corresponding constitutional allowance for enlargement by legislative intervention. That distinction was succinctly captured by this Court in AG OYO STATE & ANOR VS. FAIRLAKES HOTEL LTD (1988) LPELR – 24926 (SC) ……. This pronouncement underscores, beyond peradventure, the deliberate constitutional design which insulates the appellate jurisdiction of this Court from statutory enlargement, while permitting a measure of legislative flexibility in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. The necessary implication of this scheme is that, whereas the legislature is empowered to expand the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal by statute, no such corresponding power is conferred in respect of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The omission is neither accidental nor inadvertent; it is deliberate, significant, and must be accorded its full constitutional effect. It is a settled canon of constitutional interpretation that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not mentioned – “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”. (Pages 30 – 32, Paragraphs D – F).
Relying on these findings, in his Lordship’s view a statutory provision – created by an act of the National Assembly – is subject to the supremacy of the constitution and therefore Section 12(7) of the LPA, which purports to adorn a right of appeal directly to the Supreme Court in respect of directions from the LPDC, is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. [See Section 1(3) of the Constitution and A-G Abia State v. A-G Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Part 763) 264].
In arriving at the decision, the apex Court was not oblivious to its previous decision in Okike v. LPDC (2005) 3-4 SC 49 where it resolved in favour of its powers to entertain appeals directly from the directions of the LPDC. Idris JSC whilst recognising the significance of the doctrine of “stare decisis” (to stand by things decided), as a cardinal pillar in our jurisprudence, observed that the principle itself was not an “inflexible dogma”. In his Lordship’s view the Okike decision did not examine the constitutional implications of Sections 233(1) and 240 against the backdrop of the settled principles governing constitutional interpretation. Had the relevant decision taken cognisance of the established cannons of constitutional interpretation, the Court may well have reached a different conclusion. Therefore, there was justification and indeed constitutional duty on the part of the Court to revisit the decision. In other words and as described by his Lordship “… where it becomes apparent that an earlier decision of this Court is inconsistent with the Constitution, occasions manifest injustice, or purports to expand jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility by sheltering under procedural formalities”. (Page 44, Paragraphs A – B).
The judgement is a clear, deliberate and unapologetic statement, which simply says “We do not have the jurisdictional powers to entertain direct appeals from the decisions of the LPDC. Regardless of any statutory provision, the apex Court will not entertain any appeal emanating from any other court or tribunal apart from the Court of Appeal”.
At the time Okike was decided, Sections 233 and 240 of the Constitution, as well as Section 12(7) of LPA were extant. Therefore, one cannot help but wonder why the Justices of the Supreme Court in 2005 held such divergent views to that of the current apex Court or vice versa.
The dissenting decision of Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru J.S.C, lends an insight into the thinking of the Court in the Okike decision of 2005. The issue at hand was, in many ways, identical to the questions raised, in this case. The Court had equally raised suo moto the question “whether the provision of Section 12(7) of Decree No. 21 of 1994 did not conflict with the provisions of Section 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution”. In resolving the issue, a full complement of 7 Justices comprising of Honourable Justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais CJN, Honourable Justice Salihu Alfa Belgore, JSC, Honourable Justice Idris Kutigi, JSC, Honourable Justice Akintola Ejiwunmi, JSC, Honourable Justice Dahiru Musdapher, JSC, Honourable Justice Ignatius Pats-Acholonu, JSC and Honourable Justice Sunday Akintan, JSC unanimously held the provisions of Section 12(7) of Decree No 21 of 1994 did not conflict with the provisions of Section 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution. In other words, the Supreme was endowed with the jurisdictional powers to entertain direct appeals from the LPDC.
Abiru JSC reviewed the unison opinions of the eminent Justices of the apex Court in the Okike decision. Honourable Justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais (Chief Justice at the time) resolved and said:
“In my opinion, the provisions of Section 233 Subsection (1) of the 1999 Constitution have not in any way ousted the jurisdiction either expressly or impliedly of the Supreme Court to hear appeal from the Disciplinary Committee. Therefore, in the absence of any express provision in the Constitution which ousts the jurisdiction of the Court, we should be very reluctant to hold that the jurisdiction has been ousted … This Court does not readily oust its jurisdiction. In principle, it jealously protects the jurisdiction. It follows from all the foregoing that this Court amply has the jurisdiction to hear the present appeal from the Disciplinary Committee. …”
Belgore, JSC agreed and said:
“I therefore entirely agree with the Ruling of the Honorable Chief Justice in his elaborate Ruling that this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal from the direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee. …”. Idris Kutigi, JSC equally agreed by saying: “I think Section 233(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal but does not in my view specifically or expressly state that this Court shall hear appeals from the Court of Appeal only. In other words, this Court can and will hear appeals from other Courts established by the Constitution or law once there is appropriate and proper provision to that effect in the law. This Court is therefore competent, I believe, to hear appeals from any other Court in appropriate cases and not only from the Court of Appeal…….. It is settled law that no cause or matter is prima facie deemed to be beyond jurisdiction unless it is specifically or expressly shown to be so … There is nothing in the Constitution which puts beyond the Supreme Court the power to hear this appeal.”
Ejiwunmi, JSC in relying on Section 316(1) of the Constitution said:
“ It is my respectful view that by virtue of the provisions of Section 316 Subsection (1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court is deemed to have been charged with the function of hearing appeals from the Disciplinary Committee under the 1999 Constitution. Accordingly, I must therefore hold that Section 12 Subsection (7) is constitutionally valid.” (Pages 139 – 146, Paragraphs G – B).
Abiru J.S.C rested on the sound decisions of the eminent jurists in the Okike decision, as a basis for disagreeing with the lead Judgment, in the case. His Lordship’s dissenting opinion is premised on, firstly the failure of the Court to invite parties to address the Court on the issue of the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Section 12(7) of Decree No 21 of 1994, which in his Lordship’s view “came out of the blue” and was raised suo moto in the Judgment without inviting the parties to address the Court on the issue. Secondly, on the strength of the principles of “stare decisis”, his Lordship was of the view that there was no justification for disregarding and overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Okike, which was based on the exact same issue – the constitutionality of Section 12(7) of Decree No 21 of 1994. In his opinion, although the Supreme Court is entitled to overrule its previous decision, it is a task rarely undertaken at the instance of the Court itself and circumstances require the litigant or amicus curiae (a friend of the Court) to make out a serious case of error or occasioned injustice warranting the reversal of the current state of law. Essentially, efforts to overrule the Courts previous decision must be party led and not Court led. His Lordship said:
“In other words, for a precedent to be overruled, the specific issue must be directly challenged in the new case and properly brought before the Court for review. The challenging party or an interested group (filing an amicus curiae brief) must explicitly ask the Court to overturn the old ruling, providing legal or constitutional justifications to do so.
As stated earlier, in the present appeal, this Court was not urged to, invited or called upon by anyone to revisit, reconsider, review, reexamine, reevaluate and/or rethink its decision in Okike Vs Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (No 1). No one contended or proved before the Court that the decision in Okike Vs Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (No 1) was wrong or erroneous in law or that it was reached per incuriam or that it had become an instrument of injustice……
In my understanding, it is alien to the doctrine of judicial precedent for a Supreme Court, or the highest Court of the land in a common law country, to self-induce and self-impose on itself the duty of revisiting and reviewing its past decisions. A Supreme Court cannot suo motu alter or overrule its previous decision. And it is worst still to now do so without giving any justification or explanation as to what prompted and/or necessitated the review, in the first place”.
His Lordship went further to emphasise the significance of the decision in the Okike case as “underlaid by excellent judicial reasoning” in which a wider purposive interpretation of the constitutional provisions was broadly and liberally determined, whilst taking cognisance of principles of policy and justice. In this wise his Lordship expressed great concern – whilst alluding to the decisions in PDP v INEC and Cotecna International Limited v Churchgate Limited – over the consequential effect of the lead decision on the rights of legal practitioners to appeal against the decision of the LPDC. The Justices in the Okike appeal were said to have recognised the importance of applying a wide and purposive interpretation of the Constitutional provisions with the intended consequence of preserving and protecting the rights of citizens.
Still insisting on the soundness of the Okike decision, his Lordship suggested the occurrence of a difference of opinion between the panel of Justices in the present case and Okike, and went on to postulate the lack of justification for overruling a previous decision on such grounds. Finally, his Lordship said of the lead decision “I do not see any broad issue of justice or public policy or question of legal principle necessitating or warranting this Court overruling the decision in Okike Vs Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (No 1). Hence, my inability to abide by the decision in the lead judgment”.
In the lead Judgment Idris, J.S.C addressed some of the issues raised by Abiru, J.S.C in the dissenting opinion. His Lordship insisted on the Supremacy of the Constitution as the grundnorm of all legal authority, including judicial precedents which the Supreme Court has the inherent jurisdiction to revisit and depart from in the event of its inconsistency, in appropriate circumstances. He considered the doctrine of stare decisis to be well recognised as a tool for ensuring stability in the judicial system, however he proceeded to qualify his statement and said “While this Court remains committed to the doctrine of stare decisis, it cannot permit fidelity to precedent to override fidelity to the Constitution. Where an earlier decision is shown to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the demands of constitutional supremacy outweigh the demands of precedent”.
His Lordship further commented on whether the power of the Court to depart from a previous decision depended upon an invitation from counsel and resolved in the negative. Counsel’s invitation was not a condition precedent and, according to his Lordship, to hold otherwise, would result in the perpetuation of a previous error by the Court, in the event of failure to raise the issue, on the part of counsel. In closing, on the point, his Lordship said “Consequently, where it becomes apparent that an earlier decision of this Court is inconsistent with the Constitution, occasions manifest injustice, or purports to expand jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility by sheltering under procedural formalities. Consequently, although this Court will ordinarily act upon an invitation by counsel when called upon to reconsider one of its previous decisions, however, nothing prevents it from raising the issue suo motu and departing from such decision where the interests of justice and constitutional fidelity so demand, provided always that the parties are afforded a fair opportunity to address the Court on the issue. In the instant case, the issue of jurisdiction was specifically raised by the Court suo motu, and learned counsel on both sides were afforded ample opportunity to address the Court thereon”.
Conclusion
The decision in Mene-Ejegi v. NBA & Anor will long be remembered for its stance on the supremacy of the constitution. Although the Court recognised the significance of the principles of stare decisis, Idris JSC was quick to point out that the principle itself is a servant of the Constitution and not its master. In this case the previous decision of the Court in Okike, though decided by an incredible cast of renowned jurists, was considered to have been decided beyond the limits of the Constitution.
His most eminent Lordship Abiru JSC launched a spirited dissent against the lead decision, by highlighting the value of the principles of stare decisis as unanimously enumerated by a stellar cast of Jurists in the Okike decision. In his Lordship view, previous decisions of the Supreme Court must always be followed, and may only be overruled after arguments are canvassed, at the instance of the parties and not the Court itself. Abiru JSC’s objections are closely linked to concerns over the faith of those legal practitioners who have chosen to challenge the directions of the LPDC.
Are we witnessing a judicial renaissance? Time will tell, but we can certainly agree that this decision provides an insight into the brilliance of the Justices of the Supreme Court. In the decision we witness a Court with the boldness to confront its past decisions, with unreserved candour, and despite the strong and spirited dissenting views of 2 of the 7 Justices, the Court exhibits a willingness to display the robustness of its debates.
These qualities are reminiscent of the era of the great Jurists who once traversed the corridors of the highest Court in the land. However, the question of whether we are witnessing a resurgence of those days of outstanding erudition will depend on the Court’s activities in the coming months.
