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Navigating the headwinds of governance

The Council of Retired Federal Permanent Secretaries (CORFEPS) held its annual colloquium on Wednesday, October 28, 2026, at the Rotunda,

Civil service secretariat
Civil service secretariat

By Olusade Adesola

The Council of Retired Federal Permanent Secretaries (CORFEPS) held its annual colloquium on Wednesday, October 28, 2026, at the Rotunda, Tafawa Balewa House, Abuja. The theme was “Navigating the Headwinds of Governance: Centrality of the Civil Service.” Mr Boss Gida Mustapha, CFR, the immediate past Secretary to the Government of the Federation, delivered the keynote address.

The keynote argued that the strength of the civil service “is not measured by its ability to agree with political authority, but by its capacity to advise candidly, implement lawful decisions faithfully and account transparently for results.” That capacity, it contended, cannot be sustained by the service alone, and it therefore urged political leaders to “demand results, but provide the authority, resources and professional space required to achieve them.”

The keynote further submitted that “honest advice deserves protection.” The obvious question, therefore, is who provides it. That question, who protects the adviser and how, dominated the panel discussion that followed. The answer begins with what the rules expect of the adviser, and ends with the security of the office that leads the service.

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The Revised Civil Service Handbook (Chapter 6, paragraphs 17 and 18) describes the Permanent Secretary as the officer in charge of a Ministry’s day-to-day administration, its Accounting Officer, and “the Chief Policy Adviser to the Minister.” The listed duties include advising the Minister on policy, managing resources against agreed targets, preparing draft Council memoranda, ensuring that Federal Executive Council decisions are implemented, representing the Ministry on the boards of its parastatals, and managing the Ministry’s annual budget from preparation to monitoring.

The Guides to Administrative Procedures in the Federal Public Service are more explicit. They state that “it is the Permanent Secretary’s duty to advise his Minister impartially and to the best of his ability, but it is the Minister who has the final say.” In a serious difference of opinion, the Permanent Secretary “has the right to set out his views in writing,” and may have them placed before the President before the Executive Council decides. The Guides also describe the Permanent Secretary as “the Minister’s final adviser,” the channel of official communication for the Ministry, and the officer with an “unquestioned right to see all communications emanating from the Ministry.”

The rules, therefore, do more than permit candour. They require it, and they provide for dissent to reach the President. Yet these provisions are largely observed in breach; today, the common practice is to place Special Advisers and Special Assistants between the Minister and the Permanent Secretary, where they decide selectively what reaches the latter. In the most extreme cases, ministers sideline their permanent secretaries and deal directly with directors in the ministry, so that the advice the rules demand is never heard. Even when that advice does get through, the rules do not address what happens to the officer once it has been given.

Who protects the adviser?
Under the Public Service Rules, a Permanent Secretary holds office for four years, renewable once, subject to satisfactory performance. Postings, redeployments, and tenure renewal are discretionary, and no procedure distinguishes an officer moved for poor performance from one moved because his advice was unwelcome.

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The keynote identified the consequence. Where officers fear that honest advice will cost them their careers, they may offer comfortable advice instead, and “a service that cannot speak truth to power cannot protect power from its own mistakes.” The cost falls on the government, which loses the warning it needed, and on the citizen, who pays for the error.

Two protections proposed at the panel session would narrow this gap without new legislation. The first is that advice should be recorded on the file, so that frank counsel becomes evidence rather than a private risk. Such a record also preserves the reasoning behind decisions for successors and auditors, which is the institutional memory the keynote urged the service to protect.

The second is due process in disciplining Permanent Secretaries. No Permanent Secretary should be retired early or sanctioned except through a documented process, with stated grounds, an opportunity to respond, and a decision by the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and the Federal Civil Service Commission. Accountability for performance would remain; only removal for advice that was merely unwelcome would be excluded.

Protection also comes from access. Section 148(2) of the Constitution requires the President to hold regular meetings with the Vice-President and all Ministers to determine the general direction of policy, coordinate the work of the executive and advise the President. The Constitution makes no comparable provision for the Permanent Secretaries who implement those policies, but none is needed; the President can convene them as a matter of practice. A quarterly session between the President and the body of Permanent Secretaries would provide direct feedback on implementation and on recurring obstacles in funding, procurement and coordination. It would complement the delivery reviews and ministerial performance retreats described in the keynote, and it would show how much confidence the Presidency places in the bureaucracy.

The case for a guaranteed tenure
Each of these measures depends, in the end, on the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation. The office leads the service, superintends the appointment, posting and discipline of Permanent Secretaries, and is best placed to stand between a career official and political displeasure. Yet the office itself has no security of tenure.

Section 171 of the Constitution vests in the President the power to appoint and remove the Head of Service, who must be drawn from among Permanent Secretaries or officers of equivalent rank. Appointees are usually senior Permanent Secretaries near the end of their careers, so the general rule of retirement at 60 years of age or 35 years of service often determines their tenure.

Recent appointments illustrate this. Mrs Didi Esther Walson-Jack assumed office on 14 August 2024 and retired on reaching 60, handing over on 27 August 2026, after about two years. Her successor, Mr Abel Olumuyiwa Enitan, the most senior Permanent Secretary at the time, was sworn in on the same day. Press reports have noted that he turns 60 on 12 December 2026, raising the prospect of a tenure of months unless a different provision applies. The issue is structural, not personal.

Short tenures carry real costs. The Federal Civil Service Strategy and Implementation Plan 2026–2030 is a five-year programme, which a Head of Service with two years or less in office cannot own. Nor can such an office holder credibly protect Permanent Secretaries when the protection is known to be temporary. The timing makes this pressing: the service will manage a political transition after the 2027 general elections, and if its own leadership changes at the same moment, continuity is weakest when it is most needed.

Fixed tenure is not new to Nigerian public administration. Section 7(6) of the Police Act 2020 gives the Inspector-General of Police a four-year tenure, and a 2024 amendment allows the holder to complete that term notwithstanding the general retirement age or length of service, on grounds of stability and continuity. University Vice-Chancellors serve a single fixed term, and Permanent Secretaries themselves hold four-year terms, renewable once. The office that administers Permanent Secretaries’ tenure has no tenure of its own.

A sound arrangement would rest on four principles. First, the Head of Service should have a fixed minimum term, with four years as a reasonable benchmark, secured either by appointing an officer with that much service remaining or by allowing the term to run its course despite the general retirement age. Second, removal during the term should be only for cause, such as gross misconduct or incapacity, through a documented process; the President’s power to choose would be unaffected. Third, terms should straddle election cycles, with succession settled well before each election season, so the service never faces a change of government and of its own leadership at once. Fourth, the reform should apply only to future appointments and, because Section 171 governs the office, is best made through constitutional amendment.

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The controversy over the 2024 Police Act amendment, which critics described as tailored to an individual, shows why tenure reform must be seen to serve the institution rather than an office holder.

Two objections are likely. The first is that a fixed term slows progression at the top, but it affects a single office, and the stability gained outweighs a short delay for a few officers. The second is that it fetters the President. It does not: the President still appoints and can still remove for cause.

The keynote asked political leaders to give the civil service the professional space it needs to deliver.

A guaranteed tenure for the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation is a concrete and inexpensive way to do so. Together with advice on file, due process for Permanent Secretaries and a regular forum with the President, it would give frank advisers the protection the rules already assume they have. The National Assembly, particularly its constitution review committees and the Senate Committee on Establishment and Service Matters, together with the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and the Presidency, should take up the matter before the next transition, not after it.

Adesola, OON, retired Permanent Secretary, wrote from Lagos. 

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