Nigeria’s search for reliable partners to secure its energy assets, industrial facilities, transport corridors and digital infrastructure is opening new possibilities for cooperation with Russia. But as experts warn that previous bilateral agreements have yielded limited results, the challenge remains translating diplomatic commitments into tangible economic and security gains.
As security threats increasingly extend beyond conventional warfare to include cyberattacks, oil theft, vandalism, terrorism, and disruptions to strategic supply chains, protecting critical infrastructure is becoming an important consideration in Nigeria’s national security calculations.
For Nigeria and Russia, this presents an opportunity to broaden a relationship historically anchored on defence cooperation and technical assistance into a more comprehensive partnership covering energy security, industrial development, transport connectivity and cybersecurity.
Yet, despite renewed diplomatic engagement and several areas of mutual interest, the extent to which both countries can develop a functional framework for protecting critical infrastructure remains uncertain.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Centre for the Promotion of Private Enterprise (CPPE), Dr. Muda Yusuf, said Nigeria must be realistic about what it expects from new partnerships, particularly given the country’s record of failing to maximise agreements already signed with foreign governments.
According to him, Nigeria needs more international partners to support development across critical sectors, but it must first establish whether prospective agreements can deliver measurable outcomes.
“It is no secret that Nigeria needs more trade and investment partners across different sectors, but we must ask the hard questions if Russia can deliver on any new agreements as it stands now. Several MoUs were signed in the past regarding infrastructure development, energy, transport and security, but I am not aware if any of these delivered so far,” he said.
Yusuf said Nigeria must manage expectations concerning its relationship with Russia, especially as Moscow continues to commit significant human and material resources to the ongoing conflict with Ukraine.
“I think we must manage expectations as far as some of these agreements and relations with Russia are concerned. I say this because Russia is occupied with the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, and quite some resources and commitments, both human and material, are tied up in the war. I am not very optimistic about concrete outcomes for Nigeria and the rest of Africa as long as the war is ongoing,” he added.
He also identified policy continuity as a major factor affecting the implementation of bilateral agreements, arguing that changes in government often disrupt commitments and undermine the prospects of long-term infrastructure projects.
“Over the last two editions, there have been changes in government, and each time there is a change, it affects some of these commitments and agreements. We must commit to continuity across administrations so that some of these projects can see the light of day,” Yusuf said.
His concerns highlight a fundamental question confronting Nigeria’s expanding international partnerships: whether the country can turn diplomatic goodwill into sustained investment, technological development and stronger protection for assets critical to economic growth.

Beyond military hardware
Nigeria and Russia have a formal military-technical cooperation framework, with an agreement signed in 2021 renewing an earlier arrangement reached in 2017. The framework provides a basis for cooperation involving defence equipment, training and technical assistance.
Nigeria’s engagement with Russia has also included discussions on expanding military training and building the capabilities of Nigerian civilian specialists and law-enforcement personnel.
These ties provide a foundation for broader cooperation, but protecting critical infrastructure requires capabilities that extend beyond conventional military procurement. It demands coordinated intelligence, engineering expertise, specialist personnel, surveillance systems, cybersecurity arrangements and effective institutions capable of identifying and responding to threats.
Nigeria’s energy infrastructure illustrates the scale of the challenge. Oil and gas installations, pipelines, refineries, electricity transmission networks and power-generation facilities are central to the country’s economic stability. Disruptions to these assets can affect production, public revenue, industrial operations and household welfare.
Nigeria and Russia have identified hydrocarbon production and processing, nuclear power and energy infrastructure as potential areas for deeper engagement. In 2024, Nigerian officials, including representatives of the National Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of the National Security Adviser and the Defence Ministry, held discussions with Russian counterparts and representatives of Rosatom on nuclear-energy cooperation.
Such engagement creates room for technical collaboration in infrastructure protection, risk monitoring, personnel training and the security of complex energy installations. However, the existence of discussions and areas of mutual interest should not be mistaken for evidence that a comprehensive bilateral infrastructure-protection programme is already operational.
The distinction is important because Nigeria’s security needs are immediate, while the development of sophisticated systems and institutional arrangements requires funding, planning and sustained implementation.

Industrialisation and the Ajaokuta question
The debate over Russo-Nigerian cooperation is also inseparable from Nigeria’s long-standing industrialisation ambitions and the unresolved question of how to revive strategic industrial assets.
For Ibrahim Usman, former chairperson of the infrastructure committee of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and Manufacturers’ Power Development Company Ltd, Nigeria’s failure to maximise previous agreements with Russia should serve as a warning against entering fresh arrangements without first evaluating existing commitments. He cited the Ajaokuta Steel Company as a prominent example of the gap between bilateral cooperation and actual industrial outcomes.
“It is a pity that very little has come from agreements and understandings signed in the past. A good example is the Ajaokuta Steel that was built by Russia many years ago, and we thought they could help revive the plant to make it functional. Years after it was constructed, it is yet to produce a single steel bar,” Usman said.
He blamed successive Nigerian administrations for failing to make the plant operational, despite repeated promises of revival and the allocation of public funds.
“Subsequent governments have been unserious and have simply been paying lip service to its revival all these years, with nothing to show for it. Ajaokuta has been used as a drainpipe by different governments over the years to siphon funds. They allocate funds to Ajaokuta every budget cycle, promise to revive it, but nothing is done as we can all see,” he said.
For Usman, the experience raises questions about Nigeria’s ability to turn foreign technical expertise and bilateral agreements into functioning industrial capacity.
He argued that previous commitments should be assessed and, where viable, fulfilled before new agreements are signed.
“There are so many sectors we can partner with Russia on today, agreements that will be beneficial to everyone. However, before we sign any new agreements again, let us work to fulfil the old ones that have not seen the light of day.
“What is the state of the previous agreements? Did any of them see the light of day? The steel, rail, security agreements and the likes that were signed in the past, did we do anything with them?” he asked.
Usman disclosed that the African Steel Council and MAN had jointly worked on a proposal aimed at reviving Ajaokuta, but the initiative had yet to materialise.
He maintained that the government should prioritise projects capable of delivering immediate benefits rather than repeatedly announcing new partnerships.
“There are so many low-hanging fruits that can be tackled immediately and deliver quick wins. The government must handle the low-hanging fruits first before looking to enter into new agreements,” he said.
The Ajaokuta experience therefore presents a broader lesson for critical infrastructure security. Industrial facilities cannot contribute meaningfully to national resilience if agreements surrounding their construction, maintenance, financing and operation remain unfulfilled. Nor can infrastructure security be separated from the institutional capacity to keep strategic assets functional.

Cybersecurity as an emerging frontier
Perhaps the most consequential new dimension of the relationship is cybersecurity.
As government agencies, banks, telecommunications operators, electricity providers and industrial companies become increasingly dependent on digital systems, cyber threats have emerged as a risk to both national security and economic stability.
An attack on a power network, telecommunications system or government database can disrupt essential services, expose sensitive information and undermine public confidence. In the energy sector, digital vulnerabilities can also create risks for the operation of physical infrastructure.
Nigeria’s security priorities increasingly reflect this changing environment. In September 2026, Defence Minister Christopher Musa identified land, maritime, air and cyber domains as part of Nigeria’s strategic security frontier, underscoring the growing importance of digital capabilities in national defence.
A 2026 academic study by Russian and Nigerian researchers also identified digital technologies and e-government, cybersecurity, the nuclear industry and electricity as sectors in which the countries’ interests and capabilities intersect.
The study argued that a central challenge was not necessarily the absence of potential technical capabilities, but the difficulty of translating high-level agreements into concrete projects with effective monitoring mechanisms.
For Nigeria, practical cooperation could include specialist training, digital forensics, cyber incident response, information-sharing on cybercrime and measures to protect critical information infrastructure.
A bilateral protocol for exchanging information on cybercrime has also been proposed as a possible short-term priority.
Such arrangements could help build institutional capacity, provided they are supported by clearly defined responsibilities, appropriate data-protection safeguards and mechanisms for accountability.
The risks must also be considered. Cooperation involving surveillance and digital-security technologies raises questions about privacy, civil liberties, data governance and technological dependence. Any partnership should therefore be assessed not only by its security benefits but also by its implications for citizens’ rights and Nigeria’s control over sensitive information.

From agreements to implementation
The potential areas for deeper cooperation are clear. Nigeria could explore arrangements covering the physical security of energy infrastructure, the protection of industrial enterprises, transport and logistics security, cybersecurity, and the training of engineers and other technical specialists.
The Federal Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning said in April 2026 that Nigeria and Russia were seeking to expand technical partnerships and technology cooperation. Such engagement could provide a foundation for a more practical relationship focused on skills development and technology transfer rather than equipment purchases alone.
However, the success of any expanded partnership would depend on the quality of its implementation framework.
Projects require clearly defined objectives, financing, procurement arrangements, technical standards, institutional responsibilities and measurable outcomes. Without these, agreements risk remaining diplomatic statements of intent rather than instruments of economic development.
Yusuf’s concerns about policy continuity and Russia’s commitments elsewhere, alongside Usman’s criticism of Nigeria’s record on Ajaokuta, point to weaknesses that cannot be resolved through diplomacy alone.
Nigeria must determine which previous agreements remain viable, establish their implementation status and identify the resources and institutional reforms needed to complete them. New partnerships should be evaluated against demonstrable benefits to the economy and the country’s security architecture.
At the same time, Russia’s capacity to deliver must be assessed realistically, including the implications of its ongoing war with Ukraine and the competing demands on its resources.
For Nigeria, the attraction of closer cooperation lies in the potential access to Russian defence, engineering, energy, nuclear and digital capabilities. For Russia, engagement with one of Africa’s largest economies offers opportunities to deepen its economic and technological relationships across the continent.
But mutual interest does not automatically guarantee successful projects.

A test of regional stability
Critical infrastructure security is increasingly linked to regional stability because the effects of disruption rarely stop at national borders. Interruptions to energy supplies, transport corridors and strategic trade networks can affect neighbouring economies, regional commerce and investor confidence.
For Nigeria, stronger infrastructure protection could support industrial productivity, improve the reliability of essential services and reduce the vulnerability of strategic economic assets. Effective cybersecurity could also strengthen the resilience of public institutions and private-sector operators.
Russia-Nigeria cooperation could contribute to these objectives if it is structured around specific needs, practical technology transfer and transparent implementation.
Yet the central lesson from previous agreements is that the country cannot rely on diplomatic declarations alone. The unresolved Ajaokuta project, concerns over earlier steel and rail commitments, and questions about the implementation of security agreements all reinforce the need for a more disciplined approach.
The priority, therefore, should not be the number of new memorandums signed, but the number of viable projects completed, the capabilities transferred, the professionals trained and the critical assets made more secure.
Ultimately, the prospects for Russo-Nigerian cooperation in critical infrastructure security will depend on whether both countries can move beyond traditional defence ties and convert shared interests into funded, accountable and measurable programmes.
For Nigeria, the task is twofold: identify partners capable of delivering the expertise it needs and strengthen the domestic institutions responsible for turning agreements into results. Until that happens, the promise of a broader strategic partnership will remain greater than its practical impact on industrialisation, economic security and regional stability.