By Ibrahim Dikko

Scrutiny is legitimate whenever the Federal Government announces a major security initiative. Decisions involving national security deserve serious questions because the consequences of getting them wrong can be far-reaching. However, such scrutiny is most useful when grounded in context, professional experience, and a clear understanding of how security institutions operate.

It is against this background that some of the arguments raised by Yushau Abdulhameed Shuaib concerning Major General Adeyinka A. Famadewa (Rtd.) and the 90-day security planning exercise in his article titled “Famadewa, Ribadu and a 90-day security plan: Unpacking Onanuga’s release” deserve closer examination.

The central issue should not be whether Famadewa’s name appeared with the suffix “Rtd.” in a government statement, or simply that a retired general has been given another national responsibility. The more important question is why a career intelligence officer with decades of experience was selected to coordinate an exercise aimed at strengthening Nigeria’s defence and security planning.

As the Special Adviser to President Tinubu on Homeland Security, Major General Adeyinka A. Famadewa (Rtd.) is not an outsider being introduced to Nigeria’s security architecture without prior knowledge of its workings. Commissioned into the Nigerian Army through the 37 Regular Course of the Nigerian Defence Academy in 1990, he built much of his career around intelligence, counter-intelligence, strategic assessment and security operations. Those areas of expertise are directly relevant to an exercise designed to identify threats, assess capability gaps and establish operational priorities.

His professional preparation has also gone beyond military service. His academic background includes a degree in chemistry, postgraduate training in management and strategic studies, as well as specialised programmes in security and national defence in Nigeria and abroad. His exposure to institutions such as the Harvard Kennedy School, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the Canadian Forces College reflects a career shaped by both Nigerian experience and international professional development.

Still, academic qualifications and training programmes tell only part of the story. The stronger argument for Famadewa’s suitability lies in the responsibilities he has previously undertaken. He has served as chief instructor at the Nigerian Army Intelligence School, deputy director at the Defence Intelligence Agency, commander of the Nigerian Army Counter-Intelligence Command and director at the Intelligence Production Centre. These appointments required intelligence analysis, threat assessment, institutional coordination and sound judgment.

His experiences become even more relevant when viewed against his work at the intersection of Nigeria’s intelligence and wider security institutions. As principal general staff officer to the National Security Adviser, he gained exposure to coordinating different agencies and turning intelligence into strategic decisions. This is particularly important because one of the persistent weaknesses in Nigeria’s security response has been the movement of information from collection and analysis to timely operational action.

This background provides useful context for the reported development of an Intelligence Fusion Centre involving institutions such as the Department of State Services, National Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency and the Police. Intelligence fusion is intended to bring information from different agencies together, assess it collectively and develop a clearer picture of the threats facing the country. Making such a system work requires an understanding of institutional responsibilities, information flows and the realities of inter-agency cooperation.

From this perspective, Shuaib’s description of Famadewa primarily as a retired military officer who has received another government appointment significantly understates what he brings to the exercise. His value is rooted in institutional memory and accumulated professional experience. He has worked within intelligence structures, understands their strengths and limitations, and has operated close to the point where intelligence, strategy and military operations meet.

Shuaib also raised an argument about why National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu is a member of the committee while Famadewa coordinates its work. There is no inherent contradiction in having the National Security Adviser participate in a strategic committee while a specialist with extensive intelligence and operational planning experience coordinates its technical work. Different responsibilities can exist within the same structure without diminishing the authority or competence of others.

The presence of the National Security Adviser, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff, Service Chiefs and heads of major intelligence institutions gives the committee a broad institutional base. Famadewa’s coordinating role should therefore not be interpreted as placing him above the heads of those institutions. It is more reasonably understood as a responsibility to keep the technical work focused, organised and directed towards the mandate of the exercise.

His criticism concerning the omission of the Nigeria Police Force and other internal security bodies also requires caution. Government committees are ordinarily constituted around specific mandates, and membership is determined by the responsibilities considered necessary for achieving those mandates. The absence of an institution from a particular committee may raise questions about representation, but it cannot, by itself, be treated as evidence that the entire exercise is flawed. What matters ultimately is whether the committee’s work captures the relevant dimensions of Nigeria’s security challenges and provides mechanisms for effective coordination with institutions outside its immediate membership.

Similarly, Shuaib’s argument that Nigeria already has enough security strategies deserves a more nuanced assessment. The existence of previous policy documents does not mean the country should stop reviewing its security architecture. Security threats are not static. Terrorist organisations adapt, criminal networks change their methods, technology creates new vulnerabilities and the character of modern warfare continues to evolve. A strategy that was appropriate at one stage may require substantial revision as the security environment changes.

For that reason, the 90-day exercise should not be judged simply by whether it produces another document. Its real value will depend on whether it honestly identifies why existing strategies and capabilities have not always delivered the desired results and whether it proposes practical solutions. A new plan is useful only when it leads to clearer priorities, better coordination and improved security outcomes.

This also brings into focus the distinction between policy and implementation. Nigeria may have produced several security strategies over the years, but a policy document does not automatically guarantee effective implementation. Command structures, intelligence sharing, equipment, manpower, logistics, funding, inter-agency cooperation and accountability often determine whether a policy translates into improved security on the ground.

That is why the proposed Strategic Defence Operations Plan can serve a useful purpose if properly integrated with existing national security frameworks. It can identify operational priorities, expose capability gaps and establish realistic requirements for manpower, equipment and resources. Most importantly, its recommendations should be measurable, practical and capable of implementation.

Famadewa’s relative lack of public visibility should also not be mistaken by Shuaib for a lack of relevance. Intelligence professionals are not ordinarily judged by how frequently their names appear in newspapers or on television. Much of their work takes place away from public attention, and in security matters, discretion is often an essential part of professionalism. His career suggests decades of dealing with the very questions of intelligence, counter-intelligence, strategic assessment and security coordination that the present assignment requires.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is therefore justified in drawing on professionals with deep experience within Nigeria’s intelligence and security system. At a time when the country faces interconnected threats ranging from terrorism and banditry to organised crime and insurgency, the search for competent people with institutional knowledge should be encouraged rather than dismissed simply because they are retired. Famadewa’s experience provides a reasonable basis for the confidence placed in him.

Nigeria’s security challenges are too complex for experimentation driven by familiarity, publicity or political convenience. What the country needs is competence, institutional knowledge and the ability to connect intelligence with operational reality. And Famadewa has all the relevant expertise to coordinate the much-needed security reset.

*Dikko writes from Kaduna