By Tunji Olaopa
In its over six decades of national existence, the Nigerian state has accumulated sufficient national crises and predicaments that have made populism a romantic alternative that promises a better life.
Populism is founded on the capacity of government policies to transform the welfare of the people, especially through the people-oriented appeal of a charismatic leadership. Within this populist framework, any new governance template is framed against the supposed successes of the past which any incumbent government is not rising up to.
The Tinubu administration, like its predecessor, have been judged according to some perceived governance successes in Nigeria’s first and second republics which these administrations are meant to replicate or transcend. Unfortunately, populism is not always a coherent political ideology.
One fundamental reason for this assessment is that it often deduces simplistic solutions from complex political and governance dynamics. In the case of the Nigerian developmental and governance circumstances, a populist orientation always seems to long for some good old days when some governance policies made the lives of Nigerians much better. Romanticising these policies eventually led to a populist benchmarking of governance failures disguised as “successes.” Unfortunately, this ideological sentiment does not investigate how some of these wrong-headed policies constituted some of the structural foundation for the governance and developmental challenges and crises of today—challenges that the Tinubu administration and other previous government had to unravel.
I will list a few to make my point. Take one of the most popular governance legends: one naira to one dollar nostalgia. The 1970s and 1980s were often considered to be an era when the value of the naira was at par with that of the dollar. This period would then suggest that the monetary policies of today must be designed to raise the value of the naira. While the conclusion is solid, what is not obvious is the governance policies that were deployed towards shoring up the value of the currency outside of a solid productivity paradigm covered up by a massive injection of the oil windfall into the weak economy. The import-dependent economy of today was solidified over the death of the agricultural sector and local manufacturing. This reality is not often obvious through the populist spectacle.
The 1970s and 1980s also host the reference to the cheap fuel regime. And this constitutes, for civil society organisations and activists, and especially the labour unions, the baseline for agitation against subsidy removal or market deregulation today. But here also, what is behind five is more than six! The subsidised pricing not only encouraged cross-border smuggling, it also drained trillions of naira that could have gone into financing significant infrastructural development projects, from transportation to healthcare services. But even more, it is one of the factors that locked Nigeria into a perpetual cycle of depth while crippling the refineries.
We must also speak about the clamour for marketing and commodity boards of the 1960s and 1970s that, like the fuel subsidy, fixed the prices of agricultural produce. This was supposed to be a great policy in terms of the support it gave farmers. The same could be said about the universal basic education and subsidised higher education of the first republic.What is not obvious, with regard to the agricultural boards, is that government used the boards as a device that surreptitiously taxed the poor rural farmers.
The surplus derived from buying the produce and selling on the global market went into the financing of the urban elites and bloated state bureaucracies. In the context of education and the clamour for a return to state-funded higher education, a deeper analysis will demonstrate how education back then was funded through revenues accruing from crude oil without a most enduring fiscal tax base, institutional stability and demographic projections. The government then refused to adopt a more sustainable public-private funding collaborations that would have made the policy more fundamental to national development.
Thus, the populist nostalgia about past policies stands as a framework for benchmarking governance failures while oblivious of how those “golden eras” contributed to the understanding of Nigeria’s post-independence predicaments today. What is even worse than this populist nostalgia is transforming the benchmarking framework into a governance praxis that celebrates underperformance when juxtaposed with past governance policies and practices.
In governance and democratic practices, the idea of benchmarking is deployed as a management framework that enables the government to drive public sector reform through comparing national institutional, structural and procedural outcomes against global best practices. However, this management logic is inverted when the government benchmark failure as an active governance praxis to rationalize and justify systemic underperformance. What ought to be structural and governance failure, after due and in-depth analysis, is routinely normalized and institutionalised through a rather unfortunately sub-optimal comparative standard. This then makes it rather difficult to achieve a significant understanding that derives from comparing and evaluating public policies ad state capabilities against functional international and global benchmarks that work.
The anatomy is that an incumbent government compares its low performance to the abject performance records of past governments. This tactic simply accentuates the governance “capability” of the government by relativising its incompetence and benchmarking its failure against past failures. Thus, patching up a few stretches of kilometers is compared to the failure of the past government to even lay one kilometer of road. Achieving a few hours of unstable electricity distribution is trumpeted as infrastructural progress compared to the grid collapse that characterised past governance failure. A distinct feature of how failure is benchmarked is demonstrated by why and how infrastructural development is privatised and the burden shifted to the citizens.
Security becomes the responsibility of communities, private schools replace dilapidated public education, and private power generation replaces the government’s responsibility to supply electricity. One other significant anatomical feature is the alacrity with which government hire international consulting firms and agencies to design governance blueprints which are disconnected from the unassessed structural capabilities of the MDAs meant to implement the blueprints. Here, it is just sufficient to launch those masterplans with fanfares and chalk them up as indicators of performance than to actually succeed in implementing them.
Benchmarking failure as governance praxis is a veritable binding constraint to economic growth and national development. This goes without saying. A binding constraint is that singular structural deficiency or bottleneck that undermines every corrective governance innovation and initiatives. For example, and as was stated earlier, policies are launched and celebrated without any significant administrative reflection given to the execution dynamics. And the institutional capability of the MDAs that are meant to oversee the implementation is neglected.
This leads to a very high attrition level for public projects, while also facilitating the political and bureaucratic misallocation of public capital. Fiscal discipline is reduced because budgeting and funding projections are decoupled from realistic estimations that enables the government to adjust for macroeconomic instability.
The most significant factors that subsumes the above is the deployment of political power towards political recruitment that facilitate patronage and clientelist networks of hangers-on and political jobbers. This undermining of merit eventually is the cause of the subversion of a competency-driven governance model. The issue is very simple: when government recruits political yes-men and clients, the patronage system generates a domino effect that cascades down not only to the dynamics of administrative competence but also affects the administrative decisions that could have facilitated governance performance and productivity.
To break this binding constraint of benchmarking failure and undermining the execution trap that has diminished governance performance, there is a governance imperative to shift away from the damaging effects of benchmarking governance failure towards laying the solid foundations for structural and objective metrics for governance successes. First, national development plans and blueprints must be the function of internal dynamics that connects global initiatives with local assessment and ownership.
In other words, national masterplans must be subjected to structural and administrative brainstorming and discussions to determine their significance and relevance. And the MDAs are critical stakeholders in such structural and administrative assessment. The second imperative is to ensure that these MDAs which are to be responsible for the implementation of the policies and blueprints must necessarily undergo independent institutional audits and reviews to determine the status of their capability readiness. There is no logical and administrative sense in allocating projects to any MDA that lacks the capability to execute until and unless that capability is demonstrated.
The next key dynamic is to subject policies and projects to risk, cost and scoping analyses and assessments as a mean of determining their feasibility. This must also include high profile budget projections that must be articulated with a mind to achieve flexible buffers that protect public investments against volatile oil price and revenue shocks. Last but not the least, the government need to initiate the modalities for transitioning the governance and administrative mechanics, structures and procedures to an outcome-based framework.
In other words, the pubic sector must jettison its traditional scorecard that is founded on input metrics—regulations, procedures, etc. that prioritize rules and procurements. Rather, the scorecard must be determined by performance contracts and evaluation that allows the government to focus entirely on measurable, verifiable, citizen-centric outcomes. In governance terms, the government is then able to monitor and evaluate cost and ease of doing business, literacy rates, the man-hour that goes into performance, hours of grid electricity, etc. And furthermore, these governance outcomes are then benchmarked not against some failed outcomes of the past, but against regional and global practices.
The implication of all these for the Tinubu administration is that there is a live and real chance of transforming the next administration cycle, post-2027, into a significant moment for real governance opportunity to transform Nigeria’s governance framework. This, for one, helps the administration to connect its initial macroeconomic gains in the first administration cycle into tangible microeconomic policies that will benefit from strategic implementation dynamics and institutional capability readiness of the MDAs.
The real challenge of governance anywhere in the world is founded on the capability of government to make its policies work for the betterment of the citizens. The Tinubu administration cannot afford to benchmark failures, or connect its governance “successes” to what a past government has failed to do well. Rather, it must articulate and implement standalone policies whose solidity must stand shoulder to shoulder with such policies and projects in global comparison. Post-2027, the administration must become proactive in dealing with the binding constraints that could keep undermining all of its pre-2027 governance and administrative efforts. This is where the real democratic governance legacy lies.
Prof. Olaopa is chairman, Federal Civil Service Commission, Abuja