Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger: Deepening push for new regional bloc in Sahel

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES – Alliance des États du Sahel), a coalition of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed in 2023 and perceived as representing a bold attempt to redefine sovereignty and security in the Sahel, has significant implications for regional politics, security, and global geopolitics. Experts say if managed well, it could mark a turning point for Africa, if not, it risks exacerbating the challenges the region is already facing, OLUDARE RICHARDS writes.

One year after the military leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger publicly declared their intent to withdraw from the ECOWAS on January 28, 2024, the AES, in its boldly controversial move, has not only in defiance of ECOWAS and at the risk of economic consequences proceeded in its plan to exit the regional bloc, but has also launched its own passport to cause an historic shift of power in the Sahel.

The emergence of the coalition has introduced a new layer of complexity to West Africa’s political and security landscape. The new bloc, established in 2023, aims to assert greater regional autonomy and strengthen security cooperation against terrorism in its sub-region, signaling a significant shift from the influence of traditional powers such as France.

The advancement of the AES, however, presents substantial challenges for the ECOWAS, raising questions about its authority and relevance in the region.

The AES’s formation underscores a growing dissatisfaction with ECOWAS, which has often been criticised for its slow and sometimes ineffectual responses to the region’s political and security crises. It is perceived that by creating a parallel regional bloc, the AES not only diminishes ECOWAS’ influence but also threatens to fragment regional cooperation. With key members like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso effectively exiting, ECOWAS’ capacity to act as a unifying force is significantly weakened.

One of the most visible implications of the AES is the divergence in counterterrorism strategies. While ECOWAS has historically collaborated with western nations, particularly France, to address the growing jihadist threat in the Sahel, the AES prioritizes a self-reliant approach. This includes partnerships with alternative powers, most notably Russia, which has provided military assistance to member states through the Wagner Group.

Experts are of the view that this ideological and strategic divide risks creating conflicting policies, potentially undermining regional efforts to combat terrorism and insurgencies.

Moreover, the AES’s defiance of ECOWAS sanctions, most notably during the Niger coup of 2023, has set a precedence that weakens the regional bloc’s enforcement capabilities.

The AES’s consolidation also carries significant economic implications. By controlling strategic resources such as Niger’s uranium and Mali’s gold, the alliance could leverage these assets to negotiate independent trade agreements, by-passing ECOWAS protocols.

Challenges the new bloc may face in its influence on the shift in regional power dynamics include geopolitical friction, and risks of fragmentation or isolation.

Also, the Alliance may face political instability, military coups, and economic struggles within the member states which could undermine the effectiveness. Continued alignment with controversial actors like Wagner could lead to sanctions or economic repercussions from the West.

The ties with Wagner Group and potential alliances with China signal a shift in global alliances that could heighten competition for influence in Africa. However, the alliance may exacerbate tensions with Western powers, particularly France and the European Union, as their influence in the Sahel wanes.

Consequently, the AES might encourage other African countries to form regional coalitions, particularly in areas like the Horn of Africa and Central Africa. There is also the potential to influence a strategic alignment such as partnerships with BRICS nations (such as Russia and China) which could expand, challenging Western dominance in Africa.

Professor of History and International Studies at Federal University, Lokoja, Kogi State, Audu Mohammed Suleiman, told The Guardian that the advancement of AES would present both opportunities and challenges for the region, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community. He believes the success of the coalition will depend on effective cooperation, institutional strengthening, and sustainable governance.

Suleiman noted that countries in the transitional zone between the Sahara Desert to the north and the savannas to the south known as The Sahel such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and The Gambia face similar challenges, including poverty and underdevelopment. They also share issues such as climate change and environmental degradation, terrorism and insecurity, weak governance and limited access to basic services like education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Whilst the Sahel states are also home to several regional and international organizations, including the Sahel Alliance, ECOWAS, and the African Union’s Sahel Region, the new alliance may have so far claimed only three out of the eight Sahel states.

Being pro-localised and solution-based, the AES model prioritises regional approaches over external interventions, especially on security cooperation against insurgencies where there has often been criticism on inefficiency and neo-colonial undertones.

The AES has significant implications for the region, ECOWAS, AU, regional peace, security, and politics, as well as the international community. While the alliance aims to promote economic growth through cooperation in sectors like agriculture, energy, and governance, which could improve the living conditions of populations in the Sahel region, its effectiveness in addressing security challenges such as terrorism and banditry remains a concern, particularly given the presence of transitional military regimes.

Suleiman said the alliance had the potential of enhancing regional cooperation and coordination among ECOWAS and AU member states, promoting collective security and stability. He added that the focus on security cooperation could contribute to global security efforts, particularly in combating terrorism and organized crime. Also, the Alliance’s potential to attract international partners, such as the European Union, United States, and China could enhance regional development and security.

Besides, the Alliance’s potential to integrate the Sahel region into global markets and economies could have positive impacts on trade and economic development, promoting regional cohesion. However, the Alliance’s growing influence may create competing interests within ECOWAS and the AU, potentially leading to tensions and challenges.

“The Alliance’s inclusivity and representation of diverse regional interests are crucial to its success, its long-term sustainability is uncertain, given the presence of transitional military regimes and potential changes in government priorities,” he told The Guardian.

A professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Lagos, David Aworawo, said while it appeared the Alliance has come to stay, it would be detrimental to its three- member countries and also ECOWAS. He explained that the Alliance could further weaken concerted efforts in the fight against insurgency and terrorism; it could also weaken cohesion between member-states not only separated by borders but also regional blocs which could not only encourage limitations in cooperative mitigation but also cross-border terrorist activities amid porosity.

“Regional integration presents better opportunity for sustainable development efforts. When these countries were with ECOWAS, it was difficult tackling insecurity. It could become even more difficult between blocs. The separation is not in the interest of the Alliance and that of the ECOWAS member-states; it is in fact detrimental and more to these countries than to ECOWAS states.

“I do not see much benefit of the Alliance because these countries are poor. This could also affect their capacity to gain economically and militarily with separation. Although it would affect the alliance countries, ECOWAS states will also be affected because these countries are sandwiched between themselves. Although free movement is currently not affected, but if they someday choose to restrict their airspace or free movement, it would severely constrain travel,” Aworawo said.

He noted that throughout the history of Africa, countries have been able to achieve more when they reach solidarity, especially when pan-Africanism was at its highest. Examples of such instances include the influence of solidarity against apartheid and colonialism.

Aworawo said it was even more worrisome to consider expansion of the Alliance with increased membership because the more countries break away to join them, the more ECOWAS is weakened. ‘Countries with more financial capacity would not likely join the Alliance. If it happens that more poor countries join, they will only be further impoverished. This situation will likely lead to the exacerbation of poverty in these countries and will only result in a spillover into the abstaining neighbouring countries such as ECOWAS member-states.

This will further put a strain on the fight against insecurity and render West Africa rather fragile.

“It makes more sense to have the Alliance countries return to ECOWAS even after a few years than to have an expansion. It would be a tragedy for the region.’

To Professor Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi of the Department of History and International Studies, Delta State University, Abraka, the states in the Alliance have the whole world to lose and nothing to attract others to their fold.

He described the Alliance of Sahel States as merely a group of military regimes attempting to reinvent outdated military dictatorships in the Sahel region. As such, they can only be treated as pariahs on the global stage.

“The world cannot return to the Trans-Sahara Trade era or militarisation of governance in the 21st century to make the Sahel States relevant and models of governance in international relations and regional integration.

“The outdated military governments of the three Sahel states need ECOWAS, AU and the UN to survive and remain relevant, irrespective of what carrot Russia may dangle before them. It does not make any sense for them to free their countries from the enslavement of France and go into Russia’s enslavement or teleguidance,” he said.

A former Chairman, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Delta State University, Abraka Branch (ASUU-DELSU) insisted that the countries so depend on their neighbours for virtually everything that the “braggadocio of their self-imposed military dictators will soon become history.”

In a curious development, Togo indicated the possibility of joining the Alliance through its Foreign Minister during an interview with Voxafrica on January 17, 2025.
Togo indicated that it could further collaborate with the AES as well as other countries. Its Foreign Minister Robert Dussey announced that the Togolese government had not ruled out joining the Sahel States Alliance. “It’s not impossible,” he said.

When asked about the potential membership in the Alliance of Sahel States, Dussey stated: “It is the decision of the President of the Republic. It is not impossible.”

Amid the tensions, Nigeria has resumed trade with Niger and is pursuing military cooperation while Ghana has appointed a former senior officer, Larry-Gbevlo Lartey as special envoy to the AES following Ibrahim Traore’s visit to Accra.

As landlocked nations, the AES must negotiate with their southern neighbours for port access to facilitate transit of goods to and from the Sahel. For the three Sahel countries, another potential outlet could be found to the North with the Kingdom of Morocco, which has since late 2003 indicated willingness to offer an Atlantic gateway to members of the AES.

These existing and potential bilateral partnerships are particularly crucial to the AES given that two of the three Alliance members are in diplomatic conflict with their coastal ECOWAS member-states who are neighbours.