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Buhari’s eligibility: Recourse to constitutional provision

By Robert Omote
02 February 2015   |   11:00 pm
NIGERIAN political history has never generated so much delicate debate and undercurrent compared with the on-going political scenario. It is instructive that the People’s Democratic Party controlled Federal Government of Nigeria since 1999 has never been jolted at elections except this forthcoming one scheduled on the 14th February 2015.     At the moment, Nigerians…

Buhari-11-1-2015

NIGERIAN political history has never generated so much delicate debate and undercurrent compared with the on-going political scenario. It is instructive that the People’s Democratic Party controlled Federal Government of Nigeria since 1999 has never been jolted at elections except this forthcoming one scheduled on the 14th February 2015.

    At the moment, Nigerians are at the peak of their elections and are expected to be thrilled by robust campaigns where issues embedded in their manifestos are persuasively and vigorously presented before the people.

    Most disturbing has been the furore generated by the ribbing interpretation of S. 131(d) (1999) CFRN (As Amended) by political hackers whose leaning has further heated up the political process without recourse to the Interpretation Act.

    However, the circumstances under which the acclaimed mega and largest political party in the continent prepares for the 14th February 2015 election has revealed the very primordial and Machiavellian ways of the acquisition of power and challenges thrown up by the constitution recently as Nigerians prepare for the general election is the eligibility of the APC candidate: General Muhammadu Buhari rtd. It is against this backdrop that the quagmire of eligibility is examined in line with the extant constitution. 

    S. 131 (1999) CFRN (As Amended) succinctly chronicle the qualification/eligibility of a Nigerian aspiring for the exalted office of the President to wit: (a) He is a citizen of Nigeria by birth (b)  He has attained the age of forty years (c)  He is a member of a political party (d) He has been educated up to at least school leaving certificate or its equivalent.

    On the other hand, S. 318 of the (1999) constitution (As Amended) provides thus: School Certificate or its equivalent means   (a)   a secondary school certificate or its equivalent or Grade II Teacher’s Certificate, the city & Guilds Certificate or (b)   education up to Secondary School Certificate Level or (c)   primary six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent and (i)  Service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years.

    (ii)  Attendance at courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to a minimum of one year and (iii) The ability to read, write, understand and communicate in the English Language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission; and (d). Any other qualification acceptable by the Independent Electoral Commission.

    The incomprehensiveness and hollowness of S.131 and the great debate over Buhari’s eligibility is further captured in Elelu v AG (Fed) (2012) (PT 629) 1011@1022 R.10 where the Supreme Court in a glowing manner listed 16 guidelines to be observed in the interpretation of statues, especially the provisions of the constitution as follows: (i)  Effect should be given to every word used in the constitution (ii)   A construction nullifying a specific clause in the constitution shall not be tolerated unless where absolutely necessary. (iii)  A constitutional power should not be used to attain an unconstitutional result. (iv) The language of the constitution where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain and evident meaning. (v)  The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entity; hence a particular provision should not be severed from the rest of the constitution. (vi) While the language of the constitution does not change, the changing circumstance of a progressive society for which it was designed, can yield new and further import of its meaning. (vii)  A constitutional provision should not be construed in such a way as to defeat its evident purpose.

    (viii)   Under the constitution granting specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can be exercised. (ix)  Declaration by the National Assembly of its legislative functions is precluded by the constitution. (x)  Words are the common signs that men make use of to declare their intentions one to another, and when the words of a man express his intentions plainly, there is no need to have recourse to other means of interpretation of such words. (xi) The principles upon which the institution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used should measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.

(xii) Words of the constitution are therefore not to be read with “stultifying narrowness”. (xiii) Constitutional languages are to be given a reasonable construction and absurd consequences are to be avoided. (xiv)  Constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject matter are to be constructed together. (xv)   Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized if possible so that effect can be given to all parts of the constitution. (xvi)  The position of an article or clause in the constitution influences its construction.

• Robert Omote is a Benin-based legal practitioner 

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